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ABSTRACT 
An Empirical Analysis of the Factors Affecting 
Appropriateness of Confidence 
in Predicting Financially Distressed Firms 
By 
Siu-yeung CHAN 
Confidence is a judge's estimation of the probability that his/her judgment is correct. 
Appropriateness of confidence is how well the judge's confidence matches the 
normative probability of the actual correctjudgments (Griffin and Tversky, 1992). A 
judge is overconfident if his/her confidence is greater than the corresponding 
normative probability, whereas a judge is underconfident if his/her confidence is less 
than the corresponding normative probability. Inappropriate confidence could lead 
bank loan officers to commit judgment errors with serious consequences of which 
they would not even be aware. 
The current study investigated the prediction performance of bank loan officers as 
measured by the appropriateness of their confidence .when predicting the probabilities 
of firms being in financial distress. It further examined three selected major factors 
that could affect this performance. These factors were the relevance of base-rate 
information, the perceived informativeness of case-specific evidence, and the need for 
cognition (NC) trait ofbank loan officers. 
Data was gathered by individual interviews with 50 bank loan officers from the Bank 
of China Group who were randomly assigned to two treatment groups: the more 
relevant and the less relevant base-rate information groups. The study used a two-
group experimental design with before and after treatment observations by dividing 
the experiment into two consecutive prediction tasks. In Task 1，all subjects were 
asked to assess the financial distress likelihood for each of the ten given corporate 
financial profiles containing nine financial ratios extracted from stepwise logit analysis 
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and executives interviews. In Task 2, the subjects in each treatment group were 
given a different type of additional base-rate information (either more relevant or less 
relevant) and were asked to assess the financial distress probability for each of the 
same ten given profiles. The NC trait of bank loan officers was measured by the 18-
item NC instrument as being developed by Cacioppo, Petty and Kao (1984). The 
perceived informativeness of case-specific evidence was measured by classifying the 
financial distress likelihoods into either low or high informative group according to 
whether the evidence can clearly lead one to judge that the firms would or would not 
be in financial distress. Appropriateness of confidence was measured by comparing a 
bank loan officer's probability judgment of financial distress solicited in Task 2 of the 
experiment with a normative standard based on the Bayesian rule. 
The t-test results indicated that bank loan officers had significant overconfidence 
when predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial distress. The unbalanced 
ANOVA test and the supplementary repeated measures ANOVA test provided 
moderate support that bank loan officers who were given the more relevant base-rate 
information had less overconfidence than those bank loan officers who were given the 
less relevant base-rate information. In addition, by using an unbalanced ANOVA test 
both with and without controlling for the effect of task predictability (i.e., the 
predictability of financial distress for a firm from its financial ratios), it was further 
found that bank loan officers who perceived case-specific evidence as being more 
informative had less overconfidence than those bank loan officers who perceived 
case-specific evidence as being less informative. However, neither the main effect of 
NC, nor the interaction effect between NC and the relevance of base-rate 
information, was found to be statistically significant. The implications of these results 
for theory and practice were discussed. 
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1.1 Background of the Study 
Financial statements contain a wealth of useful information to unveil a firm's financial 
health, the success of its operations, and the insight into its future performance 
(Fraser, 1995). Frequently, users of financial statements need to integrate many 
different pieces of information from the financial statements and other sources into a 
probabilistic judgment. For example, bank loan officers are often required to 
incorporate financial ratios, the base rate of financial distress, and other financial data 
into ajudgment for predicting the future financial soundness of a firm. 
Measuring the performance of these probabilistic judgments is important for 
understanding how well bank loan officers make these judgments and how to 
improve their judgment performance. This measure is also important for a bank loan 
officer to evaluate the quality of each judgment source and to consolidate the 
different sources into a final lending decision effectively. For these reasons, the 
research on probabilistic judgments has attracted much attention by accounting 
researchers (e.g., Libby, 1975a; 1975b; Casey, 1980a; 1983; Zimmer, 1980; 1981; 
Tomassini, Solomon, Romney and Krogstad, 1982; Solomon, Ariyo and Tomassini, 
1985; Casey and Selling, 1986; Keasey and Watson, 1986; Moeckel and Plumlee, 
1989; Dilla, File, Solomon and Tomassini, 1991; Ismail and Simnett, 1991; Pincus, 
1991; Selling, 1993; Mladenovic and Simnett, 1994; Simnett, 1994). One important 
task for the future research in this area specifically highlighted by Wright, Rowe, 
Bolger and Gammack (1994, p.7) is to identify the important factors that contribute 
to the optimal performance of probabilistic judgments. This task is also the focus of 
the current study. 
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One common approach to measuring the performance of probabilistic judgments in 
behavioural science is to evaluate the appropriateness of a judge's confidence in a 
prediction task (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1977; Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and 
Phillips, 1982; Sniezek, 1990; Yates, 1990; Griffin and Tversky, 1992; Bolger and 
Wright, 1993; Wright et al., 1994). Confidence is a judge's estimation of the 
probability that his/her judgment is correct. For instance, the task of a subject is to 
choose A or B as the correct alternative and then he/she is asked to state a probability 
between 50% and 100% that the selected option is in fact correct: 50% indicating no 
confidence and 100% indicating full confidence. Alternatively, confidence can be 
expressed as a value between 0% and 100% which is ajudge's probabilistic prediction 
for a chance event such as a firm in financial distress. Also, confidence can be 
identified by the width of a confidence interval. Appropriateness of confidence is 
how well a judge's confidence matches either the normative probability of correct 
judgments or the proportion of his/her actual correct judgments (Griffin and Tversky, 
1992). The normative probability can be derived from a normative statistical model, 
such as the Bayesian rule, on the basis of a single observation by incorporating base-
rate information, while the actual proportion of a judge's correct judgments needs to 
be determined over a large number of assessments. 
Due to the limited number of observations available in a research experiment and the 
need to understand more about the effect of base-rate information on human's 
probabilistic judgments, and in order to make statistical inference on the basis of 
these findings, an important line of research on probabilistic judgments in psychology 
focuses on the use of the Bayesian rule to investigate the appropriateness of ajudge's 
confidence (Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic and Ross, 1990; Vallone, Griffin, Lin and 
Ross, 1990; Griffin and Tversky, 1992). According to this normative statistical 
model, if a judge's confidence is equal to the corresponding normative probability, 
his/her confidence is considered to be appropriate. A judge is overconfident if his/her 
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confidence is greater than the corresponding normative probability, whereas a judge 
is underconfident if his/her confidence is less than the corresponding normative 
probability. 
For instance, if a bank loan officer estimates the probability of a firm being in 
financial distress is 80%, then his/her confidence of the prediction of financial distress 
can also be taken as 80%. If the normative probability of the firm being in financial 
distress is also 80%, then the bank loan officer is said to have appropriate confidence. 
However, if the normative probability is only 70%, then the bank loan officer is 
considered to be overconfident. Or if the normative probability is 90%, then the bank 
loan officer is seen as underconfident. Therefore, inappropriate confidence includes 
both overconfidence and underconfidence. This approach to measuring the 
performance of probabilistic judgments in terms of degree of underconfidence or 
overconfidence is recognised as a finer measure than the traditional accuracy measure 
which only indicates the proportion of ajudge's correct answers in ajudgment task. 
The importance of studying appropriateness of confidence cannot be underestimated. 
Appropriateness of confidence is conceived as a persistent trait or characteristic for 
particular types of experts performing particular judgment tasks. Inappropriate 
confidence of a substantial nature may carry with it undesirable consequences of 
which many judges themselves are not even aware. One such consequence is to entice 
people to commit judgment errors leading to poor decisions (Fischhoff and 
MacGregor, 1982; Neale and Bazerman, 1985; Heath and Tversky, 1991; Griffin and 
Tversky, 1992; Selling, 1993). 
Previous research focused solely on the adverse effects of overconfidence. However, 
both overconfidence and underconfidence of bank loan officers when predicting the 
probabilities of firms being in financial distress can have adverse effects. Bank loan 
officers with overconfidence when predicting future financial distress of loan 
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applicants may tend to reject loan applications even if submitted by good clients. 
Bank loan officers may be so confident as not to recognise that insufficient or 
inappropriate information might have been used to reject those loan applications. 
Even if bank loan officers are not so confident as to reject the loan applications 
immediately, they may not be willing to concede during the negotiations with their 
potential clients. The consequence is to reduce the chance of making successful 
deals. 
Similarly, bank loan officers with a high overconfidence tendency when predicting 
future financial distress of clients who have already been granted the loans may 
attempt to exercise undue caution by monitoring healthy firms. This over-monitoring 
may cause much inconvenience to the healthy clients, leading to possible 
deterioration in relationships between the two parties. Moreover, this undue level of 
monitoring may cause distress among those bank loan officers with high 
overconfidence because of the frequent confrontations with their clients. 
Underconfidence when predicting firms' future financial distress also may lead to 
undesirable consequences. Bank loan officers with high underconfidence will tend to 
grant loans to applicants who are considered as having low probabilities of financial 
distress, when in fact the actual probabilities are high. The underconfidence tendency 
may entice bank loan officers to grant loans to financially unsound applicants without 
recognising the risk associated with their decisions. As a result, they may fail to take 
subsequent measures to offset this risk. These measures may include the imposition 
of security or guarantee requirements as a condition for granting the loans, or the 
diversification of the loan portfolios of their banks. Significant underconfidence 
when predicting financial distress may also lead to insufficient monitoring of problem 
clients who were granted loans. The consequences of underconfidence may therefore 
have serious adverse effects on the career prospects of bank loan officers, as well as 
the financial stability of their banks and the banking system as a whole. 
4 
Therefore, it can be seen that the measure of appropriateness of confidence goes 
beyond the traditional accuracy measure by providing insights into one's tendency to 
commit errors in future decisions. This tendency is represented by the degree of 
overconfidence or underconfidence. However, most previous studies on 
appropriateness of confidence were undertaken in psychology, and there has been 
relatively little judgment and decision research in accounting focusing on this 
important judgment performance variable, particularly related to the task of bank loan 
officers predicting firms being in financial distress. The wide variety of support for 
the overconfidence phenomenon in the psychology literature therefore presents an 
interesting and important research topic for accounting researchers. Indeed, more 
specific judgment and decision research in accounting has been called for in this area 
(Tomassini et al., 1982; Solomon et al., 1985; Casey and Selling, 1986; Moeckel and 
Plumlee, 1989; Dilla et al., 1991; Ismail and Simnett, 1991; Pincus, 1991; Selling, 
1993; Mladenovic and Simnett, 1994; Simnett, 1994). 
1.2 Research Problems and Objectives 
To avoid the various adverse consequences arising from inappropriate confidence as 
mentioned earlier, it is important to determine empirically whether bank loan officers 
tend to have inappropriate confidence. If they do, then it is also important to identify 
the major factors that could affect the degree of their inappropriate confidence. 
Researchers in psychology also express a similar need for more research to identify 
the major factors contributing to optimal performance in general probabilistic 
judgments (Wright et al., 1994, p.7). This advocacy is attributed to the limited 
theories and empirical evidence available in both psychology and accounting for 
understanding those factors. The current study attempts to fill this research gap by 
providing answers for the following two research problems: 
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(1) Do bank loan officers tend to have appropriate confidence 
when predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial 
distress? 
(2) What are the effects of some selected major factors on the 
appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence when 
predicting the probabilities of firms being in Hnancial 
distress? 
The primary objective of the current study is to provide empirical evidence on the 
degree of bank loan officers' inappropriate confidence as well as the effects of some 
selected influencing factors when predicting the probabilities of firms being in 
financial distress. This objective is justified by the unique task nature of these 
predictions and the serious consequences of inappropriate confidence of bank loan 
officers as discussed earlier. The justification for the current study will be further 
discussed in Section 1.3. 
The secondary objective of the current study is to fiU the said research gap and to 
integrate the research efforts on appropriateness of confidence in both psychology 
and accounting. The integration of these research efforts is carried out by examining 
the robustness of some behavioural decision theories on appropriateness of 
confidence as developed in psychology when applied to accounting studies on 
financial distress predictions. Therefore, the current study attempts to generalise 
some theories on general probabilistic judgments from psychology into an accounting 
context, and the findings from these accounting studies can provide further insights 
back into the original theories. The current study also attempts to extend some 
behavioural decision theories on probabilistic judgments as developed in psychology 
beyond their original scope. Therefore, the current study not only contributes to its 
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immediate research discipline of behavioural decision research in accounting, but also 
adds new knowledge to its parent research discipline of behavioural decision theory 
in psychology. 
1.3 Justification for the Study 
The significance of the current study can be justified by the important role played by 
bank loan officers in the banking industry. According to the statistics provided by the 
Hong Kong Government, there were 168 licensed banks with 1,433 branches in 
Hong Kong by the end of December 1993. The total amount of loans and advances 
to customers was 2,713,505 million Hong Kong dollars, which accounted for 47.5% 
of the total assets of all these banks (Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong, 
1994). Bank loan officers are charged with the responsibility to look after such a 
large portion of asset portfolios in their banks and therefore their judgments on how 
to grant and administer these assets will have significant impacts on the financial 
health of the whole banking industry. 
The recent failure of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in Hong 
Kong challenged the adequacy of protection for depositors in Hong Kong, and 
reopened the debate on the necessity of imposing a deposit insurance scheme in Hong 
Kong. The public's attention has also been directed to the issue of the adequacy and 
effectiveness of controls imposed by the Government for safeguarding the stability of 
the banking system in Hong Kong. This concem has led to the demand for more 
financial disclosures from Hong Kong's licensed banks, especially for information on 
their reserves. All these recent developments support the notion that more attention 
is now being paid by the public to the operation of the banking system in Hong Kong. 
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Although bank loan officers play an important role in the banking industry, there is a 
lack of research focusing on examining the appropriateness of their confidence when 
predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial distress. Only two studies were 
found in the U.S. examining the appropriateness of confidence for financial distress 
predictions by using students as surrogates for bank loan officers (Casey and Selling, 
1986; Selling, 1993). A few other studies (e.g., Tomassini et al., 1982; Solomon et 
al., 1985; Keasey and Watson, 1986; Moeckel and Plumlee, 1989; Dilla, et al., 1991; 
Ismail and Simnett, 1991; Pincus, 1991; Mladenovic and Simnett, 1994; Simnett, 
1994) did use real subjects such as auditors to investigate the appropriateness of their 
audit judgment confidence. Therefore, more research on the performance of bank 
loan officers is justified in view of the significant impact of their inappropriate 
confidence as discussed in Section 1.1. More studies are especially called for to 
determine the major factors affecting the appropriateness of bank loan officers' 
confidence. 
On the practical side, the findings of the current study can be useful to both users and 
providers of financial statement information. Bank loan officers are major users of 
financial statement information. In view of the serious adverse effects of 
inappropriate confidence on bank loan officers, their understanding of the nature of 
inappropriate confidence will help them have more insights into theirjudgments. The 
findings of the current study would allow them to understand some major influencing 
factors to which they should pay particular attention in order to minimise 
inappropriate confidence. This information can also be useful for bank management 
to reallocate its resources more effectively by improving bank loan officers' job 
performance. 
Providers of financial information and information systems designers can also benefit 
from understanding these major factors that could affect the extent of inappropriate 
confidence among bank loan officers. The possibility and the degree of inappropriate 
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confidence could be reduced if more relevant information and more appropriate 
warning signals could be incorporated in the information systems which are designed 
for assisting bank loan officers in making judgments. 
Finally, the findings of the current study would be important for those trainers who 
are charged with responsibility to design and conduct training programmes for bank 
loan officers. To attain more appropriate confidence is a teachable and leamable skiU 
(Russo and Schoemaker, 1992). By understanding the major factors that could affect 
the appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence, a training programme can then 
be designed to cope with their needs and to reduce the possibility and the degree of 
inappropriate confidence in theirjudgments. 
1.4 Research Model and Hypotheses 
1.4.1 Research Model 
Three specific potential factors have been identified from the psychology research 
literature and are considered to have a significant impact on the appropriateness of 
bank loan officers' confidence in financial distress predictions. These three factors are 
the relevance of base-rate information, the need for cognition (NC) trait of bank loan 
officers, and the perceived informativeness of case-specific evidence (i.e., the 
financial ratios of a firm). The first two factors were viewed as the primary 
independent variables of interest, while the last factor was of an exploratory and 
supplementary nature. The effects of all these factors on appropriateness of 
confidence have not been investigated by any previous studies in either psychology or 
accounting. 
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Although task predictability (or a similar concept called task difficulty in Lichtenstein 
et al., 1982) would also have an impact on the appropriateness of bank loan officers' 
confidence (e.g., Casey and Selling, 1986; Selling, 1993), it was not examined in the 
current study because this factor does not relate directly to base-rate information 
which was the focus of the current study. Nonetheless, for comparison purposes, 
findings of additional analyses will be presented in Chapter VI for the effects of the 
primary factors examined in the current study on the appropriateness of bank loan 
officers' confidence after controlling for the effect of task predictability. 
The research model is depicted in Figure 1.1 which shows the hypothesised direct 
effects of the relevance of base-rate information, the NC trait of bank loan officers, 
and the perceived informativeness of case-specific evidence on the appropriateness of 
bank loan officers' confidence (H2, H3 and H5 respectively). It also indicates the 
hypothesised moderating effects of the NC trait of bank loan officers on the 
relationships between the relevance of base-rate information and the appropriateness 
of bank loan officers' confidence (H4). The development of this research model wiU 
be explained in more detail in Chapter IV. 
1.4.2 Research Hypotheses 
Five research hypotheses were developed from the research model. The underlying 
logic of each of these hypotheses will be explained in full in Chapter IV, after the 
relevant literature is reviewed in Chapters II and III. These research hypotheses are 
listed below: 
H1: Bank loan officers tend to have overconfidence when 
predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial distress. 
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Figure 1.1 Research Model 
Need for • 
Cognition _ S ^ 
^ S ^ H 3 
H4 ^ S ^ 
I ^ I 
Relevance of | � ^ Appropriateness • 
Base-Rate 1 H2 ^ ofConfidence 1 
Information I ^^^^1 " 
^ 1 l 5 H1 
Perceived I 
Informativeness of • 
Case-Specific Evidence ^ 
H2: Bank loan officers who are given the more relevant base-rate 
information tend to have less overconfidence when predicting 
the probabilities of firms being in financial distress than do 
those who are given the less relevant base-rate information. 
H3: High NC bank loan officers tend to have less overconfidence 
when predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial 
distress than do low NC bank loan officers. 
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H4: High NC bank loan officers tend to have less overconfidence 
when predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial 
distress than do low NC bank loan officers when they are 
given the less relevant base-rate information. Conversely, high 
NC bank loan officers do not tend to have less overconfidence 
when predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial 
distress than do low NC bank loan officers when they are 
given the more relevant base-rate information. 
H5: Bank loan officers who perceive case-specific evidence as 
being more informative tend to have less overconfidence when 
predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial distress 
than do those who perceive case-specific evidence as being 
less informative. 
The testing of Hypothesis 1 can provide an answer to the first research problem. 
Specifically, the purpose of testing Hypothesis 1 is to investigate whether bank loan 
officers really do have inappropriate confidence when predicting the probabilities of 
firms being in financial distress. The testing of Hypotheses 2 to 5 can provide 
answers to the second research problem, that is, to determine to what extent the three 
specific potential factors identified could significantly affect the appropriateness of 
bank loan officers, confidence. 
1.5 Research Methodology 
In order to enhance the reliability and validity of the findings, the current study 
adopted a causal type of research methodology by conducting a field experiment and 
using real bank loan officers as subjects. Data was gathered by individual interviews 
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with bank loan officers. A total of 50 bank loan officers from the Bank of China 
Group (a banking network consisting of 14 different independent banks) participated 
in the current study. 
As the relevance of base-rate information was the only independent variable or 
treatment that could be manipulated by the investigator in the experiment, the 
subjects were divided into two base-rate information groups. The subjects in the 
experimental group received the more relevant base-rate information, while the 
subjects in the control group received the less relevant base-rate information. 
The experiment instrument was assembled in a booklet and distributed to each 
subject during the interview. Each instrument contained ten different corporate 
financial profiles and the subsequent additional base-rate information to aid the 
subjects in predicting the probability of each firm being in financial distress, along 
with a sub-instrument measuring the NC trait of each bank loan officer. Each 
subject's perceived informativeness of case-specific evidence (see the definition in the 
next section) was also classified into one of the two groups: the more informative and 
the less informative. 
The two-group design adopted by the current study measures observations before 
and after the treatment (i.e., the type of base-rate information) by dividing the 
experiment into two consecutive prediction tasks. In Task 1, each subject in the two 
base-rate information groups was asked to make a "financial distress likelihood" 
estimation for each of the ten given corporate financial profiles without being given 
base-rate information. In Task 2, the subject was given back the "financial distress 
likelihood" estimations he/she had made in Task 1，together with additional base-rate 
information (either the more relevant or the less relevant type). The subject was then 
asked again to make a "financial distress probability" estimation for each of the ten 
given corporate financial profiles. Appropriateness of confidence could then be 
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calculated for each prediction made by a subject by comparing his/her "financial 
distress probability" estimation with the normative probability calculated by using the 
Bayesian rule. 
To test the five research hypotheses, the data collected was then analysed by mainly 
using a t-test and an unbalanced ANOVA test. Supplementary tests by using 
different unbalanced ANOVA models and repeated measures ANOVA, and by 
controlling for the effect of task predictability, were also conducted to provide 
additional insights into the findings. The full details of the measurements of the 
variables, the experimental design, the data collection method and the statistical 
analysis methods used in the current study will be discussed in Chapter V. 
1.6 Definitions of Key Terms 
Definitions of a term adopted by different researchers are often not uniform. 
Therefore, several key terms used in the current study are first defined here to avoid 
potential semantic problems in the remaining parts of the study. 
Confidence is a judge's estimation of the probability that his/her judgment is correct. 
Appropriateness of confidence is how well a judge's confidence matches the 
normative probability of correct judgments (Griffm and Tversky, 1992). This 
normative probability can be derived from a normative statistical model, such as the 
Bayesian rule, on the basis of a single observation. According to this model, if a 
judge's confidence is equal to the corresponding normative probability, his/her 
confidence is considered to be appropriate. A judge is overconfident if his/her 
confidence is greater than the corresponding normative probability, whereas a judge 
is underconfident if his/her confidence is less than the corresponding normative 
probability. 
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A base rate is the relative frequency of the targeted events in the corresponding 
populations (e.g., the percentage of financially distressed firms in the population). 
The base-rate fallacy is an individual's tendency to under-utilise base-rate 
information in favour of case-specific evidence, rather than integrate the two as 
prescribed in the normative probability theories. The relevance of base-rate 
information is defined as the degree to which the base-rate information is relevant to 
a particular judgmental task. The more (less) relevant base-rate information is the 
base-rate information which is more (less) relevant to a particular judgmental task. 
Case-specific evidence is the basic financial ratio information with which a judge can 
predict how likely it is a firm will be in financial distress. The perceived 
informativeness of case-specific evidence is defined as how informative the case-
specific evidence is perceived by a judge as being helpful in predicting the probability 
that a firm will or will not be in financial distress. The more informative case-specific 
evidence enables one to judge that the specific firm is either very likely (say > 70%) 
or very unlikely (say < 30%) to be in financial distress. Conversely, the less 
informative case-specific evidence does not help one judge that the specific firm is 
either very likely or very unlikely (say between 30% and 70%) to be in financial 
distress. 
Financial distress likelihood is an assessment of how likely it is that a firm will be in 
financial distress in the coming year, estimated by a bank loan officer using only the 
financial ratio information contained in the firm's corporate financial profile. 
Financial distress probability is the probability that a firm will be in financial distress 
in the coming year, estimated by a bank loan officer using both the financial ratio 
information contained in the firm's corporate financial profile and additional base-rate 
information. Financial distress likelihood and financial distress probability are 
basically the same type of measurement and the use of different names aims to 
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distinguish the two prediction tasks conducted in sequential order during the 
experiment. 
Need for cognition (NC) refers to a general personality trait that relates to the 
tendency of an individual to engage in and enjoy expending cognitive effort to do a 
task (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty and Kao, 1984; Verplanken, 
Hazenberg and Palenewen, 1992). A high NC individual refers to an individual who 
has a high tendency to engage in and enjoy expending cognitive effort. Conversely, a 
low NC individual refers to an individual who has a low tendency to engage in and 
enjoy expending cognitive effort. 
In addition, the terms judgment, prediction, estimation and assessment will be used 
interchangeably throughout the study, although theoretically there may be slight 
differences among them (Libby, 1981). The operationalisation and measurement of 
the above variables will be further discussed in Section 5.7 of Chapter V. 
1.7 Scope of the Study 
The current study will draw upon theories and frameworks from several disciplines, 
including accounting, finance and banking, psychology, behavioural decision-making, 
and statistical modelling. One major strength of the current study is the integration of 
work which has, until recently, been separated. It should also be noted that the scope 
of the current study is restricted to individual judgments; group and organisational 
judgments are not investigated. 
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1.8 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised around seven chapters (see Figure 1.2). After the overview 
of the current study given in this chapter, Chapter II provides a detailed literature 
review on behavioural decision theory as developed by psychology researchers. This 
research area is considered to be the parent discipline of the current study. Chapter 
III then reviews the literature on behavioural decision research in accounting. This 
latter research area is considered to be the immediate discipline of the current study. 
Chapter IV develops the research model of the current study which depicts the 
hypothesised effects of the relevance of base-rate information, the NC trait of bank 
loan officers, and the perceived informativeness of case-specific evidence on the 
appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence. Five research hypotheses are 
constructed and their underlying logic are discussed. 
Chapter V discusses the methodology adopted for the current study, including the 
experimental design, sample selection, instrument design, data collection, and data 
analysis methods. Chapter VI analyses the data collected from the field experiments 
and the results on testing each of the five research hypotheses are presented. 
Finally, Chapter VII provides the conclusions for the findings of the current study. 
The implications for theories and practice from these findings are discussed. The 
chapter also specifies the potential limitations of the current study and suggests some 
directions of further research in this area. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW ON BEHAVIOURAL DECISION THEORY 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter and the next provide a detailed review of the literature pertinent to the 
current study. This chapter first presents a literature review on Behavioural Decision 
Theory (BDT), which is considered to be the parent research discipline of the current 
study. The next chapter will then review the literature of Behavioural Decision 
Research (BDR) in accounting, which is considered to be the immediate research 
discipline of the current study. Together they provide both background and context 
for the current study. Such an extensive review of the relevant literature is also 
considered important for developing and refining the research model and hypotheses 
of the current study. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised around seven sections. Section 2.2 first 
provides an overall picture of BDT in a chronological perspective since the 1950's. 
Four major areas of findings or ideas in BDT research during this period are then 
highlighted. Section 2.3 discusses the Principle of Bounded Rationality, the first 
major area of findings in BDT research that laid the foundation for the past four 
decades of BDT research. Sections 2.4 to 2.6 then review the literature of the other 
three major areas of findings, with each area of these findings forming its own 
research framework in BDT. These frameworks include the Lens Model, Heuristics-
and-Biases, and Contingent Decision Behaviour frameworks. Section 2.7 attempts to 
provide an integrated framework linking these four major areas. Finally, Section 2.8 
gives a summary of the chapter. Instead of providing a comprehensive review of 
BDT, the focus of this chapter is on reviewing the major findings that have high 
potential for applying to accounting research. 
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2.2 Behavioural Decision Theory: Historical Development 
BDT is concerned with the study of how individuals make decisions^ (Slovic, 
Fischhoff and Lichtenstein, 1977; Hogarth, 1993). The research on studying human 
decision-making has long been an important topic, but much of the research 
conducted today can be traced back to several far-reaching classical publications in 
the 1950's (Hogarth, 1993). 
Edwards (1954) reviewed and brought together the research on decision behaviour 
carried out by economists, statisticians, and philosophers. In defining the domain of 
BDT, he argued that psychology researchers could use normative decision models 
drawn from economics and statistics to investigate whether people's judgments were 
consistent with these models. At about the same time, Simon (1955) introduced the 
Principle of Bounded Rationality by a landmark research paper on investigating the 
limited information processing capacity of human beings. This principle, in effect, 
defines the problems that the researchers of BDT have been trying to solve ever 
since. In addition, Meehl (1954) compared human judgments with statistical 
predictions, and illustrated the limitations of both human judgments and statistical 
predictions in terms of judgment and prediction accuracy (see Section 2.4 on the 
discussion of the limitations of human judgments and statistical predictions). 
Hammond (1955) extended human judgments research by applying the Bmnswik's 
lens model to compare the correlation of a set of cues with a decision criterion and 
with human judgments on the same criterion (also see Section 2.4). 
^Judgment usually refers to the process of estimating outcomes and their consequences, while 
decision-making involves an evaluation of these consequences, which leads to a choice among the 
alternatives. Judgment provides inputs for decisions. These two terms, however, are used 
interchangeably in this thesis (Libby, 1981). In addition, prediction usually refers to the judgment 
for future events. Similarly, the terms prediction and judgment are also used interchangeably in this 
thesis. 
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An increasing amount of empirical work and further development of the above ideas 
was found in the 1960's, due mainly to the use of computers in research. Of 
particular importance is the development of the Bayesian approach to statistical 
decision theory (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961)，highlighting the normative statistical 
standards for measuring the performance of people's probabilistic judgments. 
Substantial progress in the field was found in the 1970's. Tversky and Kahneman 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1971; 1973; 1974; Kahneman and Tversky, 1972) laid the 
foundation of the "Heuristics-and-Biases" approach to developing BDT. They 
described the general human cognition process at an intermediate stage, and 
suggested that people use simplified "rules of thumb", called heuristics, to make 
decisions. The use of these heuristics sometimes works well in people's ordinary Ufe 
and saves much of their cognitive effort. The extensive use of these heuristics, 
however, leads to less economically rational behaviour. 
BDT has been in a period of consolidation and extension since the 1980's. On the 
one hand, researchers sought to extend, challenge, and refine the insights of human 
decision behaviour developed in the preceding decades. On the other hand, the 
previous findings were applied to different fields, such as negotiation (e.g., Neale and 
Bazerman, 1985; 1991). Some topics that did not receive much attention previously 
were explored, such as ambiguity of probabilities (e.g., Einhom and Hogarth, 1985)， 
the order effects of belief updating (e.g., Hogarth and Einhom, 1992)，and contingent 
decision behaviour (e.g., Payne, 1976; 1982; Johnson and Payne, 1985; Bettman, 
Johnson and Payne, 1990; Simon, 1990; Payne, Bettman and Johnson, 1988; 1990a; 
1993). 
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The above overview on the major achievements in BDT research over the past four 
decades can be summarised into four major areas of findings or ideas^. These areas 
include one principle and three research frameworks. The Principle of Bounded 
Rationality (Section 2.3) laid the foundation of the research conducted under the 
three frameworks. These frameworks include the Lens Model (Section 2.4), 
Heuristics-and-Biases (Section 2.5) and Contingent Decision Behaviour (Section 
2.6). Each of these research frameworks represents a distinguished approach to 
examine the various issues in BDT research. Although the current study did not 
make use of all these areas of findings, a review of each of these areas would help the 
author develop and refine the specific research model and hypotheses in the current 
study. These areas of findings are discussed in more detail in the next four sections. 
2.3 Bounded Rationality 
Traditional economic theory postulates a human being as an economic man, who is 
expected to act rationally in making decisions. This man is assumed to have 
knowledge of the relevant aspects of his environment, to have a well-organised and 
stable system of preferences, and to have ability in computation that enables him to 
calculate and select the best among the available alternative courses of action. This 
best course of action allows him to reach the highest attendable preference as 
prescribed by the theory of Subjective Expected Utility. 
^Hogarth (1993) suggested eight major findings or ideas of BDT research in the recent decades. 
These findings or ideas are: (1) that judgment can be modelled; (2) bounded rationality; (3) to 
understand decision-making, understanding the task is more important than understanding the 
people; (4) levels of aspiration/reference points; (5) use of heuristic rules; (6) the importance of 
adding; (7) search for confirmation; and (8) thought as construction. The literature review of BDT 
research in this chapter reclassifies these findings or ideas into one principle and three research 
frameworks. This principle or each of these frameworks represents the research interests for a 
distinguished group of researchers who are in pursuit of similar approaches and methodologies to 
develop BDT. Therefore, this new classification can provide .more insights into the development of 
this field. 
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These assumptions of an economic man under traditional economic theory, however, 
have been challenged by researchers of BDT. First, traditional economic theory does 
not consider the limitations of the human organism. In particular, the short-term 
memory and the computational capacity of human beings are very limited (Simon, 
1955; Miller, 1956). Second, an economic man may not be able to specify the exact 
nature of the outcomes in view of unanticipated consequences. Third, the traditional 
economic model stipulates that all alternatives are evaluated before a choice is made 
(Simon, 1955). Finally, the classical theory of perfect rationality does not recognise 
the multiple goals in decision-making and leaves no room for regrets, second 
thoughts, or weakness of will (Simon, Dantzig, Hogarth, Plott, Raiffa, Schelling, 
Shepsle, Thaler, Tversky and Winter, 1987). 
In view of the handicap in using traditional economic theory to predict the rational 
human decision behaviour, Simon (1955) proposed an insightful Principle of 
Bounded Rationality^ to describe actual human decision behaviour. Simon argued, in 
actual human decision-making, that only a subset of alternatives is available and these 
alternatives are often examined sequentially. The first satisfactory alternative that 
meets the minimum requirement as defined by an individual's aspiration level will be 
selected. This aspiration level may change in the sequence of trials. As the 
individual, in his exploration of alternatives, finds it easy to discover satisfactory 
alternatives, his aspiration level rises; as he finds it difficult to discover satisfactory 
alternatives, his aspiration level falls. 
Adjusting the aspiration level is not the only way to raise the chance of reaching a 
satisfactory solution; adjusting the size of the subset of alternatives can also be used 
3 Bounded Rationality was named by Simon (1990) as a principle, although it was also called a 
concept by other researchers (e.g., Simon, 1955; Hogarth, 1993). To conserve the founder's latest 
ideas, this thesis adopts Simon's latest discussion of this area and names it as a principle (Simon, 
1990，p.6). However, it is not the intention of the author of this thesis to argue whether Bounded 
Rationality is a principle or a concept. For this reason, the terms 'principle' and 'concept' are taken 
to be the same in this thesis. 
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to serve a similar purpose. If satisfactory alternatives can be identified easily, the 
subset of alternatives will be narrowed; if it becomes difficult to find satisfactory 
alternatives, the subset of alternatives will be broadened. The characteristics of 
decision makers will determine which adjustment will be used. The more persistent 
the decision makers, the greater the role played by adjusting the subset of 
alternatives, relative to the role played by adjusting the aspiration level (Simon, 
1955). 
Although the assumptions underlying human decision behaviour in economics and 
psychology are contradictory to each other, both of these two disciplines describe 
human decision behaviour as rational. Their interpretations of rationality, however, 
are different. Simon (1986) used substantive and procedural rationality to account 
for this difference. Economics researchers recognise that a substantively rational 
person always reaches the best decision objectively in terms of the given utility 
function. Psychology researchers consider that a procedurally rational person makes 
a decision in a procedurally reasonable way in the light of the available knowledge 
and means of computation. 
The Principle of Bounded Rationality has had a far-reaching effect on BDT research 
of the past four decades. On the one hand, the different research frameworks in BDT 
fit in very well with this principle. On the other, this principle defines the problems of 
suboptimal human decision behaviour for other researchers in this field to explain. 
The next three sections will discuss these three research frameworks in detail 
according to the chronological order of their development. 
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2.4 Lens Model 
The Lens Model is one of the earliest judgment models used by psychology 
researchers in undertaking cognitive psychology research (Hammond, 1955). The 
Lens Model developed by Brunswik (1952; 1955; 1956) suggests that the outcomes 
of a criterion variable can be explained by a set of interrelated environmental cues. 
Decision makers also use those cues to predict the outcomes of the same criterion 
variable. This framework argues that simple linear models, with the environmental 
cues as independent variables, work remarkably effectively at making predictions 
about the outcomes of the criterion variable as well as the human decision behaviour 
(Meehl, 1954; Goldberg, 1970; Dawes, Faust and Meehl, 1989; Kleinmuntz, 1990). 
In developing the linear models for predicting human decision behaviour, it was 
found that the effectiveness of the models depended largely on identifying the right 
environmental cues and including all those cues in the models. Deviations from 
optimal weighting for those cues in the models did not usually make much practical 
difference for the accuracy of the models (Dawes and Corrigan, 1974). 
In general, the predictions based on the linear models of judges were found to be 
better than the intuitive judgments made by the same judges (Goldberg, 1970; Dawes 
et al., 1989). The rationale is simply that the predictions obtained from the models 
are more consistent than the human judgments. Therefore, the linear models of 
judges set the upper limit of the intuitive judgments of the judges themselves 
(Hogarth, 1975). 
25 
In some situations, however, human judgments may have the potential to outperform 
the linear models of the same judges. When the judges have additional insights in 
which the models had not incorporated, and when judges have picked up a rare cue 
that would never have been anticipated by the models, the judges can outperform the 
models. In these cases, the number of cues used by a judge is greater than the 
number of cues already included in the relevant models. Furthermore, when the 
models are inflexible and become less accurate due to changes in environment, human 
judgments become more realistic (Blattberg and Hoch, 1990; Yaniv and Hogarth, 
1993). 
In view of both human judgments and the linear models of judges having strengths 
and weaknesses, combining human judgments with models, therefore, has a high 
potential to improve judgment performance^. This suggestion was supported by 
several studies such as Blattberg and Hoch (1990) and Yaniv and Hogarth (1993). 
As just mentioned, models are consistent in their predictions, but they are inflexible in 
dealing with unexpected events and environmental changes. Judges are able to use 
information redundant to the environment to get insights into a judgment case. 
However, judges are found to be suboptimal in making judgments, due to their 
limited information processing capacity. Judges are also found to be too adaptive 
and over-reactive to the current events. Therefore, a model-man combination can 
increase adaptivity while placing a regressive, but necessary, upper bound on that 
adaptivity. In this case, model and man are complementary to each other and may 
stabilise the judgment performance. 
4 The terms judgment performance and judgment quality are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
Judgment performance includes, among others, judgment accuracy and appropriateness of 
confidence as discussed in this thesis. 
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2.5 Heuristics and Biases 
2.5.1 Overview 
The Lens Model framework argued that simple linear models, with the environmental 
cues as independent variables, work very well at predicting the outcomes of the 
criterion variable. At the same time, the model predictions can be used to compare 
with the performance of human judgments. In contrast, the Heuristics-and-Biases 
framework was established by Tversky and Kahneman in the 1970's and adopted 
Edwards' (1954) view on using normative models as standards for comparing the 
performance of human judgments. The focus of this framework was on the errors 
and mistakes of people when they made judgments. The suboptimal judgment 
performance among people as stipulated in this framework could be explained by the 
limited capacity in human information processing as proposed in the Principle of 
Bounded Rationality (Simon, 1955). Therefore, the Heuristics-and-Biases 
framework fits in very well with this principle. 
The discussion of the Heuristics-and-Biases framework in this section is divided into 
two parts. The first part deals with the three heuristics that are most commonly used 
among people, including the availability, anchoring and adjustment, and 
representative heuristics (Sections 2.5.2 to 2.5.4). Heuristics are the basic rules of 
thumb used in an intermediate stage of human cognition processes. People's use of 
heuristics, in most cases, works fairly well in daily life, but these heuristics may 
sometimes lead people to commit judgmental biases. 
The second part of this review then focuses on the judgmental biases. These biases 
include the conjunction fallacy, hindsight bias, order effects of belief updating, sunk 
cost effect, framing effect, confirmation bias, accountability, base-rate fallacy, and 
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overconfidence effect (Sections 2.5.5 to 2.5.13). These biases are not only of interest 
from the viewpoint of psychology, but have also been used by many other disciplines 
for explaining human decision behaviour in practice, including decision behaviour in 
accounting. 
2.5.2 Availability Heuristic 
Availability refers to a heuristic adopted by a person when he/she evaluates the 
frequency of classes or the probability of events by how easily the relevant instances 
or associations can be brought to mind (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). The use of 
the availability heuristic may lead to systematic biases when the actual frequency of 
the events is unknown or difficult to retreat from the memory. Two classical 
psychology studies that examined this heuristic are described below. 
In an experiment to illustrate this heuristic, Tversky and Kahneman (1973) asked 152 
subjects to judge whether the given five letters appeared more often in the first or in 
the third position of given words. They found that 105 subjects judged the first 
position to be more likely for a majority of those letters, and 47 judged the third 
position to be more likely for a majority of those letters. In fact, all five letters were 
more frequent in the third position than the first position. It was also found that 
provision of a financial incentive for better performance did not reduce this bias 
among the subjects. The results of this experiment can be explained in terms of the 
availability heuristic. It is certainly easier to think of words that start with a specific 
letter than of words where the same letter is in the third position. 
Similarly, Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman and Combs (1978), in studying 
how people judged the frequency of death from various causes, found that their 
subjects tended to overestimate small frequencies and underestimate larger ones. The 
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subjects were also found to have exaggerated the frequencies of some specific causes 
and underestimated the frequencies of others. They traced these biases to the 
disproportionate exposure, memorability, or imaginability of various events. The 
results of this experiment further support the notion that availability is affected by 
various subtle factors unrelated to actual frequency, such as familiarity, recency, and 
emotional saliency. Therefore reliance on the availability heuristic to make judgments 
may result in systematic biases. 
2.5.3 Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic 
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic is a general judgment process by which 
people use an initially generated or a given response as an anchor and arrive at the 
final answer by adjusting away from this anchor. Such adjustments, however, are 
often found to be inadequate, as the final judgments are too close to the anchor 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). A classical study in psychology which examined this 
heuristic is discussed in detail below to illuminate the ideas behind the above 
definition. 
In an experiment to investigate this heuristic, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) asked 
their subjects to estimate the percentage of African countries in the United Nations. 
Before the estimation exercise, a number between 0 and 100 was determined by 
spinning a wheel of fortune in the subjects' presence. The subjects were instructed to 
indicate first whether the given number was higher or lower than the actual 
percentage, and then to estimate the actual percentage by moving upward or 
downward from that number. 
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In this experiment, the numbers generated by spinning a wheel of fortune were used 
by the subjects as anchors. As suggested by the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, 
the amount of adjustments indicated by the subjects were found to be inadequate. 
The median estimates of the percentage were found to be 25 and 45 for groups that 
received ten and 65 respectively as starting points. It was also found that provision 
of incentives for accuracy did not reduce this anchoring and adjustment effect. 
In another experiment, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) asked two groups of high 
school students to estimate, within five seconds, a numerical expression written on 
the blackboard. One group was presented a numerical expression of "8 x 7 x 6 x 5 x 
4 X 3 X 2 X r , while the other group was presented the same numerical expression in 
the reversed order of “ 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8". Since the time available was not 
sufficient for performing a complete calculation, the subjects could only perform a 
few steps of calculations by using the first few numbers. The results of these 
calculations were then used as anchors and the final estimates could be made by 
extrapolations or adjustments. It was found that the median estimate for the 
ascending sequence was 512, while the median estimate for the descending sequence 
was 2250. The median estimates of these two groups differed substantially and were 
far removed from the correct answer of 40,320. 
Besides explaining how an anchoring and adjustment process can lead to systematic 
biases in human judgments, the result of this experiment also suggests that the 
presentation order could be an important consideration for subjects to select their 
anchors. This heuristic provides the basis on which the theory of the order effects in 
belief updating is developed. This theory will be discussed later in more detail (see 
Section 2.5.7). 
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2.5.4 Representativeness Heuristic 
Representativeness is a heuristic to evaluate the probability of an uncertain event, or a 
sample, by judging the degree to which the event is similar in essential properties to 
its parent population, or the degree to which it reflects the salient features of the 
process by which it is generated (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; 1973). 
This definition can further be elaborated by a classical study in psychology. In an 
experiment to investigate this heuristic, Kahneman and Tversky (1972) found that 
most of their subjects erroneously believed that families of six children in which the 
exact order of birth of a girl (G) and a boy (B) was BGBBBB were less frequent than 
families in which the exact birth order was GBGBBG. In fact, the given two birth 
sequences are about equally likely. However, most people will surely agree that they 
are not equally representative. The sequence of BGBBBB appears less random and 
thus less representative. 
The biases resulted from using the representativeness heuristic are not limited to 
naive subjects. Sophisticated psychologists were also found to use this heuristic in 
viewing even small samples as highly representative of the populations from which 
they were drawn. This belief led them to underestimate the error and unreliability 
inherent in small samples of data (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972). 
The three heuristics most widely used among people have been discussed in this part 
of the review. These heuristics can be used to explain some human judgmental biases 
found in the research on human decision behaviour. These judgmental biases are 
discussed in detail in Sections 2.5.5 to 2.5.13. 
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2.5.5 Conjunction Fallacy 
The simplest and most fundamental law of probability is the extension mle. This rule 
stipulates that if the extension of A includes the extension ofB (i.e., Az)B), then P(A) 
>=P(B). In this case, the set of possibilities associated with a conjunction of A&B is 
included in the set of possibilities associated with A. The same principle can also be 
expressed by the conjunction rule P(A&B) <= P(A). Specifically, a conjunction 
cannot be more probable than any one of its constituents. This rule is valid regardless 
of whether A and B are independent, and is valid for any probability assignment on 
the same sample space. The violation of the conjunction rule in a direct comparison 
of A to A&B is called the conjunction fallacy (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). 
The commitment of the conjunction fallacy can be explained by both the 
representativeness and availability heuristics (see Sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.4 for the 
details of these two heuristics). People's conception of the probability of events is 
based on natural assessments that are routinely carried out as part of the perception 
of events and the comprehension of messages. Such natural assessments include 
computations of similarity and representativeness, attributions of causality, and 
evaluations of the availability of associations and exemplars. When the conjunction is 
perceived as being more representative or can more easily be brought to mind than its 
constituents, people become more likely to commit the conjunction fallacy. 
This fallacy was demonstrated by an experiment conducted by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1973). In investigating how the use of the availability heuristic might 
lead to the conjunction fallacy, two versions of a question on estimating word 
frequency were given to their subjects. In the first version of the question, the 
subjects were asked to estimate how many seven-letter words ended with "ing" in 
four pages of a novel (about 2,000 words). The second version of the question 
requested them to estimate how many words occurred in the form of “ n-" in the 
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same reading material. It is certainly easier to recall words ending in "ing" than 
words with only the letter "n" in the second to last position. Words ending in "ing", 
however, are in the subset of words with the letter "n" in the second to last position. 
The results of this experiment indicated that the subjects were not aware of this 
obvious probabilistic relationship. The median estimates for the frequency of words 
were 13.4 for the first version of the question, and 4.7 for the second version of the 
question. 
The conjunction fallacy can be mitigated by several manipulations to induce 
extensional reasoning. First, people are more likely to pay attention to extensional 
reasoning if they are required to assess the relative frequency of both classes before 
assessing the relative frequency of their intersection. Second, an explicit reference to 
the number of individual cases encourages the subjects to set up a representation of 
the problems in which class inclusion is readily perceived and appreciated. 
In general, the conjunction fallacy is a rather robust phenomenon across different 
contexts including estimation of word frequency, personality judgment, medical 
prognosis, decision under risk, suspicion of criminal acts, and political forecasting. 
Systematic violations of the conjunction rule are observed in the judgments of lay 
people and experts in both between-subjects and within-subject comparisons. It was 
reported that statistically sophisticated subjects conformed more to the conjunction 
rule in a transparent test, although the incidence of violations was fairly high even in 
this group of intelligent and sophisticated respondents (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1983). 
In summary, the extent of the conjunction fallacy is determined by the nature of the 
evidence, the formulation of the question, the transparency of the event structure, the 
appeal of the use of heuristics, and the sophistication of the respondents. Whether 
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people obey the conjunction mle in a particular situation depends on the balance of 
all these factors. 
2.5.6 Hindsight Bias 
The hindsight bias is the tendency for individuals with outcome knowledge 
(hindsight) to claim that they would have estimated a probability of occurrence for a 
reported outcome that is higher than they would have estimated without the outcome 
information (Fischhoff, 1975; Slovic and Fischhoff, 1977; Connolly and Bukszar, 
1990; Hawkins and Hastie, 1990; Creyer and Ross, 1993). The hindsight bias, 
therefore, is a projection of new knowledge into the past accompanied by a denial 
that the outcome information has influenced the judgment. One major consequence 
of the hindsight bias is overconfidence because the accuracy of prior expectation is 
exaggerated. 
The hindsight bias is believed to result from general memory processes. Some 
researchers (e.g., Fischhoff, 1977; Fischhoff and Beyth, 1975) suggested that the 
answer to a question or the outcome of an event is immediately integrated into one's 
pre-existing knowledge. Subsequently, information about one's prior state of 
knowledge is lost. Therefore, the use of outcome knowledge to estimate the 
probabilities of past events is an unconscious process. 
The hindsight bias can be reduced by increasing cognitive effort (Arkes, Faust, 
Guilmette and Hart, 1988; Creyer and Ross, 1993). For instance, Creyer and Ross 
found that the hindsight bias, under certain conditions, could be mitigated when 
subjects worked hard. The specific conditions identified were that the attractiveness 






I was the most important one, or the importance of an attribute with missing 
information was ambiguous. 
::I 
Generating reasons for outcomes in hindsight and reviewing one's foresight 
perspective could also be used as ways to reduce this bias (Davies, 1987; Arkes et 
al., 1988; Creyer and Ross, 1993). However, the results of the previous studies that 
I examined the effectiveness of focusing on foresight manipulations for reducing the 
•！ -
I hindsight bias were mixed. For instance, contrary to the findings of other studies 
;'j 
(Davies, 1987; Arkes et al., 1988; Creyer and Ross, 1993)，Fischhoff (1977) found 
that simply warning subjects about the phenomenon or asking them to work harder to 
J 
j • 
accurately recall their foresight state of knowledge did not reduce the hindsight bias. 
j 
2.5.7 Order Effects in Belief Updating 
Belief updating has long been an interesting topic for psychology researchers. This 
topic is particularly relevant to probabilistic inference (Edwards, 1968; Slovic and 
Lichtenstein, 1971; Hogarth, 1975; Schum, 1980; Fischhoff and Beyth-Marom, 
1983). Individual studies have long been existed, but a meta descriptive theory on 
the order effects in belief updating was developed by Hogarth and Einhom (1992) 
I 




j Suppose that there are two pieces of evidence, say A and B. Some subjects express 
j 
I an opinion after seeing the information in the order A-B (i.e., first evidence A, then 
I 
I evidence B); others receive the information in the order B-A. An order effect occurs 
when opinions after A-B differ from those after B-A, 
The theory proposed by Hogarth and Einhom assumes that people handle belief-
updating tasks by a general, sequential anchoring-and-adjustment process in which 
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the current opinion serves as an anchor and is adjusted by the impact of succeeding 
pieces of evidence. These adjustments depend on the relative positions between the 
impact of succeeding pieces of evidence and the reference points. The reference 
points adopted, in turn, are determined by the tasks. 
Based on these assumptions as described above, Hogarth and Einhom proposed a 
basic belief-adjustment model as: 
Sk = Sk- i+wk[s(xk)-R] , (2.1) 
where: 
Sk = the degree of belief in some hypothesis, impression or attitude after evaluating 
k'pieces of evidence (0 <= Sj^  <= 1). 
Sk-l = an anchor or prior opinion. The initial belief is denoted So. 
s(xk) =the subjective evaluation of the kth piece of evidence. 
R = the reference point or background against which the impact of the kth piece 
of evidence is evaluated, 
wk = the adjustment weight for the kth piece of evidence (0 <= wj^  <= 1). 
This theory suggests that the order effect of revising belief depends largely on task 
characteristics. The key task variables identified are evidence encoding, the length of 
an evidence series, response mode (Step-by-Step or End-of-Sequence), and the 
complexity of evidence items. The effects of these task variables on the basic belief 
adjustment model as depicted in Equation (2.1) are discussed below under three 
subprocesses: evidence encoding, response mode, and adjustment weighting. 
2.5.7.1 Evidence Encoding 
The means by which people encode evidence depends on whether the tasks are 
evaluation or estimation. In evaluation tasks, people encode evidence as positive or 
36 
negative relative to the hypothesis under consideration, such that -1 <= s(Xk) <= +1 
and R 二 0. By substituting R = 0 into Equation (2.1)，the belief-adjustment model for 
evaluation tasks takes the form: 
Sk = Sk-l + wkS(xk). (2.2) 
I In contrast, estimation tasks involve assessing some kind of "moving average" (e.g. 
:;:l 
' impression of "likableness") that reflects the position of each new piece of evidence 
I relative to the current opinion. In other words, in estimation tasks people are 
sensitive to the difference between the location of the current anchor (i.e. Sk_i) and 
the level of opinion suggested by the evidence. As an estimate or measure of 
opinion, evidence is seen as unipolar such that 0 <= s(Xk) <= 1 and R = Sk_i. By 
substituting R = Sk_i into Equation (2.1)，the belief-adjustment model for estimation 
； tasks takes the form: 
[ Sk = ( l-wk)Sk_l+WkS(xk). (2.3) i j I 
•1 
•1 i i 
• 
2.5.7.2 Response Mode 
！ 
I There are two response modes (or processes): Step-by-Step (SbS) and End-of-
:) 
Sequence (EoS). Specifically, when using a SbS process, a person is assumed to 
adjust his or her opinion incrementally by each piece of evidence processed. This 
assumption exactly matches the assumption adopted in Equation (2.1). With an EoS 
process, however, the initial anchor is assumed to be adjusted by the aggregate 
impact of the succeeding set of evidence. The belief-adjustment model for an EoS 
process takes the form: 
Sk = So + wk[s(xi,...,Xk)-R], (2.4) 
i 
j where s(xj, ..., %) is a range of some functions, possibly weighted averages, of the 
individual subjective evaluations (or scale values) of evidence items that follow the 
anchor. 
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Hogarth and Einhom suggested that people try to match a cognitive strategy with a 
response mode but shift the strategy if the response mode is too demanding on their 
cognitive effort. Therefore, they suggested that when the response mode is SbS, a 
SbS process is always used. When the response mode is EoS, however, the process 
!
used depends on the length of an evidence series and the complexity of evidence 
items. An EoS process is expected more likely to be used for a short series of 
cognitively simple evidence items, and a SbS process is more likely adopted for 
cognitively complex evidence items or a longer evidence series in order to cope with 
the information-processing demands of the task. 
j 





j This last subprocess is related to the effects of the value of an anchor on revising 
•i 
belief upon the impact of new evidence items. Hogarth and Einhom proposed a 
"contrast effect" that when a piece of negative evidence is received, belief will be 
affected more by a large anchor than by a small one. Similarly, when a piece of •j . 
:j positive evidence is received, belief will be affected more by a small anchor than by a 
large one. 
The rationale behind this effect is that when the current belief (an anchor) is already 
low, a piece of negative evidence cannot reduce the anchor greatly in terms of 
absolute adjustments. When the current belief is strong, however, the same negative 
evidence has higher potential to adjust the anchor downward in absolute terms. A 
'i • 
I similar argument is applied to a situation where a piece of positive evidence is 
I 
received. Thus, the adjustment weight for the kth evidence item can be stated as: 
wk = ocSk-i,whens(xk)<=R; (2.5a) 
wk = P (1 - Sk-i), when s(xk) > R； (2.5b) 
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where a and p are constants. 
By substituting Equations (2.5a) and (2.5b) into Equation (2.1)，the belief-adjustment 
models for a SbS process can be written as: 
I Sk = Sk-1 + a Sk-1 [s(xk) - R] for s(xk) <= R； (2.6a) 
I Sk = Sk_i + p (1 - Sk_i) [s(xk) - R] for s(xk) > R. (2.6b) 
: | 
4' 
2.5.7.4 Order Effects 
In summary, the order effects in belief updating for SbS and EoS processes depend 
on evidence coding, response mode, the length of an evidence series and the 
complexity of evidence items. Under estimation tasks (R = S k - i ) � a SbS process 
I • • 
, always predicts recency (for a, P not equal to 0). Under evaluation tasks (R = 0), a 
I SbS process predicts no order effects for consistent evidence but always predicts 
} 
recency in the sequential evaluation of mixed evidence except if a or p is 0. 
� For an EoS process, a force towards primacy holds no matter whether the evidence is 
I all positive, all negative, or mixed. Hogarth and Einhom also discussed in detail the 
effect of task characteristics, such as the complexity of evidence items and the length 
of an evidence series. While some discussion has been provided in this section, 
further details of these topics, though interesting, are beyond the scope of this 
literature review and are therefore not pursued. 
Hogarth and Einhom also conducted five experiments to verify the accuracy of their 
'i 
I proposed belief-adjustment models. The results of Experiments 1 to 4 supported the 
models' predictions of no order effects for consistent evidence and recency effects for 
mixed evidence. These results also held across both the SbS and the EoS response 
modes. Moreover, the contrast effect was supported. In Experiment 5，they 
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attempted to rule out the potential alternative explanations for the results in 
Experiments 1 and 2 by testing the order effects for consistent evidence in both 
evaluation and estimation tasks. As predicted, consistent evidence led to recency in 
estimation tasks but no order effect was found in evaluation tasks. 
I r., 
I 2.5.8 Framing Effect 
1 
1The framing effect describes the phenomenon of people's choices being affected by 
changes in how a situation is described or framed. This effect violates the principle 
of description invariance which states that the way a situation is described should not 
affect one's decision. The framing effect is defined in two different senses: the strict 
definition of the framing effect refers to pairs of problems that involve a redescription 
i of an exactly identical situation; the loose definition refers to pairs of problems that 
I 
are not exactly the same, but are equivalent from the perspective of economic theory. 
These two definitions of the framing effect were illustrated in the two experiments 
I 
conducted by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and are discussed below. '( i i :i .j 
j 
1 In investigating the strict definition of the framing effect, Tversky and Kahneman 
(1981) gave their subjects a case that the U.S. was preparing for an outbreak of an 
unusual Asian disease which was expected to kill 600 people. Subjects were asked to 
make a choice between two rescue programmes. The consequences of these two 
programmes, however, were described under two different frames. In the first 
framing, the consequences were that if Programme A was adopted, 200 people would 
be saved. If Programme B was adopted, there was a one-third probability that 600 
people would be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people would be saved. 
j 
j In the second framing, the consequences were that if Programme A was adopted, 400 
• 
people would die. If Programme B was adopted, there was a one-third probability 
that nobody would die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people would die. 
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The two framings were actually the redescriptions of an identical situation. The only 
difference between the two framings was that the consequences of the first framing 
were described as how many people would be saved, whereas the consequences of 
the second framing were described as how many people would die. The results, 
� however, indicated that the majority of people chose Programme A in the first 
f:i 
I framing, and Programme B in the second framing. This experiment clearly 
j _• 
� demonstrates that people's choices vary as a result of the way a situation is described, 
or framed. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) also examined the loose definition of the framing 
effect. They asked their subjects to make a choice between two situations in a 
problem. In the first situation, subjects were supposed to have paid $10 for a ticket 
‘ to see a play. When the subjects got to the theatre, they discovered that they had lost 
their ticket. The seat was not marked and the ticket could not be recovered. 
I 
Subjects were asked whether they would buy a new ticket in this situation. In the 
second situation, subjects were assumed to go to see a play that cost $10 per ticket. 
When the subjects got to the theatre, they discovered that they had lost a $10 bill. 
j The subjects were asked whether they would then buy a ticket in this situation. 
• 
I 
The results revealed that more subjects were willing to buy a ticket in the second 
situation than in the first situation. Unlike the problem that was used to investigate 
the strict definition of the framing effect, these two situations were not redescriptions 
of exactly the same situation. In one situation the subjects had lost a ticket that cost 
$10 and in the other situation they had actually lost $10. However, the two 
I situations were equivalent in that, in both cases, the subjects' total wealth had 
'•i 
,] decreased by $10. Thus, from a purely monetary perspective, the difference in the 
two situations was irrelevant. 
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Two possible reasons have been proposed to account for why people treat equivalent 
situations differently. The first explanation is that the framing effect is similar to 
perceptual illusions. That is, although the choice that a person makes is affected by 
framing, the option that the person would actually experience as more desirable is 
not. The second explanation is that framing affects decisions because it affects the 
Ioption that the person would actually experience as being more desirable (Frisch, 1993). 
Frisch supported the notion that most people who showed the framing effect did not 
agree the equivalence of the two versions even when they directly compared the two 
versions. This finding supports the second explanation of a genuine belief among 
people that changing the "frame" significantly alters the situation; it is therefore 
reasonable for them to make different choices in different frames. 
2.5.9 Sunk Cost Effect 
‘ 
In basic management accounting, finance or economics courses, students are 
reminded that economic decisions should only be influenced by incremental or 
opportunity costs. Costs expensed in the past cannot be rectified and should 
therefore be irrelevant to these decisions. However, this expected rational economic 
behaviour is often violated, which leads to a robust judgment bias called the sunk 
cost effect. The sunk cost effect is a tendency of irrational economic behaviour to 
continue an endeavour once an investment in money, effort, or time has been made 
(Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Simonson and Staw, 1992). 
In an experiment to investigate this bias, Arkes and Blumer (1985) asked their 
subjects to consider a situation where they had spent $100 on a ticket for a weekend 
ski trip to Michigan. Several weeks later the subjects bought a $50 ticket for another 
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weekend ski trip to Wisconsin, and they were assumed to enjoy the Wisconsin ski trip 
more than the Michigan one. As the subjects were putting their just-purchased 
Wisconsin ski trip ticket in their wallet, they noticed that the Michigan ski trip and 
the Wisconsin ski trip were for the same weekend. It was too late to sell either 
ticket, and they could not retum either one. The subjects had to use one ticket and 
not the other. They were then asked on which ski trip they would go�Contrary to an 
axiom of traditional economic theory that decisions should be based on the costs and 
benefits that are expected to arise at the choice of each option, it was found that 54% 
of the subjects in Arkes and Blumer's experiment chose the Michigan trip. Obviously 
the larger sunk cost of the Michigan trip had influenced many subjects' choices. 
The sunk cost effect can be explained as the psychological justification for the desire 
not to waste prior money. The admission that one has wasted money would seem to 
be an aversive event. Staw (1976) showed that when business students felt 
1 
I responsible for a financially unsuccessful prior decision, they continued to invest 
I -
more money into that option than if their prior decision was successful. In this 
example, negative consequences fostered further commitment to the chosen course of 
action. 
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) can provide a theoretical framework 
to explain the effect of sunk cost (Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Garland and Newport, 
1991). Under this theory, an investor considers an equal amount of gain or loss to 
have an equal amount of perceived value, when an initial investment is being 
considered. After a substantial unsuccessful investment has been made, the investor 
is at a point where further losses do not result in large decreases in the perceived 
value; however, comparable gains do result in large increases in the perceived value. 
Therefore, the investor at this point will risk only small perceived losses to obtain 
possible large perceived gains. This point represents a situation where the investor 
has paid a sunk cost. Compared to the position where a person considers the initial 
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investment, the person at this point is more likely to make a risky investment, that is, 
to continue adding funds to the sunk cost. 
Simonson and Staw (1992) suggested that three procedures could be used to mitigate 
the sunk cost effect. The first procedure is to make negative outcomes less 
� 
threatening. The second procedure is to set minimum target levels that, if not 
I achieved, would lead to a change in policy. The third procedure is to evaluate 
decision makers on the basis of their decision process rather than the outcome. 
Simonson and Staw also found that there was only moderate support for the 
contention that personal involvement increased the sunk cost effect. Moreover, the 
sunk cost effect was not lessened by having taken prior courses in economics in 
which the sunk cost effect was specifically discussed. 
The final issue relating to the sunk cost effect is the question of whether absolute or 
relative sunk costs are more important in the decision to continue investing in a 
course of action. Garland and Newport (1991) conducted a series of experiments to 
investigate this issue. They found that the sunk cost effect was a function of the 
proportion of allotted resources, such as a budget, expended on a project rather than 
the absolute expenditures. 
2.5.10 Confirmation Bias 
The confirmation bias refers to the tendency to seek information that is relevant only 
to confirm the hypothesis under consideration (Wason, 1960; Skov and Sherman, 
1986; Higgins and Bargh, 1987; Klayman and Ha, 1989). An example to illustrate 
this bias was cited by Wason (1960), which examined the hypothesis testing 
strategies adopted by people in a rule discovery experiment. Subjects were told that 
the three numbers 2, 4，6 conformed to a simple relational rule that the experimenter 
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had in mind, and they were asked to discover the rule by generating sequences of 
three numbers. Then the experimenter would tell them each time whether the rule 
held for their sequence. The subjects were also asked to state the rule only when 
they were highly confident that they had discovered it. 
The results indicated that the subjects did not attempt to eliminate their hypotheses in 
this task. In addition, provision of financial incentive was found only to have the 
effect of significantly increasing the number of series generated before making an 
announcement of their guess. It had no effect on the tendency to discover the correct 
rules. Therefore, the failure to eliminate hypotheses was not due to a lack of 
motivation. These results also suggested that even intelligent adults did not readily 
adopt a scientific attitude to a novel problem. They adhered to their own 
explanations with remarkable tenacity when they could produce confirming evidence 
for them. 
In another experiment, Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) investigated the 
confirmation bias in deductive reasoning by giving their subjects four cards with "E", 
"K", "4"�and "7" facing up. Subjects were told that each of the cards had a letter on 
the one side and a number on the other. They were then provided with the rule that if 
a card had a vowel on the one side, then it had an even number on the other. 
Subjects were asked to name only those cards needed to be turned over to determine 
whether the rule was true or false. Wason and Johnson-Laird found that the vast 
majority of the subjects said either "E and 4”，or "only E". Both answers, however, 
are wrong; the correct answer is "E and 7". This given rule is actually a simple 
conditional logic statement: if p then q. The subjects in this experiment were, 
however, found to commit a similar confirmation bias, without due regard to the 
correct course of action to select not-q. 
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The usual explanation for the confirmation bias is that people prefer conceptually 
positive information: that is for thinking about the presence rather than the absence of 
properties (Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Higgins and Bargh, 1987). Another explanation 
is that in many real situations, such as choosing an employee, a job, a spouse, or a 
car, people must similarly live with their mistakes. Thus, they may be naturally 
inclined to focus more on verifying their favourable hypotheses in mind in those 
situations (Klayman and Ha, 1987). 
The confirmation bias can also be explained as a result of using the Heuristics-and-
Biases approach in information gathering. In particular, people may use the 
representativeness heuristic to start with a hypothesis that contains one or two of the 
most salient features of the known target case in inductive reasoning tasks. They 
may then add, delete, and replace such features as the feedback suggests (Klayman 
and Ha, 1989). The confirmation bias may be caused by the hindsight bias in which 
people falsely believe they knew the outcome would occur, and thus they convert 
negative feedback to positive feedback (Skov and Sherman, 1986). 
Moreover, the confirmation bias can be explained by the loss aversion effect as 
proposed in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). People seek 
confirmation instead of disconfirmation because they value the possible psychological 
loss such as embarrassment, disappointment or regret (Davidsson and Wahlund, 
1992). Davidsson and Wahlund further contended that the failure of people to search 
for and use negative information in the previous studies that examined this bias was 
due to their tasks not being concrete enough for their subjects to recognise the 
correct solutions. Also, inadequate activation of the decision rule or memory cueing 
induced by the task structure was proposed as another reason to account for this bias. 
For these reasons, they tested three additional tasks along with the four-cards task 
adopted from the experiment conducted by Wason and Johnson-Laird. These three 
tasks were considered as being more concrete and related more to real-life cases. 
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Davidsson and Wahlund found that both of these factors significantly affected the 
degree of the confirmation bias. Therefore, these findings have lent additional 
comfort to the effects of the confirmation bias on real-life situations. 
2.5.11 Accountability 
Accountability refers to the need to justify one's views and preferences to others 
(Tetlock，1983a, Simonson and Nye, 1992). Accountability may have a substantial 
impact on decision makers. Accountable decision makers are more likely than 
unaccountable ones to use cognitively complex rules in choosing among response 
options (Tetlock, 1983a), to be more aware of the determinants of their judgments 
(Hagafors and Brehmer, 1983), to display greater consistency and stability of their 
judgments (Hagafors and Brehmer, 1983), to process persuasive messages in detail 
j rather than to rely on their general evaluation of the message's source (Chaiken, 
1980)，and to be more discriminating and responsive to evidence in evaluating others 
(Tetlock, 1983a; 1985a). 
Previous studies on the effects of accountability supported the notion that 
accountability leads decision makers to devote more effort to their judgments, which 
can be used to reduce the judgmental biases originating from a situation where they 
have not expended much cognitive effort on the judgmental tasks. It was found that 
accountability reduced the primacy effects in impression formation by increasing 
willingness to pay attention to all the evidence and to modify initial impressions in 
response to contradictory evidence (Tetlock, 1983b). 
Accountability also reduced people's tendency to over-emphasise particular attributes 
in an essay-attribution context by increasing sensitivity to the situational pressures on 
others (Tetlock, 1985b). Furthermore, accountability reduced the overconfidence 
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effect in a personality-prediction context by increasing awareness of complexities in 
the behaviour of others (Tetlock and Kim, 1987). Finally, accountability reduced the 
sunk cost effect in a personal finance context by directing the attention of subjects to 
the irrelevance of sunk costs (Simonson and Nye, 1992). 
Accountability, however, is recognised as being more effective in preventing than in 
reversing judgmental biases. Once subjects have assimilated or integrated 
information into their impressions of a person or event, they have difficulty in 
reinterpreting that information. It was argued that accountability had a marked 
impact on the initial impression-formation process, but that it had little impact after 
the initial processing had occurred (Tetlock and Kim, 1987). 
In addition, accountability did not reduce a variety of decision errors for which the 
correct response was not known and unlikely to be identified with more thorough 
information processing. Simonson and Nye (1992) found that accountability did not 
promote consistent preferences across different preference elicitation procedures, did 
not direct the subjects' attention to the small sample effect and the framing effect, and 
did not mitigate the base-rate fallacy and the conjunction fallacy. 
Accountability can have negative effects on human decision behaviour and thus leads 
to judgmental biases. As mentioned earlier, accountability induces complex thinking 
among decision makers and motivates them to use a wide range of information in 
making judgments. As a result, accountability will dilute the impact of the truly 
diagnostic variables by encouraging decision makers to integrate information from 
multiple sources before making ajudgment. This is called the dilution effect (Tetlock 
and Boettger, 1989). Accountability also has an adverse effect on commitment of 
resources to a failing policy. Fox and Staw (1979) suggested that decision makers 
were more likely to escalate their commitment when they were most vulnerable (such 
as low job security) and were accountable to a sceptical board of directors. 
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2.5.12 Base-Rate Fallacy 
! The question of how people make probabilistic judgments for uncertain events has 
been a major focus in BDT (Payne, Bettman and Johnson, 1992). Because of the 
unobservable nature of cognitive processes, the study of these probabilistic judgments -
makes heavy use of normative standards to provide a benchmark against which 
performance of decision makers is evaluated. One such useful normative standard to 
analyse human judgment performance in BDT literature is the Bayesian rule. Under 
this normative principle of statistical prediction, accurate probabilistic judgments 
require judges to consider two sources of information, including "base-rate 
information" and "case-specific evidence". 
( 
A base rate is the relative frequency of those targeted events in the corresponding 
population (e.g., the percentage of financially distressed firms in the population). 
Case-specific evidence is the information about a specific prediction case at hand 
(e.g., the corporate financial profile of a targeted firm). The Bayesian rule prescribes 
that both sources of information should be given equal weight when judges make 
probabilistic judgments. A consistent finding in psychology literature, however, 
supports the notion that people tend to give undue weight to case-specific evidence 
and under-utilise base-rate information (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Bar-Hillel, 
1979; 1980a; 1980b; 1982; 1983; Tversky and Kahneman, 1982a; 1982b; Bar-Hillel, 
1984; 1990). This phenomenon is called "the base-rate fallacy". 
The base-rate fallacy is people's tendency to under-utilise base-rate information in 
favour of case-specific evidence, rather than integrate the two as prescribed in the 
normative probability theories (Bar-Hillel, 1980a). The main reason for this tendency 
is that people are simply not very good at dealing with probabilistic data due to their 
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lack of a good mental framework for working with this data (Nisbett, Crandall and 
Reed, 1976; Maital and Paolucci, 1990). Instead of using sophisticated information 
processing strategies, people were found to rely on rather simple intuitive heuristics 
in making probabilistic judgments. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1973) pioneered to empirically investigate this fallacy and 
conducted experiments to examine how people use the representativeness heuristic 
(see Section 2.5.4 for the details of this heuristic) to integrate information from 
different sources in making probabilistic judgments. In one of these experiments, 
they assigned a group of subjects randomly to two groups: the low-engineer and the 
high-engineer groups. Subjects in the low- (high-) engineer group were told that five 
j thumbnail descriptions were chosen at random from 100 descriptions of 30 (70) 
engineers and 70 (30) lawyers. Each subject was given the same five descriptions. 
For example, one of the descriptions was given as follows (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1973，p. 54): 
"Jack is a 45-year-old man. He is married and has four children. He is 
generally conservative, careful, and ambitious. He shows no interest 
in political and social issues and spends most of his free time on his 
many hobbies which include home carpentry, sailing, and 
mathematical puzzles." 
After being given each description, subjects were asked to estimate the probability 
that the description was one of the 30 engineers (lawyers) in the sample of 100 
descriptions. The results showed that explicit manipulation of base-rate information 
had a minimal effect on the subjects' probability estimation. Subjects relied mainly on 
the thumbnail descriptions (i.e., case-specific evidence) which was vivid, salient, 
concrete and thus more representative (Nisbett et al., 1976). In contrast, the given 
base-rate information, by its very nature, was perceived as remote, pallid, abstract 
and not affecting representativeness. Base-rate information is thus generally under-
utilised in probabilistic judgments in practice. 
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2.5.12.1 Reduction of the Base-Rate Fallacy 
The extent of the base-rate fallacy can be reduced in many ways. One such way is 
I based on the concept underlying the anchoring and adjustment heuristic (Tversky and 
> Kahneman, 1974). This heuristic suggests that when two or more items of 
I information are integrated in arriving at a probabilistic judgment, the more relevant 
1 
j information item will serve as an anchor and will dominate the judgment. The less 
relevant information item either will be ignored or will produce a minor adjustment to 
the initial judgment (the anchor). The base-rate fallacy can therefore be reduced by 
increasing the relevance of base-rate information, or by decreasing the relevance of 





2.5.12.1.1 The Relevance of Base-Rate Information 
� 
？ Two major approaches to increasing the relevance of base-rate information are 
causality and specificity. The causality approach is to provide a judge with 
information perceived to have a causal relation to the criterion. In making 
predictions, people rely on information perceived to have a causal relation with the 
criterion while disregarding valid but non-causal information. This conjecture was 
supported in several psychology studies that examined the base-rate fallacy (Ajzen, 
1977; Tversky and Kahneman, 1982a; 1982b; Bar-Hillel, 1980a; 1981; 1983). 
‘V 
I For example, in one of the experiments conducted by Ajzen (1977), a group of 
i 
subjects were first given the information about the base rate of success on the fmal 
examinations of a course. They were then asked to estimate how likely a given 
student had passed the examination. Half of the subjects were given causal base-rate 
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information: two years ago, about 75% of the students passed (failed) a fmal 
examination in the same course. The percentage of the students passed or failed the 
examination was perceived to have a causal relation with the difficulty of the 
examination. The rest of subjects were given non-causal base-rate information: an 
educational psychologist intentionally selected about 75% students who had passed 
(failed) the examination for research purpose. The results indicated a significant 
interaction between the base rate of success (25% versus 75%) and the causality type 
of the base-rate information provided (causal versus non-causal). Specifically, 
although the causal base rate had a stronger effect than the non-causal base rate, 
prediction of success was, in each case, significantly higher for the 75% base rate 
than it was for the 25% base rate. 
The second approach to increasing the relevance of base-rate information is 
specificity, that is to relate the base-rate information more specifically to the 
outcomes (Carroll and Siegler, 1977; Bar-Hillel, 1980a; 1983). Specificity is 
achieved by providing information on a smaller sample (e.g., the financial distress rate 
for a particular industry) rather than the population (e.g., the financial distress rate for 
all types of firms), of which the targeted case is a member. It was found that the 
more specific information tends to dominate the less specific one. 
For example, Bar-Hillel (1983) suggested that, for the purpose of predicting the Ufe 
expectancy of a newly bom German baby, the life expectancy in Germany was 
perceived to be more relevant than the worldwide life expectancy. Another example 
was given by Bar-Hillel (1980a) in one of her experiments on the modified cab 
problem (p. 226): 
•Two cab companies operate in a given city, the Blue and the Green 
(according to the color of cab they run). Eighty-five percent of the 
cabs in the city are Blue, and the remaining 15% are Green. A cab 
was involved in a hit-and-run accident at night. The police 
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investigation discovered that in the neighborhood in which the 
accident occurred, which is nearer to the Green Cab company 
headquarters than to the Blue Cab company, 80% of all taxis are 
Green, and 20% are Blue." 
Subjects were asked to think about the chances that the errant cab was green. The 
results revealed that major of the subjects gave an estimate of 80%, which was more 
consistent with the more specific base rate than the general base rate. 
.-.i 
-� 
2.5.12.1.2 The Relevance of Case-Specific Evidence 
i 
As mentioned earlier, an increase in the relevance of base-rate information is not the 
1 
only way to reduce the extent of the base-rate fallacy. This fallacy can also be 
mitigated by reducing the relevance of case-specific evidence. There are several 
situations where the relevance of case-specific evidence can be reduced. For 
example, when no or little case-specific evidence is provided, base-rate information is 
more likely to be used (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Lyon and Slovic, 1976; Bar-
Hillel, 1980a; Tversky and Kahneman, 1982a). Likewise, when outcome categories 
are similar (e.g., the characteristics of financially distressed and financially non-
distressed firms are similar), or when inconsistent or uninformative case-specific 
evidence (e.g., the corporate financial profile does not tell much about whether a firm 
‘ will be in financial distress or not) is provided, base-rate information is more likely to 
be used (Ginossar and Trope, 1980). Finally, if subjects observe base rates being 
generated from a random sampling process, or if they have everyday experience with 
the problem, they are more likely to incorporate base-rate information in their 
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， 2.5.12.2 Effects of Need for Cognition on the Base-Rate Fallacy 
m 
^ i 
The characteristics of judges have been identified as an important determinant of 
human judgment performance. Psychology researchers have found that there was a 
r 
substantial variation in human judgment behaviour across different judges. 
Therefore, they advocated that future research should investigate the reasons for 
these differences (Juslin, 1994). One possible reason to account for this variation in 
human judgment behaviour across different judges can be attributed to a different 
I 
degree of cognitive effort expended by the judges on the task. Cognitive effort has 
； been recognised to have significant effects on the tendency to commit judgmental 
biases. Therefore, the extent of the base-rate fallacy committed by people in 
probabilistic judgments is expected to vary as a result of their cognitive effort 
j ！ expended. 
1^ 
i The relationships of cognitive effort and the tendency to commit judgmental biases 
j were also demonstrated in some research on accountability. As mentioned previously 
. j 
I in Section 2.5.11, accountability induces people to devote more effort to their 
I 
judgments. It was found that accountability reduced the primacy effects in 
impression formation by increasing people's willingness to pay more attention to all 
] the evidence and to modify initial impressions in response to contradictory evidence I ^ 
(Tetlock, 1983b). Accountability also reduced people's tendency to over-emphasise 
particular attributes in an essay-attribution context by increasing sensitivity to the 
situational pressures on others (Tetlock, 1985b). Furthermore, accountability 
reduced the overconfidence effect (to be discussed in Section 2.5.13) in a personality-
prediction context by increasing awareness of complexities in the behaviour of others 
(Tetlock and Kim, 1987). Finally, accountability reduced the sunk cost effect in a 
personal finance context by directing the subjects' attention to the irrelevance of sunk 
costs (Simonson and Nye, 1992). All these studies supported the notion that 
accountability, a social context variable, induces people to expend more cognitive 
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1 
effort and leads people to be less likely to commit judgmental biases. The need for 
cognition trait ofjudges, an individual difference factor, can serve a similar purpose 
to distinguish those with a tendency to expend more cognitive effort from those with 
tendency to expend less cognitive effort. 
•) 
Need for cognition (NC) refers to a general personality trait that relates to the 
.•! 
tendency of an individual to engage in and enjoy expending cognitive effort to do a 
task (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982; Cacioppo et al., 1984; Verplanken et aL, 1992). , 
i High NC individuals were found to be more active in information processing than low 
1 NC individuals. This difference in information processing could not be attributed to 
1 
the differences in ability, but attributed to the differences in internal motivation to 
understanding their environment (Heppner, Reeder and Larson, 1983). 
I 
High NC individuals were found to be more effective in problem-solving (Heppner et 
al., 1983)，to expend more cognitive effort and to recall more message arguments 
:! 
I (Cacioppo, Petty and Morris, 1983), to be more affected by argument quality but not 
i 
the attractiveness of an endorser (Ahlering, 1987; Haugtvedt, Petty, Cacioppo and 
I 
'i 
j Steidley, 1988), and to process more information items (Verplanken et al., 1992). 
1 All these findings support the notion that high NC individuals prefer complex to 
I 
！ simple tasks, whereas low NC individuals prefer simple to complex tasks (Cacioppo 
and Petty, 1982). 
NC can be used to explain some phenomena observed in the previous human 
information processing studies. For example, human beings are recognised as 
'cognitive misers'. In performing most of the mental tasks, cognitive effort is a major 
factor determining the selection of an information processing strategy (Payne, 1982; 
Johnson and Payne, 1985; Payne et aL, 1988; 1990a; 1992). People tend to take 
short cuts in performing information processing tasks (Fiske and Taylor, 1984). NC 
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NC trait ofjudges may moderate their extent of the base-rate fallacy in information 
processing (Ahlering and Parker, 1989, P.314). 
As mentioned earlier, base-rate information is generally under-utilised in probabilistic 
judgments in practice, leading to systematic judgmental biases. Based on the 
,| Bayesian rule, the ratio of the probability of an event to the probability of a non-event 
I is the product of the ratio of the base rate of an event to the base rate of a non-event 
and the ratio ofthe case-specific evidence of an event to the case-specific evidence of 
a non-event. When the base rate of an event is smaller than the base rate of a non-
event, the under-utilisation of the base rate of the event could lead to an over-
estimate of the probability of the event. This phenomenon is called the 
i overconfidence effect and is the topic to be discussed in the next section, 
j . 
，‘ ^ 
2.5.13 Overconfidence Effect 
People are frequently required to make probabilistic judgments under uncertainty. 
One approach to measuring the performance of these probabilistic judgments is to 
evaluate the appropriateness of people's confidence. As defined in Chapter I， 
confidence is the judge's belief that a stated judgment is correct, and is typically 
;j 
measured by evaluating the likelihood or probability that a prediction is correct. 
！ Appropriateness of confidence is how well the judges' confidence matches the actual 
probability. The actual probability can be derived from a normative statistical 
standard such as the Bayesian rule, or determined by the proportion of the judges' 
correct judgments over a large number of assessments (Griffin and Tversky, 1992). 
If the judges' confidence is equal to the actual probability, their confidence is 
considered as being appropriate. Judges are overconfident if their confidence is 
greater than the actual probability, whereas judges are underconfident if their 
confidence is less than the actual probability. A robust phenomenon supported by the 
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:i extant literature in psychology is that people tend to be overconfident in most 
:淘 
probabilistic judgment tasks (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1977; Fischhoff and Slovic, 
1980; Fischhoff and MacGregor, 1982; Lichtenstein et al., 1982; Sniezek, 1990; 
Yates, 1990; Griffin and Tversky, 1992). 
For example, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977) conducted a series of experiments to 
I 
'j investigate whether people had appropriate confidence on some probabilistic 
judgment tasks. In the first experiment, a group of subjects were asked, for each of 
•1 
the given small drawings, to decide whether the drawer was a European child or an 
Asian child and to estimate the probability that their selection was correct. Similarly 
j 
in the second experiment, another group of subjects were asked to indicate the 
i 
j direction of price movements for some stocks over a specific period. The results of 
j both experiments were rather similar and showed that the subjects' percentage of 
correct predictions was significantly lower than their mean estimated confidence, thus 
leading to overconfidence. 
I Another example for demonstrating the overconfidence effect was a series of 
experiments conducted by Fischhoff and Slovic (1980) with a variety of different 
general discrimination tasks. Some of these tasks were similar to those used by 
Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977) and included handwriting recognition, diagnosing 
i 
I ulcers as malignant or benign on the basis of a smaller number of diagnostic signs, 
j 
j predicting stock price movements, picking the winner in horse racing, and sorting 
I children's drawings according to their continent of origin (both with and without the 
I 
instruction warning of impossible discrimination). The results of this series of 
experiments were quite consistent and supported the overconfidence effect. 
Although the overconfidence effect has been recognised as a robust phenomenon 
supported by the extant literature, most of these studies asked student subjects to 




[ of overconfidence for these types of subjects and tasks were applicable to experts 
； when they performed tasks of their expertise, was not addressed by them. These 
issues will be further discussed later in Section 2.5.13.4. 
' 4 i 
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2.5.13.1 Calibration and Calibration Curve 
• 1 ;.N 
:i :•j 
i •' 
The overconfidence effect was commonly demonstrated in previous studies by means 
f 
j of the appropriateness of judges' confidence (i.e., the extent of overconfidence or 
i 
j underconfidence), although it is not the only method available for measuring the 
'} 
j quality of the judges' probabilistic judgments. Another commonly used measures of 
' judgment quality are calibration and calibration curve. Calibration is the extent to 
! which probability judgments correspond to the actual relative frequencies of events. 
People are said to be well calibrated if, over the long run, for all propositions 
assigned the same probability, the proportion of correct propositions is equal to the 
j probability assigned (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1977). For example, if an assessor 
.| 
assigns to a group of answers a probability of 70% as being correct and 70% of these 
answers tum out to be correct, then the assessor is said to be well calibrated (or 
perfectly calibrated). However, if only 50% or in fact 90% of these answers turn out 
to be correct, then the assessor is not well calibrated. Therefore, either over-
I estimation or under-estimation of the probability of correct judgments will lead an 
！ 
I assessor to have poor calibration. Simply looking at the figure of calibration cannot 
tell whether the assessor over-estimates (overconfident) or under-estimates 
(underconfidence) his/her hit rate. Although calibration and overconfidence draw the 
same conclusion when an assessor has a perfect hit rate, calibration is more sensitive 





Calibration curve is a graph showing the hit rate (percentage correct) for each 
� probability response assigned by an assessor. The horizontal axis of this graph 
usually represents the probability responses given by the assessor, while its vertical 
: . 1 
axis indicates the proportion of correct responses. Therefore, a curve along the 
diagonal of the graph suggests the assessor to be well calibrated. A curve below the 
i diagonal shows that the assessor is overconfidence. In contrast, a curve above the 
• i 
I 
diagonal reveals underconfidence. Although calibration curve provides readers with 
, a visual pattern of the assessor's performance, this curve cannot tell whether the 
\ deviation from the perfect calibration (along the diagonal) is statistically significant. 
.:1 
I In view of the differences in strengths and weaknesses among the various measures 
I 
j mentioned above, overconfidence, calibration and calibration curve were usually used 
i 
I together in most of the studies in this line of research in order to provide more 
I information on the assessor's judgment performance to the readers (Lichtenstein and 
i 
) Fischhoff, 1977; Fischhoff and Slovic, 1980; Fischhoff and MacGregor, 1982; 




Another common approach to measuring the performance of people's probability 
\ 
\ judgments is coherence. Both calibration and coherence have similar definitions, but 
i [ 
I they differ by using different actual probability estimates. Coherence refers to the 
extent to which probabilistic judgments correspond to a probability theory or model. 
Since people may use heuristic strategies to estimate their judgments and these 
judgments may deviate from the actual probability, calibration is therefore a measure 
of the judges' domain of knowledge or expertise for those specific judgment tasks, 
whereas coherence is a measure of the judges' probabilistic knowledge or their 
knowledge of the outcome frequencies pattern (Bolger and Wright, 1993; Wright et 
al., 1994). 
Although the extant literature supports the notion that overconfidence is a robust 
phenomenon, the understanding of the causes and consequences of this phenomenon 
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I 
I is still in its infancy. Theory development in this area requires the understanding of 
I why overconfidence arises and how it can be reduced to improve judgment 
’； performance. Studies uncovering those factors affecting appropriateness of 
.<,:¾ 
^ confidence are few in existence and more such studies are much needed (Sniezek and 
i ^ ; - \ ' 
Buckley, 1993; Wright et al., 1994). These factors can be classified into three major 
I 
•.丨 
,| types (task, environment, and individual differences) and a brief review of each type 














2.5.13.2.1 Task Factors 
:! 
Task factors are considered to be the most important factors affecting 
'( 
I appropriateness of confidence. These factors include the task difficulty (or a similar 
• i • 
I concept called predictability task), discriminability, who makes the choice, and 
i whether decisions are made after judgments. The most consistent finding for the past 
two decades in this line of research is the effect of task difficulty on appropriateness 
ii 
,3 
of confidence. The extant research found that people tended to be overconfident 
when they made judgments on difficult tasks, but they were found to have more 
j appropriate confidence and even to be underconfident when they made judgments on 
easy tasks (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1977; Lichtenstein et al., 1982; Sniezek, 
1990; Yates, 1990; Griffin and Tversky, 1992). Tasks of high difficulty include those 
tasks which cannot be predicted solely by using the given information cues. 
Therefore, when people make judgments on tasks of high difficulty, they tend to be 
more overconfident than when they makejudgments on tasks of low difficulty. 
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画 Discriminability refers to how similar the tentative alternatives are. When the 
j alternatives are similar, their discriminability is low. Otherwise, when the alternatives 
.f..'i 
are substantially different, their discriminability is high. It was found that when the 
discriminability between hypotheses was low, people tended to be overconfident. 
•••:x 
； When the discriminability between hypotheses was high, however, people tended to 
I 
j 
be underconfident (Griffin and Tversky, 1992). 
I 
•I 
. I 1 . 
I 
I . , 
• I 
• t . 
It has been argued that when people make a choice themselves rather than leaving the 
^ 1 
‘ 
choice to someone else, they are more likely to remain committed to the selected 
i choice. Research supported this notion and found that people tended to be more 
•j 
i overconfident when they made the choice themselves rather than when someone else 
i 
1 made the choice for them (Sniezek, Paese and Switzer III, 1990). 
] 
'1 1 1 '.； 
) People usually need to make decisions based on the judgments made. The effects of 
the need to make decisions on appropriateness of confidence for the judgments were 
investigated by Paese and Sniezek (1991). They found that when people were made 
j aware of the need to make decisions immediately after the judgments were made, the 
degree of overconfidence for the judgments was significantly reduced. This finding 
1 lends some comfort to the phenomenon of overconfidence, as people will usually 




2.5.13.2.2 Environmental Factors 
j Another important class of factors affecting appropriateness of confidence is the 
environment of a task. These factors include the amount of information available, the 
value of a base rate, introduction of an incentive, and provision of performance 
j 
feedback. For example, people are recognised to have a limited information 
processing capacity. As more information is provided, people's attention to each 
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piece of information reduces. This phenomenon is called the dilution effect which 
induces people to use less relevant information in making judgments and thus leads 
1 . 
I them to have worse performance. This contention was supported by some previous 
I _ 
,( studies which showed that as more information was provided, judges became more 
網 
confident and overconfident (Oskamp, 1965; Peterson and Pitz，1988). 




A base rate plays an important role in belief revision. Previous studies strongly 
i supported the notion that people tended to under-utilise base-rate information in 
邊 
I revising their belief. This general tendency is called the base-rate fallacy which has 
I 
I been discussed in detail earlier in Section 2.5.12. It was also found that the base-rate 
fallacy had more pronounced effects on overconfidence when the base rate of an 
event was low than when it was high (Dunning et al., 1990; Vallone et al., 1990; 
j 
Griffin and Tversky, 1992). 
i An incentive induces motivation and effort to perform better in judgments. 
;l Therefore, it is expected that provision of incentives will lead judges to have more 
1 I 
j appropriate confidence. In investigating the effect of incentives on appropriateness 
I 
I of confidence, Fischer (1982) found that subjects became less likely to assign very 
large or very small probabilities and had more appropriate confidence after the 
] ^ 
3 introduction of incentives. 
Providing feedback will direct the judges' attention to understanding the logic behind 
judgments and outcomes. However, whether the judges' performance can be 
improved by providing feedback depends on whether the logic can be uncovered by 
the judges through more attention or effort. For this reason, it is expected that 
people will be more likely to perform better under the provision of feedback for easy 
I tasks than they will for difficult tasks. This contention was supported by some 
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2.5.13.2.3 Individual Difference Factors 
\ 
The third class of factors affecting appropriateness of confidence is individual 
difference factors. These factors include perceived expertise, need for cognitive 
•i 
1 
structure, fear of invalidity, and perceived efforts expended. For example, Trafimow 
i - ' 
I 
^ and Sniezek (1994) found that subjects who had higher perceived expertise had more 
j appropriate confidence. In their study, Trafimow and Sniezek operationalised 
perceived expertise by asking their subjects to rank their class standing in high school 
and by advising the subjects of a high correlation between the class standing in high 
school and the performance of similar experiments conducted by other researchers. 
Similarly, Wright et al. (1994) found that subjects with high self-rated expertise had 
1 less overconfidence than those with low self-rated expertise. The variable of self-
rated expertise was measured by asking their subjects to rate how knowledgeable 
they perceived themselves to be about the issues tested in the experiment. Therefore, 
this self-rated expertise was a more direct measure of the subjects' perception of their 
knowledge about the task than the perceived expertise as used in Trafimow and 
Sniezek's experiment. 
Mayseless and Kmglanski (1987) contended that the judges' motivation affected their 
knowledge acquisition process. To verify this contention, Mayseless and Kmglanski 
examined the effects of two motivational variables — need for cognitive structure 
and fear of invalidity — on appropriateness of confidence. Need for cognitive 
structure refers to the desire to possess knowledge on a given topic. People with 
high need for cognitive structure tend to promote an early closure on a solution to a 
judgmental problem. Thus, people with high need for cognitive structure are likely to 
inhibit the generation of competing alternatives to a given hypothesis when such 
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I alternatives might appear to threaten an existing cognitive structure. The results of 
I their study showed that subjects with lower need for cognitive structure had more 
i appropriate confidence than those with higher need for cognitive structure. 
I' �I 、） 
] 
] Fear of invalidity is functionally opposite to need for cognitive structure. Fear of 
, invalidity refers the desire to avoid judgmental mistakes. People with high fear of 
invalidity will devote more effort to their cognitive process in generating alternatives 
, to a currently entertained hypothesis, and become more sensitive to information 
inconsistent with the hypothesis. Mayseless and Kruglanski (1987) found that 
subjects with high fear of invalidity had more appropriate confidence than those with 
low fear of invalidity. 
The major reason that motivational factors, such as need for cognitive structure and 
fear of invalidity as examined by Mayseless and Kruglanski, affect appropriateness of 
1 
1 confidence is that these factors induce people to expend more effort on making better 1 
：( 
judgments. Therefore, effort-related variables are also expected to affect 
appropriateness of confidence. One such variable is how much effort judges are 
perceived to have expended on a judgmental task. Paese and Sniezek (1991) 
measured subjects' perceived efforts by asking subjects to report the amount of 
personal effort expended on a task. They found that the subjects with higher 
reported perceived effort were more confident and overconfident than those with 
lower reported perceived effort. 
2.5.13.3 Methods Promoting Appropriate Confidence 
The second research issue related to appropriateness of confidence is how to reduce 
the degree of overconfidence in such a way to have more appropriate confidence. 
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of overconfidence. These methods include training with performance feedback, 
: group discussion, provision of an incentive, promotion of considering alternatives, 
the need to making a decision after a judgment, understanding the task logic, and 
rating task difficulty to peer group. All these methods focus on manipulating the 
decision processes and environments, and are discussed in more detail below. 
Training with performance feedback can be used to promote more appropriate 
confidence. The effectiveness of training, however, depends on how difficult the task 
I 
j is. As mentioned earlier in Section 2.5.13.2.1, people were found overconfident in 
！ 
1 making judgments for tasks of high difficulty, because they did not seem to make 
I 
j sufficient adjustments to their confidence according to the difficulty of these tasks 
(Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1977; Lichtenstein et al., 1982; Sniezek, 1990; Yates, 
！ 1990； Griffin and Tversky, 1992). Also, provision of training for a difficult task does 
r'I 
not help people much understand the mechanisms of the task. This argument was 
supported by some previous studies that provision of training with performance 
} 
j feedback could reduce the degree of overconfidence only for easy tasks but not for 
•j 
the difficult ones (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1980b; Arkes et al., 1987). 
Group discussion of judges' answers is another possible way to promote more 
appropriate confidence. In an experiment conducted by Arkes et al. (1987), subjects 
who were told to explain their answers to the rest of their group were less 
overconfident than those who were not told to do so, even though those subjects 
who were told to explain their answers later were not actually requested to explain 
their answers in the end. The major reason to account for the results of this 
experiment was that when subjects anticipated having to justify their answers to a 
group of judges, their confidence levels dropped substantially, although their 




Provision of incentives can motivate people to work hard and induce people to 
expend more cognitive effort. It is contended that people who are given incentives 
have better judgment performance. This contention was supported by a study 
showing that subjects who were given incentive pay for better performance were less 
overconfident (Fischer, 1982). 
.! . 
i 
Another method to promote more appropriate confidence is by motivating subjects to 
consider more possible outcomes from a chosen alternative other than the outcome 
-^
originally anticipated. One way to achieve the purpose of this method is to ask 
;.i 
subjects to provide reasons why their original choice could be wrong. In 
i investigating whether this method could be used as an effective debiasing tool to 
I reduce overconfidence, Koriat, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1980) revealed that 
i 
subjects who listed only contradicting reasons were found to be less overconfident. 
This method, however, received only modest support from other studies (Fischhoff 
and MacGregor, 1982; Trafimow and Sniezek, 1994). Hoch (1985) identified a 
specific condition under which this method could be effective. He found that for 
tasks with low to moderate base rates, judgment performance could be improved 
when subjects generated a reason against their judgments. For tasks with high base 
rates, however, generation of such a reason had no effect onjudgment performance. 
The need to make a decision after a judgment can also be used to promote more 
appropriate confidence in the judgment itself (Paese and Feuer, 1991). Therefore, 
people's judgment performance can be improved if they are instructed that a decision 
is required to be made after the judgment has been made. In practice, most people 
need to make decisions immediately after they make judgments. As such, the degree 
of overconfidence in real practice is expected to be much lower than that found in 
laboratory experiments (Juslin, 1994). 
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Keren (1992) suggested a structure-modifying technique to promote more 
appropriate confidence. Users of this technique are encouraged to understand the 
internal logic of a particular debiasing tool rather than following a procedure blindly. 
This is also a more effective way to learn a debiasing tool. Another method to 
promote more appropriate confidence is to let judges have a more objective view on 
how difficult the task is. This objective view of task difficulty can be obtained by 
.1 
丨 asking the judges to rate how difficult the task is, not from their own viewpoint, but 
I 
from the viewpoint of their peer group. This method proved effective in that subjects 
were found to be less overconfident when they were asked to rate task difficulty to 




2.5.13.4 Appropriateness ofExperts' Confidence 
As mentioned at the very beginning of Section 2.5.13, there is a robust phenomenon 
supported by the extant literature in psychology that people tend to be overconfident 
in most probabilistic judgment tasks (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1977; Fischhoff and 
Slovic, 1980; Fischhoff and MacGregor, 1982; Lichtenstein et aL, 1982; Sniezek, 
1990; Yates, 1990; Griffin and Tversky, 1992). However, this conclusion is drawn 
on those studies which used mainly students as subjects. This finding cannot be 
I • 參 
generalised to expert judges when they make judgments on those tasks of their 
I expertise. As students usually do not possess this expertise, an expert's confidence is 
therefore expected to be more appropriate than a student's. Nonetheless, the results 
ofthe studies examining the appropriateness of experts' confidence were mixed. 
Some types of experts were found overconfident when making judgments on the 
tasks of their expertise. These experts included medical doctors (Christensen-
Szalanski and Bushyhead, 1981; Christensen-Szalanski, Beck, Christensen-Szalanski, 
and Koepsell, 1983), clinical psychologists (Oskamp, 1962; 1965)，psychology 
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graduate students responding to questions about psychological propositions 
(Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1977)，and bankers when predicting stock market 
movements (Stael von Holstein, 1972). The findings of overconfidence among these 
I types of experts are consistent with the results of the extant literature in psychology 
I examining mainly students' judgments as just mentioned. One phenomenon observed 
塵 
I in these studies is that the subjective certainty in some types of these experts was ^ 
誦 often not justified by the active accuracy of their judgments. The increase in their 
1 . • 
！ confidence was found to be much higher than the improvement of their predictive ^ 
画 i 
j 
I accuracy, thus leading to overconfidence (Oskamp, 1962; 1965). 1 « i I d 
- Some experts, when performing tasks within the scope of their expertise, were found 
^ 
j to have relatively appropriate confidence. For example, auditors were found to have 
I 
‘ fairly appropriate confidence (Tomassini et al； 1982; Solomon et al., 1985; Dilla et 
.m 
， al., 1991; Mladenovic and Simnett, 1994; Simnett, 1994) due mainly to their 
. extensive job-related training and the legal liability resulted from their inappropriate 
二 confidence (the literature of auditors' confidence will be discussed in detail in Section 
J 3.3.11 of Chapter III). Weather reporters (Murphy and Brown, 1984) and 
economists (Braun and Yaniv, 1992) were also found to have relatively appropriate 
confidence for the reasons of having extensive training and timely feedback. 
m 
I Therefore, the appropriateness of judges' confidence is determined not only by the 
t judges' expertise knowledge of a task, but also by the specific task nature and the 
1 
i 




] 2.5.13.5 Conceptual and Methodological Issues 
Keren (1991) raised several conceptual and methodological issues related to 
1 calibration studies. For example, Keren questioned about a major assumption 
i 








‘ normative models when processing probabilistic information. Keren (1992) pointed 
� 
‘ out that normative decision theory assumes a decision maker as ideal and not 
confined by natural human limitations such as his/her limited memory and information 
processing capacity and vulnerability to both emotional and motivational states. 
Therefore, human limiting factors should also be taken into consideration when 
developing realistic decision models. 
Another conceptual issue raised by Keren (1991) was the problem of different 
I ‘ 
definitions of probability adopted by different researchers. Unfortunately, there is no 
； compromise on the best definition up to now. For this reason, there is a lack of an 
unambiguous acceptable yardstick to which observed probabilistic assessments can be 
compared. 
Keren (1991) proposed to classify calibration studies according to two perspectives: 
the strict view and the loose view. In the strict view, probability assessments are 
appraised by precise and rigorous criteria derived from a normative model. 
Therefore, uncertainty is external to the human assessor. In the loose view, the 
processes underlying probability judgments are continuous and iterative rather than 
sequential. These processes consist of mutual adjustments in the cognitive system 
resulting in a strength of belief that is then translated into a subjective probability. 
Therefore, this approach assumes that uncertainty is an internal attribute of the 
assessor in which the cognitive system plays a central role. 
The concepts of relatedness and essential similarity are particularly relevant to this 
loose view. Related events share common characteristics. Consequently the 
information relevant to assessing the probabilities of these events is drawn from the 
same data base. Only related or essentially similar events are justified for using a 






• Some methodological issues related to the two perspectives of classifying calibration 
V 
，: studies as defined above were discussed. In the strict view, probability judgments 
.^ 
should be invariant to the method by which they were elicited. Thus factors like 
:’ number of alternatives, choice versus no-choice procedures, framing and response 
‘ 
mode are irrelevant to these judgments. On the other hand, the loose view assumes 
j human beings having a dynamic cognitive system which is characterised by a limited 
human information processing capacity. Therefore, elicitation methods are expected 
： to have significant effects on human judgments. Also, this view recognises that 
I ， 
I individual differences may have significant impacts on probability assessments. | 
I 
Another methodological issue is the impact of social environments under which a ！ 
,； calibration study is conducted. Some researchers (e.g., Dawes, 1980) suggested that 
I people tend to overestimate their intellectual abilities, which leads themselves to have 
r 
overconfidence. This overconfidence effect may be more pronounced when the 
assessors hold some control of a task. 
Ideally, any complete evaluation of calibration studies should include separate 
analyses of the individual assessors and items respectively. However, if analysis is 
performed separately on each assessor, a large number of observations from each 
individual are necessary to have reliable results. Obtaining a large number of 
observations from subjects entails practical difficulties. In particular, subjects may 
get bored and become indifferent to the prediction tasks after a certain number of 
assessments, and sometimes even provision of some incentives may not be able to 
keep them motivated. 
Finally, Keren (1991) suggested two possible explanations for the item difficulty 
effects. First, if an assessor is explicitly instructed not to use probabilities below 
50%, as the task becomes more difficult, the extent of overconfidence increases. 
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； psychological substance. Second, a laboratory setting creates an expectation of an I 
,• intermediate level of difficulty which may be anchored, and adjustments away from ^ 
‘ 1 
the anchor are usually not sufficient, leading to underconfidence (overconfidence) for 
easy (difficult) tasks. 
In summary, appropriateness of confidence has been recognised to be a finer 
approach to measuring the performance of people's probabilistic judgments. 
Overconfidence was a robust phenomenon in this line of research. However, most of 
I 
the studies in this research area examined students' probabilistic judgments on general 
knowledge questions. Many factors affecting the degree of overconfidence have 
been found in previous studies, including task factors, the judgment environments of 
a task, and the individual differences of judges. Various methods have been proposed 
to promote more appropriate confidence, but further studies are still needed to 
determine the relative effectiveness of each method. 
Although the overconfidence effect was a robust phenomenon among students' 
probabilistic judgments, the literature of the appropriateness of experts' confidence 
was conflicting. While some studies showed that some specific types of experts were 
vulnerable to the same shortcomings as novices, the other studies did suggest clear 
superior among some other types of experts over novices. These results indicate that 
our understanding of the appropriateness of people's confidence is still only in its 
infancy. 
A number of conceptual and methodological issues related to this line of research 
have not been resolved yet. These issues will be the challenges and agendas for 
researchers interested in this area. Although a large number of studies were found in 
this line of research, little is known about the relationships among appropriateness of 
confidence, the base-rate fallacy and the NC trait of judges. The current study 






2.6 Contingent Decision Behaviour 
2.6.1 Overview 
The focus of the Lens Model and the Heuristics-and-Biases frameworks is on 
comparing human judgments with some models and standards to determine the 
performance of these judgments. Therefore, judgment performance is one major 
dependent variable investigated within these two research frameworks. The 
framework of Contingent Decision Behaviour, however, focuses more on 
investigating how people select their decision strategies by balancing the desire to be 
accurate and the desire to conserve limited cognitive effort. One important 
dependent variable investigated within this research framework is therefore the 
decision strategies selected in a specific situation. Accuracy, being a measure of 
judgment performance taken as a dependent variable in the other two research 
frameworks, becomes one of the major independent variables in the framework of 
Contingent Decision Behaviour. 
Payne and his colleagues (Payne, 1976; 1982; Bettman and Park, 1980; Johnson and 
Payne, 1985; Johnson, Payne and Bettman, 1988; Johnson and Schkade, 1989; Payne 
et al., 1988; 1990a; 1993; Bettman et al., 1990; Payne, Johnson, Bettman and 
Coupey, 1990b; Payne, Bettman and Johnson, 1992) adopted a micro-structural view 
i to investigate human decision behaviour. They have contributed to understanding the 
causal mechanism underlying human behaviour in selecting among various decision 
strategies in different situations. A decision strategy is a sequence of mental 
operations used to transform an initial state of knowledge into a final goal state of 
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knowledge where a decision maker views a particular decision problem as being 
solved. 
The remainder of this section intends to review the major findings of this research 
framework. First, the major factors affecting the contingent decision behaviour are 
identified. Second, each identified factor is discussed in more detail. Finally, the 
effects of effort and accuracy on the selection of decision strategies are investigated. 
I ^ . 
I 
I 
2.6.2 Factors Influencing Contingent Decision Behaviour 
Three classes of factors are recognised as the major determinants for selecting a 
j 
particular decision strategy among people. These factors are related to a problem, 
decision makers, and social context. Factors related to the problem include task 
variables and context variables. Task variables refer to those factors associated with 
the general structural characteristics of the decision problem, including task 
complexity, response mode, information display mode, and agenda constraints. On 
the other hand, context variables refer to those factors associated with the particular 
values of objects in the specific decision set under consideration, including the 
similarity and overall attractiveness of alternatives. In general, the values of context 
variables are more dependent on individual perceptions than the values of task 
variables. Factors related to decision makers include their cognitive ability, prior task 
knowledge, and expertise in a problem domain. Finally, factors related to social 
context include accountability and group membership. 
In the rest of this section, the focus is on the review of the literature related to the 
task and context variables. No literature review will be provided for those factors 
related to social context, as the detailed literature on accountability, one major 
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2.6.3 Effects of Task Variables on Selecting Decision Strategies 
i 
( 
2.6.3.1 Task Complexity 
Although a substantial body of literature in psychology, management and social 
I 
science has demonstrated the existence of the effects of task complexity on judgment 
i performance, there is still a lack of a comprehensive definition of task complexity. In 
an influential paper in psychology, Wood (1986) defined task complexity as the 
description of the relationships among task inputs and among task inputs and outputs. 
The required acts and information cues in a task are two important task inputs, while 
task outputs include the products from completing the task, such as an audit report. 
Wood suggested that task complexity could be measured by three analytical 
dimensions: component complexity, coordinative complexity and dynamic 
complexity. As the number of distinct acts that need to be executed in the 
performance of a task or the number of distinct information cues that must be 
processed in the performance of those acts increases, the component complexity of 
the task also increases. Coordinative complexity refers to the form and strength of 
the relationships between information cues, acts, the sequencing of inputs, and 
products. Specifically, coordinative complexity includes timing, frequency, intensity, 
and location requirements for performing the required acts. Dynamic complexity 
refers to the changes in either the set of required acts and information cues or the 
relationships between inputs and products can create shifts in the knowledge or skills 




I； Bonner (1994) gave an even more comprehensive definition of task complexity and 
I defined the overall task complexity as the amount and clarity of information at the 
I . . 
:1 input, processing, and output stages of a task. For example, the elements of input 
j^ 
^ complexity related to amount of information include the number of alternatives a 
^ 
judge must evaluate, the number of cues or attributes per alternative, and the 
J redundancy among cues. The clarity of input includes the clarity of specifying and 
the ability of measuring information cues, the match between the manner in which 
, information cues are presented and the manner in which they are stored in their 
I memory, and the presentation format of these cues. The amount of processing varies � 
j with the amount of input and the number of steps or procedures that have to be 
executed. The clarity of processing is the results of the extent of procedure 
； specification and the nature of individual input-output relations. Finally, the amount 
j of output refers to the number of goals or solutions per alternative, and the clarity of 
奈 output depends on whether the goal is defined or specified clearly. 
From the above discussion, the Bonner's definition of task complexity related to the 
input and processing stages of a task was rather similar to the Wood's. However, the 
amount and clarity of output in the Bonner's definition were ignored by Wood. 
Therefore, the Bonner's definition is considered as a more comprehensive one. 
'jj 
The elements of task complexity commonly investigated by researchers of the 
Contingent Decision Behaviour framework are the number of alternatives, the 
5 
i number of attributes, and time pressure. Their focus is on how these elements affect 
I 
1 individuals' selection of their decision strategies. As the number of alternatives and 
j attributes, and time pressure increase, the tasks become more complex. People are 
expected to adopt different decision strategies to cope with tasks of different degrees 
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^ Several experiments have been conducted to investigate the effects of the number of 
^' 
alternatives on human behaviour in selecting decision strategies. It was found that 
decision strategy selection was sensitive to the number of alternatives (Payne, 1976; 
Bettman and Park, 1980). In particular, subjects were found to shift from 
compensatory to non-compensatory strategies as the number of alternatives increased 
(Payne, 1976). It was also found that processing decision problems with a large 
number of alternatives was generally more attribute-based early in the process, and 
more alternative-based later in the process (Bettman and Park, 1980). 
I 
！ The effects of the number of attributes on the selection of decision strategies were 
: i 
mixed. Payne (1976) and Olshavsky (1979) found no effect on the selection of 
decision strategies as the number of attributes increased. Sundstrom (1987), 
I however, found an increase in the use of non-compensatory strategies with an 
increase in the number of attributes. Therefore, this issue has not been concluded 
yet. 
Time pressure increases as less time is available to complete the tasks. Different 
degrees of time pressure are expected to have different effects on how people select 
decision strategies. It was found that under a mild degree of time pressure, people 
tended to accelerate processing such that the amount of time spent on processing 
each item ofinformation decreased (Miller, 1960; Ben Zur and Breznitz, 1981; Payne 
et al., 1988). When time pressure further increased, people tended to select only a 
subset of the most important information (Miller, 1960), with more weight being 
placed on negative information about alternatives (Wright, 1974; Wright and Weitz, 
1977; Ben Zur and Breznitz, 1981; Payne et al., 1988). Under high tension of time 
pressure, people tended to shift from compensatory to non-compensatory decision 
strategies (Miller, 1960; Janis and Mann, 1977; Ben Zur and Breznitz, 1981). Under 
extremely severe time pressure, people tended to use more attribute-based processing 
in decision-making (Payne et al., 1988). 
1 76 i I 
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2.6.3.2 Response Mode 
^ 
. i k 
One fundamental principle of rational decision theory is procedure invariance which 
； stipulates that strategically equivalent ways of eliciting a decision maker's preferences 
should result in the same revealed preferences. It was, however, found that 
variations in response mode caused a fundamental change in the way people 
processed information and thus led to different preferences in choices (Lichtenstein 
j and Slovic, 1973). Reasons have been proposed for explaining the phenomenon of 
1 
preference reversals. For instance, it was suggested that additional mental operations 
were needed for non-compatibility between response modes and information, which 
‘ often increased effort and error, and might reduce the impact of those important 
attributes (Slovic, Griffin and Tversky, 1990). It was also argued that the 
phenomenon of preference reversals was due to the use of reframing and an 
anchoring and adjustment strategy, which led to different value assessments across 
response modes (Johnson and Schkade, 1989). 
2.6.3.3 Information Display Mode 
Information display mode was also found to have significant effects on the selection 
of decision strategies. Slovic (1972) found that people tended to use only the 
information being explicitly displayed in the stimulus object and use it only in the 
form in which it was displayed. In another study, Bettman and Kakkar (1977) found 
that information acquisition proceeded in a fashion that was consistent with display 
format. Jarvenpaa (1989，1990) also found that graphical format differences 
i accounted for a large portion of the variance in information acquisition and 
:i 
evaluation. Moreover, Johnson et al. (1988) found a lower rate of preference 
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reversals when probabilities were displayed in a simple form (e.g., 0.88 or 7/8) than 
I when they were displayed in a more complex form (e.g., 399/456). All these studies 
I supported the notion that people's selection of decision strategies is significantly 
affected by information display mode. 
2.6.3.4 Agenda Effect 
I 
The last task variable discussed in this part is the agenda effect. This effect suggests | 
that when people make a choice, constraints are placed on the order in which the 
elements of a choice set are considered by them. Hauser (1986) suggested that even 
if no constraints were imposed externally, a decision maker might self-impose an 
agenda on the order of selecting or eliminating choice alternatives. This was 
considered to be a method for simplifying cognitive processing and thus saving 
cognitive effort. 
2.6.4 Effects of Context Variables on Selecting Decision Strategies 
There is a growing body of literature that recognises people's selection of decision 
strategies as a function of context variables. The most important context variables 
affecting people's selection of decision strategies include similarity of alternatives and 
the framing effect. Since the framing effect has been discussed earlier in Section 
2.5.8, this section only discusses the literature of similarity of alternatives. 
Similarity was found to affect the information-processing strategies that led to choice. 
For instance, similarity was found to affect the ease of comparison between 
j alternatives (Shugan, 1980; Tversky and Sattath, 1979). Payne et al. (1993) 
i 







: alternatives were more similar. Their rationale was based on the cost of thinking 
^ hypothesis proposed by Shugan (1980), in which a relatively lower cost of thinking 
was suggested as a result of relatively few distinct dimensions needed to be 
considered among similar alternatives. It was also found that as the differences 
among alternatives on the attributes decreased, both the amount of information 
acquired in making a decision (Biggs, Bedard, Gaber and Linsmeier, 1985; 
Bockenholt, Albert, Aschenbrenner and Schmalhofer, 1991) and the total amount of 
time needed to make a decision (Stone and Schkade, 1991) increased. 
：' I 
2.6.5 Effects of Effort and Accuracy on Selecting Decision Strategies 
，’ 
One major focus of the framework of Contingent Decision Behaviour is on 
investigating how people select decision strategies by balancing decision accuracy 
and cognitive effort (Beach and Mitchell, 1978; Shugan, 1980; Klayman, 1983; 
Russo and Dosher, 1983; Johnson and Payne, 1985; Lipman, 1991). Cognitive effort 
has been recognised as a scarce resource (Simon, 1978). Therefore, the specific 
decision strategies being selected by decision makers will be the ones that can attain a 
desirable level of performance at the minimum level of cognitive effort C^^ickens, 
1986). 
The most important issue in this research area is how to measure the cognitive effort 
expended on using different decision strategies. One approach is to describe decision 
strategies by a small set of elementary information processes (EIPs) common to a 
variety of tasks (Newell and Simon, 1972). This set of EIPs includes, for instance, 
such mental operations as reading a piece of information into short-term memory, 
comparing the values of two alternatives on an attribute, and multiplying a probability 
i by a payoff. This set of EIPs can be taken as the operations used by decision makers 
to transform the initial state of problem knowledge into the final goal state (Holland, 
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Holyoak, Nisbett and Thagard，1986). Under this approach, the cognitive effort for 
each decision strategy is the sum of the efforts for the various types of EIPs that are 
used to describe that decision strategy. 
Based on this approach to measuring the cognitive effort required by different 
strategies, the question of how to balance the accuracy and effort in selecting a 
decision strategy can be explored. Bettman et al. (1990) trained seven subjects to 
use six different decision strategies to investigate this research question. A 
computer-based information acquisition system was used to monitor the subjects' 
information acquisition sequences. The subjects' performance was measured in terms 
oftheir response time and their self-reported decision difficulty (i.e., cognitive effort). 
The results indicated that their subjects took longer time to complete the tasks as the 
complexity of problem was increased by more alternatives or more attributes. They 
also found that the effects of task complexity on cognitive effort varied as a result of 
strategies. Interestingly, the estimates of the time taken for each EIP were essentially 
the same regardless of the decision strategy used. This finding was in line with prior 
studies in cognitive research (Groen and Parkman, 1972; Russo, 1978). It was, 
however, found that there were significant individual differences in the cognitive 
effort associated with individual EIPs, suggesting that individuals might choose 
different decision strategies in part because the same EIPs might demand different 
amount of effort across individuals. 
Payne et al. (1993) suggested that the effort associated with individual EIPs should 
reflect the particular task environment from which they were derived. Therefore, 
they expected that the effort associated with individual EIPs varied as a result of task 
variables, such as information display format. These suggestions were in line with the 
empirical evidence of previous studies in this line of research (Johnson et al., 1988; 




One important research issue of this framework is to investigate the reasons behind 
selecting a particular decision strategy under a particular task environment. People 
were found to be more likely to emphasise accuracy for important or irreversible 
decisions, when they were personally responsible for the outcomes of the decisions, 
and when accuracy was more salient than effort, such as when feedback was provided 
on accuracy but not on effort. 
Constraints on effort were found when people were required to solve a complex 
problem, or when they were required to solve a problem under time pressure. In 
s 
) general, constraints on effort were more commonly found than constraints on 
accuracy. As mentioned earlier in Section 2.6.1，decision task environment is 
important for determining the selection of a decision strategy. Therefore, the most 
efficient decision strategies for a given set of accuracy-effort trade-offs will vary 
across different decision task environments. 
2.7 Integrated Framework for Behavioural Decision Theory 
i 
Sections 2.3 to 2.6 presented four major areas of findings or ideas of BDT research 
for the past four decades in terms of one principle and three research frameworks. 
Although each principle or framework represented the research efforts contributed by 
a separate group of researchers who adopted a different approach to investigate 
human decision behaviour, the literature reviewed in these sections uncovered that 
this principle and these frameworks were not independent of each other. Many 
common features among them could be found. For example, some of the findings in 
one framework could be used to explain the findings of the others. This section 
attempts to explore the interrelationships among this principle and these frameworks, 
and to consolidate them into an integrated framework for future studies (see Figure 
2.1). 
81 
n 2 • ； . 
� 
Figure 2.1 Integrated Framework for Behavioural Decision Theory , “ ^ 
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2.7.1 Principle of Bounded Rationality and the Three Research Frameworks 
The main thesis of the Lens Model framework is to use simple linear models to 
describe human decision behaviour. It was found that the prediction performance of 
the models of decision makers was in most cases better than the decision makers' 




: people are not consistent in making their judgments and their judgments are thus 
；, found to be suboptimal. The major findings of this framework fit in very well with 
the Principle of Bounded Rationality, in which people are recognised to have a 
limited information processing capacity. Therefore, their decisions are satisfactory 
rather than optimal. 
The focus of the Heuristics-and-Biases framework is on investigating people's errors 
and irrationalities when they make judgments. The major reason for people making 
such errors and irrationalities is that they adopt heuristics to make judgments. These 
heuristics work well in most daily life, but lead to suboptimal solutions in certain 
situations. Similarly, the findings of this framework are in line with the Principle of 
Bounded Rationality. 
Finally, the Contingent Decision Behaviour framework argues that the human 
decision behaviour of selecting decision strategies is determined mainly by balancing 
accuracy and effort. On the one hand, balancing accuracy and effort ensures that the 
decision is satisfactory. On the other hand, balancing these two factors reflects the 
fact that people's limited information processing capacity drives their decision 
behaviour. From the above discussions, all the major findings of these frameworks 
can be explained by the Principle of Bounded Rationality. Therefore, this principle 
has laid the foundations for the research of all these frameworks. 
2.7.2 Lens Model and Heuristics-and-Biases Frameworks 
The Lens Model framework can be used to explain some of the phenomena 
discovered in the Heuristics-and-Biases framework. In fact, heuristics can be taken 
as ways of human judgments based on models with limited validity. For example, 
people use the representativeness heuristic to select a cue based on the degree of 
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perceived similarity or causal association between the cue and the criterion variable. 
The greater the perceived similarity or causal association between the cue and the 
criterion variable, the greater the likelihood that the cue will be selected. Therefore, 
I the Lens Model framework simply refers the representativeness heuristic as 
fS 
丨 overweighing a particular cue while neglecting other valid cues for inferring a 
:,; criterion variable (Hammond, 1990). 
fei %^ 
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I A similar argument can be put forward for the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. 
I Rather than ignoring some important cues in the representativeness heuristic, the -
i Lens Model framework refers the anchoring and adjustment heuristic simply as 
； overweighing a particular cue when it is taken as an anchor, while the other cues are 





‘ The Lens Model and the Heuristics-and-Biases frameworks differ mainly in their 
research focuses. The Lens Model framework emphasises achievement, that is, the 
correlation between human judgments and the actual outcomes of a criterion variable, 
I whereas the Heuristics-and-Biases framework focuses on identifying the errors and 
irrationality of human judgments (Hammond, 1990). 
�i ::; 
2.7.3 Lens Model and Contingent Decision Behaviour Frameworks 
The Lens Model framework can be thought of as a model for identifying the trade-
offs between accuracy and effort in determining the decision strategies selected by 
decision makers in the Contingent Decision Behaviour framework. In explaining the 
accuracy-effort trade-offs, the selection of decision strategies can be taken as a 
criterion variable in the model, whereas the accuracy requirement and cognitive effort 
are taken as the environmental cues. The trade-offs of these two cues are specified in 
a function specified in the model, though this function is not necessarily linear. The 
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S question of how well a linear function represents these trade-offs remains an 
i . 
$ empirical issue. 
2.7.4 Heuristics-and-Biases and Contingent Decision Behaviour Frameworks 
The Contingent Decision Behaviour framework can be used to explain some 
"irrational" human decision behaviour found by researchers of the Heuristics-and-
Biases framework. Decision strategies being selected under this framework can be 
considered to be efficient heuristics, which provide a satisfactory level of accuracy 
with substantial savings in effort under certain decision environments (Thorngate, 
1980). The specific strategies being selected depend on whether decision makers 
emphasise accuracy more or cognitive effort more, and whether there are any 
constraints imposed on these two elements. 
2.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter reviewed the literature of behavioural decision theory (BDT) developed 
by psychology researchers over the past four decades. The literature uncovered that 
the Principle of Bounded Rationality (Simon, 1955) laid the foundation for the 
direction of BDT research during this period. Based on this principle, three major 
research frameworks were developed in this area. Being developed from the 
Brunswik's lens model, the Lens Model framework received the earliest attention 
from psychology researchers, and its main thesis focuses on the linear modelling of 
judgments. The Heuristics-and-Biases framework was founded in the 1970,s by 
Tversky and Kahneman, which emphasises the errors and irrationalities of people 
when making judgments, and investigates the various means to improve the 





being developed by Payne, Bettman and Johnson at around the same time but 
；： forming its shape only in recent years, contends that human decision behaviour is 
adaptive to the task nature, and the selection of decision strategies depends mainly on 
balancing the expected decision accuracy and the required cognitive efforts expended 
by decision makers. 
Although these research frameworks have been developed separately by different 
groups of researchers who emphasised different aspects of human decision behaviour, 
the literature of BDT reviewed in this chapter uncovered that these frameworks were 
not independent of each other. It was found that there were many common features 
among these frameworks. Some of the findings in one framework could be explained 
by using the findings of the others. These common features, if Mly understood, 
could be consolidated into an integrated framework. This integration, in tum, could 
contribute to developing better theories on human decision behaviour which has not 
been explained fully by the existing theories. 
The aim of the current study is to investigate the judgmental performance and the 
biases of bank loan officers when predicting the probabilities of firms being in 
financial distress. Since financial distress prediction is a task of probabilistic 
judgment, the literature of the Heuristics-and-Biases framework is particularly 
relevant to the study's research problems. Specifically, the current study intends to 
examine the extent that the relevance of base-rate information, the perceived 
informativeness of case-specific evidence, and the need of cognition trait of individual 
bank loan officers would affect the appropriateness of their confidence. As such, this 
study offers a further link between the base-rate fallacy and the overconfidence effect 
within this framework. The findings in the other two research frameworks and the 
principle of Bounded Rationality can also be used to illuminate the results of the 
current study. 
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BDT is concerned with human decision behaviour in general. The literature of the 
overconfidence effect was concentrated on the general, rather than decision-specific 
issues. Furthermore, most of the theories in this research area have been developed 
from experiments using students as the subjects of study. Therefore, the external 
validity of the results of these experiments is subject to some criticism. These 
theories have in fact provided many opportunities for explaining human decision 
behaviour in accounting and auditing contexts. The next chapter will review the 
literature of behavioural decision research in accounting and discuss the specific 
motivations and rationale for developing the research model and hypotheses of the 
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LITERATURE REVIEW ON 
BEHAVIOURAL DECISION RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING 
1.'-..', f;, 
\\ 3.1 Introduction 




This chapter provides a detailedliterature review on those accounting studies that 
applied the major ideas or findings ofbehavioural decision theory (BDT) as discussed 
in Chapter 11. This line of accounting research is generally called behavioural 
i decision research (BDR) in accounting or behavioural accounting research, and is 
considered to be the immediate research discipline of the current study. Specifically, 
I the current study relates to BDR in accounting that investigates the performance of 
I financial distress predictions by bank loan officers. This specific research area is 




In view of the large volume of literature of BDR in accounting and since the current 
study only attempts to investigate a few major biases which are related to the use of 
base-rate information and could affect the prediction performance of bank loan 
:丨 officers, this chapter focuses mainly on reviewing those studies of BDR in accounting 
that adopted the Heuristics-and-Biases research framework in BDT as discussed 
. : i 
, previously in Section 2.5 of Chapter II. It also reviews those studies that are related 
to BDR in financial distress predictions made by bank loan officers. 
1 The remainder of this chapter is arranged around five sections. Section 3.2 first 
provides an overview on BDR in accounting, which highlights the major determinants 
of the performance of decision-making. Section 3.3 then reviews those studies on 
BDR in accounting that adopted the Heuristics-and-Biases framework (except those 
studies related to financial distress predictions by bank loan officers which will be 
；) 
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reviewed in Section 3.4). The sequence of major topics reviewed in this section 
follows those in the same framework as reviewed in Section 2.5 of Chapter II m 
order to facilitate comparison and development of the research model of the current 
study. Section 3.4 then reviews the literature of all BDR in financial distress 
predictions made by bank loan officers, including but not restricted to those studies 
that adopted the Heuristics-and-Biases framework. Section 3.5 discusses the 
motivation of the current study driven by several research opportunities identified 
from the literature reviewed. Finally, Section 3.6 provides a summary of the chapter. 
3.2 Overview of BDR in Accounting and the Major Determinants of 
Decision-Making Performance 
As mentioned earlier in Section 2.2 of Chapter II, BDT is the study of how 
， individuals make decisions (Hogarth, 1993). Since decision-making is an important 
topic for a variety of disciplines, BDT is therefore highly interdisciplinary and 
I involves research efforts from areas such as psychology, economics, statistics, 
I accounting, finance and marketing, to name just a few. BDR in accounting is the 
applied research of BDT in an accounting context, and focuses on three main issues: 
i (1) how do accountants, auditors and users of accounting information make decisions 
j about and with accounting information in a particular accounting-related t a s k ? � 
how well do they perform that particular task? and (3) how can they be helped 
perform better? (Hogarth, 1991). 
The first issue addresses to understanding the decision-making processes. The 
second issue relates to the performance of decision makers. The third issue is 
concerned with the ultimate objective of this research area: to improve decision-
j making performance. To understand how to improve the performance of individual 
decision makers, it is necessary to identify the major determinants of their 
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I performance. Two factors are commonly agreed among researchers in the area of 
I BDR in accounting as being the crucial determinants of decision-making 
f * 
V 
performance: the characteristics of tasks and the characteristics of decision makers 
(Figure 3.1) (Hogarth, 1991; Payne et al., 1992; Gibbins and Jamal, 1993; Hogarth, 
1993; Libby and Luft, 1993; Peters, 1993; Wright et al., 1994). Task characteristics 
； include the structure and content of the decision problems such as base-rate 
information in probabilistic judgments, and the environments in which the tasks are 
•••‘1 - • 
； performed (see Chapter II for more detailed discussion of these characteristics). 
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Figure 3.1 Determinants ofDecision-Making Performance 
Characteristics 1 
of Tasks \ • 
\ Decision-Making 
/ ^ Performance 
I — — ^ y / ^ l t 
Characteristics of / 
Decision Makers 
The characteristics of tasks are considered to be a more important determinant for 
the performance of decision makers (Hogarth, 1991). The major reasons are that 
, j 
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Ipeople are more adaptive to the demand of the tasks. The cognition and behaviour of people are thus determined mainly by the tasks and their environments. However, the f: emphasis on the task effect does not mean that less attention should be paid to the 
influences of other factors, such as the characteristics of decision makers or the 
interactions of the characteristics of both the tasks and the decision makers. In fact, 
: these interactions are always more important than each individual type of these 
characteristics considered (Gibbins and Jamal, 1993). This suggestion is consistent 
奈 with the contingent approach proposed by Libby and Luft (1993), that the optimal 
‘ performance is determined by a fit of task demand and decision makers, 
characteristics. 
, j 
Regarding the characteristics of decision makers, ability, knowledge and motivation 
are particularly singled out as being the major factors that may affect their 
performance (Libby and Luft, 1993). Ability refers to the information processing 
capacity of decision makers and is largely task independent. People were found to 
have a limited information processing capacity (e.g., Miller, 1956; Simon, 1955; 
Simon and Newell, 1971). To cope with this limitation, people often employ 
heuristics to simplify the decision-making process. Availability, anchoring and 
adjustment, and representativeness are the three heuristics that people most 
commonly use (see Sections 2.5.2, to 2.5.4 for more detailed discussion of these 
three heuristics). These three heuristics are important for BDR in accounting because 
they can be used to explain some decision behaviour in accounting settings. 
In contrast to ability, knowledge relates specifically to a particular task. One major 
reason why knowledge is examined in accounting research is to identify the 
differences in knowledge between novices and experts. The understanding of these 
differences can help find out better ways to impart the knowledge of experts to 




Ifor properly assigning people with proper knowledge to the right tasks at minimum 
j 
costs. 
The last characteristic of decision makers that affects their performance is their 
motivation. This characteristic accounts for the willingness of decision makers to 
I expend effort (Libby and Luft, 1993). Motivation is determined jointly by the 
1 characteristics of tasks and the other characteristics of decision makers. For 
教 
i example, incentives, accountability, social pressure, the desire to preserve self-esteem 
I and the desire to understand the environment are such characteristics that may cause 
I decision makers to exert more effort. An increase of effort may lead to better 
j performance, no change in performance, or even poorer performance depending on 
^ the conditions of tasks and decision makers (Libby and Luft, 1993). 
M i 
I 
i When decision makers use a relatively low effort information processing strategy, 
； when they know the current strategy is insufficient, and when they know that a better 
’ strategy is available and they believe that this strategy can be used, increased effort 
^ will lead to better performance (Johnson and Kaplan, 1991). When some decision 
errors are the result of cognitive mechanisms not under conscious control (Camerer， 
j Loewenstein and Weber, 1989) or the result of a dominant factor such as the desire 
• to avoid criticism by others (Simonson and Nye, 1992), these errors are not sensitive ^ ； to changes in effort. Increased effort on flawed strategy may lead to poor 
^ performance (Paese and Sniezek, 1991). It is therefore important to understand 
i whether a task is effort-sensitive before ways to improve performance can be 
i"-~ ’ suggested. _ _ 
: Since the current study focuses on some decision errors in accounting judgments, the 
^ accounting studies that addressed the use of heuristics and the commitment of 
3si 




This review, in turn, will provide a clearer picture of the major determinants of 
decision-making performance as discussed in this section above. 






i A substantial body of descriptive literature in BDT suggests that people in general 
use heuristics in their everyday judgments. These heuristics are, by and large, 
developed from their experience and work very well in many simple judgmental tasks. 
These heuristics, however, do not follow the prescriptive rules and may lead to biases 
in some situations. This line of research has been conducted mainly by psychology 
: researchers, using students as the subjects of study. The generalisation of the 
： findings from these studies to applied disciplines such as accounting should be 
empirically verified by using real subjects and more realistic settings. 
Accounting and auditing judgments mainly involve experts who have different 
； motivations when dealing with specific types of tasks. Although experts in 
； accounting and auditing may also be susceptible to committing similar biases as those 
‘ committed by college students, two major questions remain to be answered by 
empirical studies: (1) whether the expertise possessed by accounting information 
I users affects their tendency to commit such biases, what the extent of these biases is, 
and what effect the specific task nature together with the accounting information 
users' motivation would have on these biases; and (2) whether committing these 
biases will seriously affect their decisions and actions. The following review attempts 
to provide some insights into these questions. 
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Similar to the review on the Heuristics-and-Biases framework in Section 2.5 of 
Chapter II，this section first reviews those accounting studies that addressed the use 
of the three heuristics (i.e., the availability, anchoring and adjustment, and 
representativeness heuristics) and then those studies related to the commitment of 
various judgment biases. This section, however, excludes those accounting studies 
that examined the decision behaviour of bank loan officers when predicting the 
probabilities of firms being in financial distress. These studies will be discussed in 
detail in Section 3.4. 
3.3.2 Availability Heuristic 
Availability is a heuristic adopted by a decision maker to evaluate the frequency or 
probability of an event by the relative number of pro versus con reasons generated, or 
by how easily such reasons can be generated (see Section 2.5.2 of Chapter II for 
more detailed discussion). Auditors and financial statement users may be susceptible 
to using this heuristic in a number of accounting decision situations. Several 
accounting studies were found to address this issue and these are reviewed below. 
Libby (1985) conducted an experiment to investigate whether auditors relied on how 
easily unexpected fluctuations in financial ratios could be generated in their minds to 
identify potential financial statement errors during analytical review. Auditors were 
randomly assigned to two treatment groups and a control group. Auditors in one 
treatment group were provided with an inherited cue chosen from the sales and 
receivables cycle, whereas auditors in the other treatment group were provided with 
an inherited cue chosen from the purchases, inventories and payables cycle. Auditors 
in the control group received no inherited cue. The results suggested that financial 
statement errors recently experienced, perceived to occur more frequently, or actually 
detected to be more frequent were more likely to be generated as initial hypotheses. 
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In addition, an inherited hypothesis increased the likelihood that subsequent 
hypotheses were generated from the same cycle. Finally, the results revealed that 
generation of a hypothesis from one transaction cycle increased the likelihood that 
I the subsequent hypothesis was also generated from the same transaction cycle. 
I 
I Hoch (1984) showed that people sometimes relied on availability as a cue to make 
I judgments. Moser (1989) extended Hoch's findings to investors' earnings forecasts. 
I Fifty-eight investors were asked to think of supporting and opposing arguments 
about the earnings prospects of a stock and to assess the likelihood that its earnings 
would increase by a certain percentage over the next 12 months. Subjects were 
j randomly assigned to one of four between-subjects groups determined by crossing 
!
two independent variables. One independent variable was the order of reason 
generation which was manipulated on two levels. On the one level, subjects were 
first asked to list the reasons why the earnings would increase, and then list the 
! reasons why the earnings would not increase. The order of reason generation on the 
： other level was reversed. The other independent variable was the amount of external 
information which was manipulated as either low or high. Subjects in the low-
amount group were given only the name of a company, whereas subjects in the high-
j amount group were given both the company name and its financial statements. The 
i results revealed that differential availability of supporting and opposing arguments 
affected investors' probability judgments on the future earnings forecast for a 
！ company. It was also found that accessibility of financial statements did not reduce 
I the availability effect on investors' earnings judgments. 
Anderson, Kaplan and Reckers (1992) extended Moser's study to investigate the 
availability effect on analytical review. Audit managers were presented with a 
scenario in which the client's unaudited financial statements exhibited a significant 
change in inventory turnover. After reading the case materials, half of the subjects 








explanations; the rest of the subjects were asked to generate explanations in the 
S reverse order. Subjects were also asked to evaluate the likelihood that the ratio 
5 
; change was primarily caused by an error or non-error. The results showed that the 
P: 
subjects who listed error explanations second generated significantly fewer error 
explanations than those who listed error explanations first. These results were 
;:.i 
I consistent with the predictions of the output interference theory that focusing first on 
non-error explanations interfered with an auditor's ability to subsequently generate 
* error explanations. However, the subjects' likelihood assessments were not 
I associated with the number of errors and non-errors generated. 
] 
In summary, there were only a limited number of accounting studies that investigated 
the effect of the availability heuristic on accounting judgments. The results of these 
studies were in general consistent with the findings of psychology studies. Auditors 
I and investors were found to use the availability heuristic to make judgments. The 
•‘ i 
j results of Anderson et al (1992), however, indicated that the auditors' likelihood 
assessments for the relationships between the change of ratio and the cause of an 
1 error in analytical review were not consistent with the availability heuristic. 
Therefore, further studies are warranted to resolve these differences. 
I 
3.3.3 Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic 
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic is a general judgment process by which 
individuals focus on an initial value (an anchor) in a decision setting and arrive at the 
final answer by adjusting from that value based on additional information available. 
1 Such adjustments from the anchor were often found to be inadequate (see Section 
i 2.5.3 for more detailed discussion). Evidence is usually received sequentially in a 
typical audit setting. Therefore, auditors may be susceptible to the anchoring bias. 
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Several studies were found to investigate this bias in accounting and auditjudgments. 
These studies are reviewed below. 
Joyce and Biddle (1981a) conducted a series of experiments to investigate whether 
experienced auditors used the anchoring and adjustment heuristic in making audit 
judgments. In Experiments lA and lB, auditors were asked to estimate the incidence 
of significant management fraud by first being given different anchors in terms of the 
numbers of management fraud incidents that they had come across in their previous 
audit assignments. The results strongly supported the presence of the anchoring bias. 
However, when the experimental tasks were more similar to typical audit settings 
than the task in the previous experiments, auditors were not found to commit this 
bias. In Experiments 2A and 2B, Joyce and Biddle gave another group of auditors a 
j list of accounting controls for one part of a client's operation, and asked them to rate 
the extensiveness of audit tests to be performed. Two of the accounting controls 
were then deleted, and the subjects were asked again to rate the extensiveness of 
audit tests to be performed. Contradictory to the results of the previous two 
experiments, the results of both Experiments 2A and 2B suggested that auditors' 
adjustments were appropriate, supporting the notion that auditors were conservative 
in conducting audit assignments. 
In another study of investigating the anchoring bias in analytical review, Kinney and 
Uecker (1982) asked a group of auditors to indicate a range of values for a given 
gross profit percentage within which no investigation should be tendered. The 
anchoring bias was found among those auditors who provided significantly different 
ranges of values depending on the value of a given anchor. The estimated ranges 
were found to be too close to the given anchors. However, the results also showed 
that more auditors in the high-anchor group indicated more investigations than those 
； in the low-anchor group. Therefore, these results suggested that auditors were less 
； willing to accept the financial data indicating economic improvement than the 
_ 
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financial data indicating economic decline, which was consistent with the findings of 
conservatism among auditors in Joyce and Biddle's Experiments 2A and 2B. Kinney 
and Uecker concluded that auditors' judgments were affected by both the given 
anchors and their conservative tendency. 
Biggs and Wild (1985) modified Kinney and Uecker's study by making the 
experimental task more representative of audit tasks in practice. Biggs and WHd 
added two treatment conditions that provided a group of auditors with the financial 
data for the past five years (instead of only the financial data for the past two years in 
Kinney and Uecker's experiment). The results corroborated the major finding of 
Kinney and Uecker's study in that auditors, judgments were biased in the direction of 
an unaudited value. However, the anchoring effect was mitigated when auditors 
were provided with a large and more realistic data set. 
Butler (1986) used three different anchors to examine auditors' direct risk 
assessments on the collectibility of outstanding accounts receivables. Subjects were 
given an allowable risk for incorrectly accepting a given account balance as 
reasonable, and were asked to assess the true risk on the basis of a given sample of 
data. The results provided limited support for the anchoring bias among auditors. 
Only the low-anchor response was consistent with a strict anchoring process. In the 
high-anchor condition, the subjects' mean response indicated an over-adjustment, and 
in the middle-anchor condition, the auditors, response was in the wrong direction. 
Butler attributed these results to a low internal anchor which auditors might have 
brought to the task. 
Butler's suggestion as to the existence of internal anchors among auditors was tested 
by Morris (1993) who asked a group of auditors to examine the collectibility of some 
receivables and the sufficiency of the related allowance for doubtful accounts. 
Subjects were provided with a piece of positive evidence and a piece of negative 
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evidence in two different orders. Experienced auditors were contended to have a 
negative internal anchor, owing to potential legal liability and professional scepticism. 
This contention was supported by the results that showed a primacy effect among 
those auditors who were given negative and then positive evidence, and a recency 
effect among the others who were given positive and then negative evidence. It was 
also found that the existence of a negative internal anchor caused auditors to rank the 
source containing negative information as relatively more important in their 
judgments. 
In summary, there are three major findings in the accounting studies that examined 
the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. First, auditors were found to use an 
anchoring and adjustment process to update their belief to a lesser extent than 
subjects of previous psychology studies. Second, auditors, judgments were affected 
not only by an anchor, but also by their conservative tendency which was shaped by 
their environment of potential legal liability and professional scepticism. Third, 
experienced auditors might have developed their internal anchors through practice. 
The existence of such internal anchors among experienced auditors might account for 
their conservatism. 
3.3.4 Order Effects in Belief Updating 
3.3.4.1 Overview 
The theory of belief-adjustment proposed by Hogarth and Einhom (1992) assumes an 
anchoring and adjustment process in which evidence is evaluated sequentially (see 
Section 2.5.7 of Chapter II for detailed discussion). An audit judgment is recognised 
to be a continuous process of receiving information (including feedback from 
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previous actions), and then choosing to act or not to act (Gibbins，1984). Therefore, 
research on the order effects in belief updating is particularly suitable for auditing 
I • 
； tasks. In fact, this theory has a significant impact on the research area of audit 
I judgments (e.g., Ashton and Ashton, 1988; 1990; Butt and Campbell, 1989; Knechel 
1 and Messier, 1990; Tubbs, Messier and Knechel, 1990; Asare, 1992; Messier, 1992; 
^ Pei, Reed and Koch, 1992a; Krull, Reckers and Wong, 1993; McMillan and White, 
!^ 1993). Research on the order effects in belief updating is also found in management 
I accounting (e.g., Dillard, Kauffman and Spires, 1991) and taxation (e.g., Pei，Reckers 
I and Wyndelts, 1992b) contexts, although research in these contexts did not attract 
the same attention as it did in audit judgments. 
；：•) 
Three issues have been addressed by the accounting studies in this research area: (1) 
do the order effects in belief revision for auditing and accounting tasks follow the 
f models' predictions? (2) what are the impacts of these order effects on accounting 
decisions and actions? and (3) what are the major factors that could affect these order 
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i 3.3.4.2 Model Predictions 
•• '� 
Ashton and Ashton (1988) conducted five experiments to test the belief-adjustment 
models proposed by Hogarth and Einhom (1992). In Experiments lA and lB, 
auditors were first given as anchors three initial estimates of the likelihood that the 
j client's internal controls would prevent or detect material errors. Subjects were then 
i given four pieces of consistent evidence and were asked to investigate whether the 
client's payroll records were correct. In Experiments 2A and 2B of a payroll scenario 
and an accounts receivable scenario, auditors were instead given mixed evidence. In 
I Experiment 3，the effects of the two presentation modes, including Step-by-Step 
! (SbS) and End-of-Sequence (EoS)，on belief revision were examined. The results 
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were consistent with the models' predictions of no order effects for consistent 
evidence, but a recency effect for mixed evidence： The results also showed that 
smaller (larger) anchors were adjusted upward (downward) more by positive 
(negative) evidence. Furthermore, the results showed that given the same evidence, 
I simultaneous processing of the evidence led to a smaller belief revision than 
I sequential processing. Finally, subjects were found to revise their belief to a greater 
I extent when they received evidence contradictory to their current belief. The two 
experiments that related to consistent evidence were replicated by Ashton and Ashton 
(1990) in their Experiments 1 and 2 and similar results were obtained. 
Tubbs et al. (1990) used two scenarios of the collectibility of accounts receivable and 
the faimess of accounts payable, to test the models' prediction. Again, the results 
indicated no order effects for consistent evidence as predicted. When two pieces of 
mixed evidence were evaluated, the predicted recency effect occurred only in the SbS 
response mode, but not in the EoS response mode. When four pieces of mixed 
evidence were evaluated, recency occurred in both response modes. Therefore, the 
[ contradictory result of no recency effect when evaluating two pieces of mixed 
I evidence and in the EoS response mode might be attributed to the small quantity of 
evidence given to the subjects. 
In investigating the recency effect in the different setting of a performance audit for a 
social programme, Pei et al. (1992a) presented two case scenarios to a group of state 
auditors. The results showed a significant recency effect for the mixed evidence 
given, as predicted by the model. The belief adjustments of the subjects were, 
however, found to be more affected by positive evidence than negative evidence, 
which was inconsistent with the findings of conservatism among financial auditors as 
suggested by Ashton and Ashton (1988) and Tubbs et al. (1990). 
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3.3.4.3 Order Effects on Effectiveness 
Given the pervasiveness of the recency effect in accounting judgments, there has been 
a growing concern over this effect on the effectiveness of corresponding accounting 
decisions and actions. Three studies (Dillard et al., 1991; Asare, 1992; Messier, 
I 1992) were found to address this important issue. For instance, Dillard et al. (1991) 
asked a group of students to decide whether actions were justified based on the 
evidence in four generic and four management accounting scenarios. The results 
showed that a significant recency effect was found for the mixed evidence given, but 
this recency effect did not affect the subjects' decisions. 
Similarly, Messier (1992) conducted two experiments in two different audit 
scenarios. In addition to revising their belief after receiving each piece of evidence, 
auditors were asked to make decisions in each scenario. For example, in 
investigating the judgments for the presentation of accounts payable, subjects were 
also asked to indicate the total budgeted hours for the additional work proposed. 
Similarly in a going-concern judgment scenario, subjects were asked to estimate the 
likelihood judgments about issuing a modified audit report. The results of both 
experiments were consistent with the predicted recency effect for mixed evidence, but 
the order of evidence was not found to have any effect on decisions. 
Asare's (1992) study on a similar task of going-concem judgments produced a 
different picture of the order effects on audit decisions. The results indicated that the 
order in which evidence was received by auditors affected their audit consensus. In 
" view of the mixed findings of the order effects on audit effectiveness and the 
. i v 
‘ importance of this issue, further research is warranted to reconcile the differences 
between the results in previous accounting studies. Future research should also 
. attempt to identify the factors that could affect this relationship. 
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3.3.4.4 Factors Affecting the Order Effects 
Several accounting studies were found to examine the major factors that could affect 
the order effects in belief revision, including prior belief, hypothesis-testing strategy, 
experience of the subjects, clients' preference, source reliability, information search 
behaviour and hypothesis framing. 
The effects of prior belief and hypothesis-testing strategy on the order effects in 
revising belief were examined by Butt and Campbell (1989). Auditors were asked to 
evaluate the likelihood that an internal control would prevent or detect a material 
error. Prior belief was manipulated by varying the background material as either a 
positive or negative evaluation of a company. Hypothesis-testing strategy was 
manipulated as confirming, disconfirming or neutral strategy. Nonetheless, the 
results only found a marginally significant three-way interaction among the evidence 
order, prior belief and hypothesis-testing strategy. In the low-prior-belief group, the 
recency effects were found among the subjects in the confirming and neutral groups, 
but not in the disconfirming group. 
Krull et al. (1993) further investigated the effect of prior belief, together with 
experience on the order effects in belief revision, in a task in which auditors were 
asked to assess the need for writing down the client's existing inventory due to 
obsolescence. Prior belief was operationalised as the likelihood of fraudulent 
financial reporting. Similar to Butt and Campbell, only a significant interaction effect 
was found. When presented with a mixture of evidence, the more experienced audit 
managers exhibited a greater recency effect than the less experienced ones. 
Pei et al. (1992b) also investigated the effect of experience, together with the client's 
preference for a particular tax treatment, on the order effects in belief revision. The 
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task was a study of the professional tax preparers' judgments on real estate tax 
reporting. The results showed a three-way interaction, in which the order effects 
were larger for experienced preparers than inexperienced preparers. However, 
experienced preparers were less affected by the client's preference than inexperienced 
ipreparers. The effect of experience on the order effects suggested by Krull et al (1993) and Pei et al (1992b) was, however, not found in the results of McMillan and White (1993) in an experiment that investigated auditors' evaluation of internal 
control. 
The effects of source reliability and information search behaviour were investigated 
by Knechel and Messier (1990). Auditors were asked to assess the collectibility of 
some accounts receivables. Source reliability was manipulated as either a more or a 
less reliable source. Information search behaviour was manipulated as either the 
decision to terminate the evidence search at an earlier or a later stage. It was found 
that subjects who terminated the information search sooner had a significantly higher 
probability assessment only for those who were given positive evidence. It was also 
found that change in auditors, judgment was the largest for those who received more 
reliable, negative evidence. 
The effect of hypothesis framing on the order effects in belief revision was examined 
in two studies (Asare, 1992; McMillan and White, 1993), but the results of these 
studies were mixed. In a series of four experiments investigating auditors' going-
concem judgments, Asare (1992) manipulated hypothesis framing as either a failure 
or a viability condition. The results indicated that hypothesis framing did not have 
any effect on the order effects. However, in an experiment of intemal control 
evaluation, McMillan and White (1993) found that the mean belief revisions for those 
auditors who favoured the error-framed hypothesis were greater than those who 
favoured the environmental (non-error-framed) hypothesis. In addition, source 
reliability was found to interact with the direction of evidence to affect the order 
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effects. Changes in auditors' judgments were the largest for those who received more 
reliable, negative evidence. 





I Three major findings can be drawn from the accounting studies that examined the 
order effects in belief updating reviewed above. First, the predictions of the models 
： proposed by Hogarth and Einhom (1992) were strongly supported in accounting 
tasks. The recency effects were found among tasks with a sequential presentation of 
mixed evidence, but no order effects were found in tasks with a sequential 
1' 
： presentation of consistent evidence. Smaller (larger) anchors were also found to 
I adjust upward (downward) more by positive (negative) evidence. 
..,.i j 
：、！ 
Second, the results of the recency effects on decisions and actions were, however, 
j niixed. While Dillard et al. (1991) and Messier (1992) did not find any impact of the 
j order effects on accounting and audit decisions, Asare (1992) showed that the order 
i 
I of evidence affected auditors' consensus. 
^ 
Third, some factors were found to affect the order effects in accounting tasks. Prior 
belief was found to interact with hypothesis-testing strategy to affect the order 
effects. The effects of subjects' experience and hypothesis framing on the order 
effects were fairly consistent. Information search behaviour was found to affect the 
order effects, in that subjects who terminated the information search sooner had 
significantly higher judgments on the collectibility of outstanding receivable balances 
only among those who were given positive evidence. 
！ ！ ！ 
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Although some of these factors were found to have significant effects on the order 
effects, their relationships were more complicated than those hypothesised. Future 
research should focus on developing better theories by using different tasks and 
adopting different research approaches to examine these relationships. 
3.3.5 Conjunction Fallacy 
The conjunction fallacy is the violation of the conjunction rule that compares the 
probabilities of the constituent events with the probability of their conjunction (see 
Section 2.5.5 of Chapter II for more detailed discussion). This fallacy will impair the 
effectiveness of an audit by predisposing auditors to generate incorrect hypotheses or 
explanations for particular types of financial statement errors. The major issue that 
accounting researchers should address is whether auditors commit to this fallacy 
similar to novice people examined in previous psychology studies, leading to 
systematic errors injudgments. 
Unfortunately, only one accounting study was found to address the above issue. 
Frederick and Libby (1986) conducted a series of experiments to investigate how the 
auditors' knowledge interacted with current audit evidence to determine their 
judgment. They asked both experienced auditors and students to predict the 
implications of some internal control weaknesses on financial statement errors, by 
ranking the likelihood of individual account errors and the combinations of those 
account errors. They posited that students only had the knowledge of a double-entry 
generating process to identify the concurrence of certain pairs of account errors. 
Besides this knowledge, auditors had knowledge of the associations of internal 
control weaknesses with particular types of account errors. This knowledge 
difference, when functioning according to the feature-matching model, led to 
different patterns of the conjunction fallacy. 
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The results were consistent with Frederick and Libby's propositions of the feature-
|
matching model and the knowledge differences between auditors and students. When 
both account errors were consistent with the prototypical outcome of the internal 
j control scenario, auditors judged the account-errors conjunction to be more Ukely 
？ 
I than either of its constituents, but students judged the account-errors conjunction to 
1 be more likely than one of its constituents. When only one of the two account errors 
1 .' 
I was consistent with the prototypical outcome of the internal control scenario, both 
I experienced auditors and students judged the conjunction to be more likely than one 
of its constituents. These results further demonstrated that the knowledge base of 











j The principle of description invariance states that the way a situation is described 
should not affect one's decision. As discussed earlier in Section 2.5.8 of Chapter II， 
j the results of a number of psychology studies indicated to the contrary that 
individuals, choices were affected by changes in how a situation was described or 
framed (Loftus and Zanni，1975; Bransford, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; 
Loftus, 1982). This phenomenon is called the framing effect. Several studies 
； investigated this effect in auditing and management accounting contexts with mixed 
findings, and these studies are reviewed below. 
^ 
: For example, Kida (1984b) conducted an experiment to examine whether auditors' 
丨 going-concem judgments were affected by the way of problem framing. Subjects 
！ were randomly assigned to two different framing groups. Subjects in the failure-
framing group were asked to determine if a firm was going to fail in the coming two 
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；； years, whereas subjects in the viable-framing group were asked to determine if a firm 
I was going to remain viable for at least two more years. All the subjects were then 
！ asked to list the information from the firm descriptions that they considered to be 
\ 
I relevant to their decisions, and to estimate the probabilities that their decisions were 
i correct. Kida (1984b) found no significant difference in the number of failure items 
! 
i that were listed by both framing groups, but the subjects in the viable-framing group 
:;:) 
1 listed significantly more viable items than those in the failure-framing group. Also, 
I the probability judgments between the two framing groups were found to be not 
I significantly different from each other. Therefore, these results provided only weak 
support for the framing effect, which was consistent with the conservative approach 
1 
I adopted by auditors. 
;•! ^ 
： Trotman and Sng (1989) extended Kida's (1984b) study to a similar task of going-
^ concem judgments, but with evidence presented sequentially. Auditors werefirst 
provided with prior expectation information, and were then asked to identify the 
1 relevant cues to account for their judgments. Subjects were randomly assigned to 
• j 
one of the eight between-subjects groups determined by crossing three independent 
variables. Hypothesis framing was manipulated in the same way as in Kida's (1984b) 
i experiment. Prior expectation was manipulated as the likelihood of either failure or 
； viability. Cue diagnosticity was manipulated as either high or low. 
I 
j � 
I Trotman and Sng found a marginally significant interaction effect of hypothesis 
i framing and prior expectation on the net number of failure cues (the number of failure 
cues minus the number of viability cues) that were considered to be relevant by the 
j subjects in making their judgments. When prior expectation was strong, hypothesis 
framing was found to have a significant effect on the net number of failure cues 
identified. However, when prior expectation was weak, hypothesis framing was 
found to have no significant effect. It was also found that cue diagnosticity affected 
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1 auditors' judgments. These results further supported Kida's (1984b) conclusion of ^ ‘ 
I only weak support for the framing effect on auditors' going-concem judgments. 
V 
藝丨 _ 
； In examining the effects of alternative sample space representations on the accuracy 
of auditors' uncertainty judgment, Shields, Solomon and Waller (1987) manipulated 
,： the framing of sample space for accounts as either book value misstatements or audit 
. . , i 
values. They hypothesised that auditors organised their knowledge in memory as 
I schemata that served as cognitive data bases about the uncertain quantity. The effect 
I of different sample spaces on auditors' judgments depended largely on whether 
auditors used a single schema (or a set of closely related schemata) or separate 
schemata for different sample space representations. Contrary to the findings in 
i psychology studies, Shields et al. (1987) did not find any significant difference in the 
accuracy of auditors' judgments between the two types of framing. They attributed 
！ this result to the type of subjects used in their experiment. 
. : i 
In a management accounting task of analysing a decision of variance investigation, 
Lipe (1993) found framing to have a significant effect on decision-making. Both 
business students and experienced business people were asked to evaluate the 
i perceived benefits and the performance of an investigator when investigation 
expenditure was framed as either a cost or a loss. Both groups of subjects were 
i found to perceive a benefit from framing the investigation expenditure as a cost, 
whereas no such benefit was perceived from framing the investigation expenditure as 
i 
j a loss. A similar result was also found in evaluating the performance of the 
investigator. A manager was rated more favourably when the investigation 
expenditure was framed as a cost than when it was framed as a loss. 
! 
^ 
In summary, studies that examined the framing effect on accounting judgments 
produced mixed results. While Lipe (1993) supported the framing effect in a 
management accounting context, Kida (1984b) provided only weak support for this 
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effect, and Shields et al. (1987) did not support the existence of this effect at all in an 
audit task. Perhaps Trotman and Sng's (1989) results provided a direction to 
reconcile these conflicting findings. They found that framing did not have a direct 
effect on auditors' judgments, but it interacted with some other factors, such as prior 












\ Auditors need to gather and evaluate evidence for forming an opinion as to whether 
I clients' financial statements are presented truly and fairly in accordance with generally 
j accepted accounting principles. Throughout an audit process, auditors often inherit 
I or generate diagnostic hypotheses to guide their search for evidence (Libby, 1985; 
{ Bedard and Biggs, 1991). Research in psychology found that individuals tend to 
search for evidence that confirms their hypotheses, and to evaluate evidence in such a 
： way that their hypotheses are confirmed (Wason, 1960; Skov and Sherman, 1986; 
I Higgins and Bargh, 1987; Klayman and Ha, 1989). This phenomenon is called the 
： confirmation bias. If auditors follow such a way in gathering and evaluating 
I evidence, the effectiveness of an audit process depends largely on the correctness of 
I their initial hypotheses (Church, 1990). 
I 
Motivated by the potential threats of this bias on the audit profession, several 
accounting studies investigated whether experienced auditors may be susceptible to 
this bias found among student subjects in previous psychology studies. Some of 
these accounting studies were closely related to the accounting studies that 
i investigated the framing effect, as reviewed earlier in Section 3.3.6. Although 
j accounting studies that investigated both the confirmation bias and the framing effect 
might provide subjects with initial hypotheses in different types of framing, only those 
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generate their own initial hypotheses. Therefore, it is not difficult to find accounting 
research which addressed both issues in the same study. 
In examining auditors' going-concem judgments, Kida (1984b) found no significant 
difference in the number of failure items listed by subjects in the two framing groups, 
] but subjects in the viable-framing group listed significantly more viable items than 
those in the failure-framing group. In addition, the difference in the probability 
assessments between the subjects in the two framing groups was found to be 
insignificant. Therefore, these results provided only weak support for the existence 
i of the confirmation bias among auditors. 
i 
i 
I Trotman and Sng (1989) extended Kida's (1984b) study to a task of going-concem 
丨 judgments with evidence presented sequentially. The results indicated a marginally 
significant interaction effect of hypothesis framing and prior expectation on the net 
number of failure cues that were considered to be relevant by subjects for making 
their judgments. When prior expectation was strong, the hypothesis framing effect 
was significant. When prior expectation was weak however, the hypothesis framing 
effect was found to be insignificant These results further supported Kida's (1984b) 
conclusion of there being only weak support for the confirmation bias. 
In investigating the information-seeking behaviour in using analytical reviews for 
initial audit planning, Kaplan and Reckers (1989) asked a group of auditors to select 
error and irregularity questions and rank the first six questions selected. Conflicting 
) results were obtained in that the number of error and irregularity questions selected 
by the auditors was not affected by the initial belief provided, nor by the experience 
of auditors. Kaplan and Reckers, however, found a significant interaction effect 
between the initial belief and the auditors' experience on the ranking of the question 
1 selected. For less experienced auditors, as the initial belief on the probability of 
^ 
• i ‘ i , ••', 
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errors or irregularities increased, the perceived error weighting also increased. This 
relation did not hold among those auditors with more experience. 
As mentioned earlier in Section 3.3.4.4, Butt and Campbell (1989) investigated the 
effects of hypothesis-testing strategy and prior belief on the confirmation bias. A 
group of auditors were asked to estimate the probability that a firm's internal controls 
would prevent or detect material errors. The results revealed that hypothesis-testing 
strategy had a significant effect on the confirmation bias only for those subjects who 
were given positive prior belief. The probability estimated by the subjects who were 
assigned to the confirming-strategy group was significantly different from that 
estimated by those in the other two groups. Therefore, the results also suggested 
weak support for the confirmation bias found among auditors. 
i Church (1991) investigated whether auditors who had committed to an audit task 
would be more likely to use a confirmatory strategy. Seventy-nine auditors were 
asked to allocate a particular number of budgeted audit hours to two transaction 
cycles, given that unexpected fluctuation was found in a firm's gross margin. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to two levels of commitment. In the strongly-
committed group, subjects were asked to provide written arguments justifying why 
they selected a particular cycle. They were also told that their arguments would be 
discussed later with representatives from their offices or firms as part of a second 
research project. To heighten commitment, subjects' names and firm affiliations 
appeared at the top of the page on which they wrote their arguments. Subjects in the 
weakly-committed group were not asked to provide written arguments, nor were 
their names and firm affiliations included in the experimental materials. The results 
provided only weak support for the commitment effect. The strongly-committed 
subjects were found to allocate more hours to the cycle being selected than the 
weakly-committed subjects. The strongly-committed subjects were also found to 
assign more importance to the confirming cues than the weakly-committed subjects. 
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No difference, however, was found between the two commitment groups in assigning 
importance to the disconfirming cues, nor in recalling the disconfirming evidence. 
In summary, the accounting studies reviewed in this section provided only weak 
support for the confirmation bias among auditors in a variety of audit tasks, including 
going-concem judgments, analytical review for initial audit planning, evaluation of 
internal control systems, and allocation of budgeted audit schedules. These robust 
findings could be explained by the same argument of conservatism among auditors. 
3.3.8 Hindsight Bias 
The hindsight bias is the tendency for individuals with outcome knowledge to claim 
that they would have estimated a probability of occurrence for the reported outcome 
which is higher than they would have estimated without the outcome information (see 
Section 2.5.6 of Chapter II for more detailed discussion). Several accounting studies 
were found to investigate the implications of this bias on accounting decision 
behaviour in the contexts of auditing and management accounting. These studies are 
described below. 
• * . 
Buchman (1985) asked a group of graduate students to make going-concem 
judgments. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental groups 
determined by crossing two independent variables. The first independent variable 
was subjects' knowledge of bankruptcy which was manipulated as either foresight or 
hindsight. Type of audit opinion was the second independent variable and was 
manipulated as either unqualified or qualified audit opinion. The results indicated 
that the probability of bankruptcy estimated by the subjects in the hindsight group 
was higher than those in the foresight group. The type of audit opinion suggested, 
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however, was found to have no significant effect on the bankruptcy probability 
judgment. 
Reimers and Butler (1992) examined the effect of a surprising outcome on the 
hindsight bias in two auditing scenarios of evaluating internal control and issuing of a 
qualifying opinion. A group of auditors were randomly assigned to one of the four 
experimental groups in each experiment: foresight, hindsight with no surprise, 
hindsight with surprise, and foresight with a decision aid. Surprise was manipulated 
as inconsistency between the evidence and the outcome, whereas no surprise was 
manipulated as consistency between the evidence and the outcome. The results 
suggested that the judgments made by the foresight group were different from that 
made by the hindsight with surprise group. The judgments made by the foresight 
group and the hindsight with no surprise group were, however, not significantly 
different from each other. 
Anderson, Lowe and Reckers (1993) compared the judgments between auditors and 
thejudges in a court case involving auditors. Fifty-eight auditors and 65 judges were 
asked to evaluate an audit engagement partner's decision not to book losses due to 
possible inventory obsolescence. In addition to the subject group, two more 
independent variables were examined. Environmental conditions were manipulated 
as either red flags or white flags. The inclusion of flag cues was to enhance the 
hindsight bias. Red and white flags provided the background information of the 
company president, suggesting high and low risk of fraudulent reporting respectively. 
The outcome information was manipulated as either a positive or a negative outcome 
condition. The results revealed that the auditors evaluated the performance of the 
audit engagement partner's decision more favourably than the judges. These results 
indicated an expectation gap between the expectation and the actual perception of the 
judges on the audit profession in terms of the auditor's role and responsibilities. Also, 
the subjects as a whole exhibited the hindsight bias in which subjects who were given 
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the positive outcome evaluated the performance of the audit engagement partner's 
decision more favourably than those who were given the negative outcome. 
Nonetheless, the inclusion of flag cues did not affect the judgments of the subjects. 
The hindsight bias was also supported in two management accounting studies 
(Brown and Solomon, 1987; Lipe, 1993). Brown and Solomon (1987) asked 96 
business students to evaluate a capital budgeting committee's decision to fund a 
particular proposal. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four outcome 
groups: no outcome reported (foresight), project failure due to a change in the 
federal copyright law (negative hindsight with evaluatee less responsible for the 
outcome), project failure due to economic factors (negative hindsight with evaluatee 
more responsible for the outcome), and project success (positive hindsight). The 
results indicated the existence of the hindsight bias among the subjects. The 
evaluation of the "negative hindsight with evaluatee more responsible for the 
outcome" group and the "positive hindsight" group was significantly different from 
that of the "foresight" group. However, the evaluation of the "negative hindsight 
with evaluatee less responsible for the outcome" group was not significantly different 
from that of the "foresight" group. 
In another management accounting task, Lipe (1993) conducted three experiments by 
asking both business students and business people to evaluate a subordinate's 
performance, perceived benefits and the degree of cost or loss in a variance 
investigation. Subjects were randomly assigned to two outcome groups: the 
outcome of the investigation was out of control versus in control. It was found that 
the subordinate's performance was perceived more favourably if the system was 
found to be out of control than if it was found to. be in control. This result also 




Accounting researchers identified a number of factors affecting the degree of the 
hindsight bias in making accounting decisions. These factors can therefore be used to 
mitigate the extent of this bias. As documented earlier in this section, Brown and 
I Solomon found that the effect of outcome information on evaluating managerial 
j 
decisions was significantly smaller when an evaluator had had prior involvement in 
the decision being evaluated, than when he or she had had no such prior involvement. 
Similarly, the effect of outcome information on evaluating failed managerial decisions 
varied in direct relation to the extent to which the reported outcome implied that an 
evaluatee was responsible for anticipating the outcome. 
I I 1 
I • • 
， • a. 
£ In summary, most of the accounting studies reviewed in this section provided only 
;„ weak support for the hindsight bias committed by several types of subjects in a 
： variety of accounting tasks. These subjects included business students, business 
I people, auditors, and judges in a court case involving auditors. Although these 
I studies did not provide the reasons for this difference, the conservatism among 
,.« 
二 auditors could once again be used to account for some of these results. 
<^ ,'it % 
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3.3.9 Accountabil i ty 
It was recognised that the most important aspect of auditors, judgments is to justify 
their decisions (Gibbins, 1984; Gibbins and Emby, 1984; Emby and Gibbins，1988). 
Messier and Quilliam (1992) reviewed the accounting literature of accountability and 
proposed that accountability tended to increase the auditors' level of cognitive 
processing, which might have both positive and negative effects on judgment process 
and performance. Therefore, the effect of accountability on audit performance 
attracted most accounting researchers’ attention in this area (e.g., Ashton, 1990; 
1992; Johnson and Kaplan, 1991; Kennedy, 1993). 
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Johnson and Kaplan (1991) asked a group of auditors to assess the risk of 
obsolescence for inventory items. Subjects in the accountable group were told that 
their judgments would be reviewed and they would be asked to explain their 
judgments. Subjects in the control group were told that their judgments were 
anonymous. Judgment performance of the two groups was compared for consensus, 
consistency, and self-insight. Consensus was defined as an agreement across 
auditors. Consistency was defined as the proportion of variance captured by a model 
of the individual's judgments in relation to the corresponding cues. Self-insight was 
defined as the extent to which auditors were aware of their own judgment process. 
The results revealed that auditors in the accountable group were found to display 
higher consensus and self-insight than auditors in the control group. The consistency 
of their performance between these two groups was, however, not significantly 
different from each other. 
Ashton (1990; 1992) examined the effects of accountability and the use of decision 
aids on audit judgment performance. Auditors were asked to predict the ratings 
assigned by Moody's Investors Serviceto bonds issued by 16 industrial corporations 
based on three financial ratios and a decision aid that was derived from a linear 
regression of the actual Moody's ratings on the same ratios. The results suggested 
that when a decision aid was not available,justification increased mean accuracy and 
decreased variability among the subjects, relative to the absence of the justification 
manipulation. When the decision aid was available in addition to the justification 
manipulation, mean accuracy decreased and variability among the subjects increased, 
relative to the absence of the justification manipulation (Ashton, 1990). Therefore, 
the justification requirement promoted greater consensus among auditors. 
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Kennedy (1993) used a sample consisting of 58 executive M.B.A. students and 171 
auditors to examine whether accountability could be used to reduce the order effects 
in belief updating. It was found that post- and non-accountable M.B.A. students who 
received evidence in a positive/negative order exhibited a recency effect and judged 
the likelihood of failure to be greater than those who received the evidence in a 
negative/positive order. Pre-accountable M.B.A. students and auditors did not 
exhibit such a recency effect in their likelihoodjudgments. 
In summary, the studies reviewed above lent some comfort to the potential problems 
associated with the judgment biases committed by auditors. The judgment biases 
commonly found among students did not seem to be a major problem for auditors in 
performing audit tasks. The major reason is that the task structure of auditing has 
incorporated the element of accountability to serve as a defence against the effort-
driven judgment biases, such as the order effects in belief revision. 
3.3.10 Base-Rate Fallacy 
3.3.10.1 Overview 
The base-rate fallacy, the focus of the current study, is the individuals' tendency to 
under-utilise base-rate information in favour of case-specific evidence, rather than 
integrate the two as prescribed in the normative probability theories (see Section 
2.5.12 for more detailed discussion). Accounting studies examining this fallacy were 
classified broadly into three categories by Smith and Kida ( 1 9 9 1 ) : � attention to 
base r a t e s , � attention to source reliability, and (3) insensitivity to sample size. 
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3.3.10.2 Attention to Base Rates 
A base rate is an important piece of information when auditors or financial statement 
users are required to make likelihood judgments on the management fraud or the 
going-concem of a firm. Several accounting studies used both business students and 
accounting professionals, such as auditors and bank loan officers, as subjects to 
examine these judgments. On the one hand, accounting researchers attempted to 
verify the applicability of the findings in previous psychology studies to accounting 
experts. On the other, accounting researchers designed more realistic business 
problems to investigate whether the ignorance of base-rate information, found in 
11 previous psychology studies, was due to unfamiliar tasks being encountered by 
= novice subjects. These accounting studies are reviewed below. 
[_^  
• w> y 
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Swieringa, Gibbins, Larsson and Sweeney (1976) conducted two experiments by 
asking a group of students to perform highly abstract tasks. Experiment lA 
replicated the Kahneman and Tversky's (1973) classical lawyer/engineer study. 
Subjects were given brief personality sketches that were sampled at random from a 
group consisting of 70 engineers and 30 lawyers (or 30 engineers and 70 lawyers). 
Subjects were then asked to assess the probability that each description belonged to a 
lawyer (or an engineer). The results conformed substantially to the Kahneman and 
Tversky's findings. The median responses indicated that the subjects focused on base 
rates only when no individuating information was provided or when they perceived 
the individuating information as being useless, but they ignored base rates when they 
perceived the individuating information as being useful. Experiment lB adopted the 
Kahneman and Tversky's experiment to describe the intemal control system of a 
company. The results were quite similar to those of Experiment lA. 
Joyce and Biddle (1981b) conducted a series of experiments to investigate whether 
base-rate information was ignored by auditors in fraud detection tasks. The first 
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experiment used an adapted version of the medical-diagnosis problem of Hammerton 
(1973). One hundred and thirty-two auditors were told that a team of accountants 
and psychologists had developed a procedure to test for management fraud by 
comparing the personality profile for a key manager to a master profile compiled by 
clinical psychologists. On the basis of the similarity.of the two profiles, the test was 
said to signal "fraud" or "no fraud". They were then asked to assess the probability 
that a key manager who received a "fraud" test signal was actually involved in 
fraudulent activity. The results indicated that auditors did not completely ignore the 
t ‘ 
given base-rate information, but their responses to this information were found to be 
insufficient. The subsequent experiments conducted by Joyce and Biddle (1981b) 
X 
I only modified the values of base rates and the population size of management 
s 
I descriptions. The results were similar to those of the first experiment. :. 
f Holt (1987) extended the results of Joyce and Biddle (1981b) to student subjects and 
I v^ “ 
I p 
to comparing the judgments of both student and auditor subjects. Holt found that the 
auditors, judgments in Joyce and Biddle's study were not better than the students' 
I : judgments in Holt,s experiment on the same task of detecting management fraud. 
I ‘...::.:: 
Similarly, the responses of auditors and students to the "taxicab case" were not 
significantly different. Therefore, the evidence integration was not apparently driven 
二 by the auditing context. These results suggested that the actual framing of the case 
rather than the type of subjects, or the context, determined how the subjects 
integrated evidence. 
/ 
The results of previous studies that documented the insufficient attention given to 
base rates drove accounting researchers to investigate the conditions under which 
auditors and financial statement users would pay more attention to base-rate 
information. The variables being investigated included diagnosticity (Johnson, 1983; 
Hackenbrack, 1992) and neutrality (Hackenbrack, 1992) of case-specific evidence, 
and causality and specificity o fbase - r a t e information (Kida, 1984a). 
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Johnson (1983) conducted an experiment to investigate the tendency to ignore base 
rates and to rely exclusively on the representativeness of a company's financial 
position when making going-concem judgments. Seventy students participated in the 
I experiment. The results suggested that the subjects' probability assessments were 
I sensitive to base-rate information when a corporate financial profile was perceived to 
be of little value in discriminating between the bankruptcy and nonbankmptcy 
population stereotypes. Even in those instances where base rates were not ignored, 
firm-specific financial data continued to dominate subjects' probability assessments to 
a greater extent than those prescribed by the Bayesian rule. The results of Johnson's 
I experiment supported the notion that the relative perceived relevance of base-rate 
information and case-specific information determined which type of information 
r 
would dominate probabilistic judgments. Decreasing the relative relevance of case-
specific information increased the relative importance of base-rate information. With 
similar logic, increasing the relative relevance of base-rate information also increased 
the relative importance of base-rate information. This suggestion was further 
examined by Kida (1984a). 
Kida (1984a) asked 73 auditor partners and managers to make going-concem 
judgments and investigated the effects of the causality and specificity of a base rate 
on their judgments. Causality was manipulated as either causal or non-causal. A 
non-causal base rate was simply stated that 2% of all firms failed. A causal base rate 
was stated that 2% of firms with cash flows similar to those of the selected firms 
failed. Specificity was manipulated as either specific or non-specific. A specific base 
i rate was stated that 2% of all the firms in the same industry as the selected firms' 
failed. A non-specific base rate was stated as being the same as the non-causal base 
rate. Subjects were randomly assigned to the four between-subjects groups 
determined by crossing the two independent variables of causality and specificity as 







only. There were no effects of the specific base rate nor the interaction of specificity 
and causality on their judgments. The result of no effect of the specific base rate was 
inconsistent with the results of the extant psychology research (Ajzen, 1977; Carroll 
and Siegler, 1977; Bar-Hillel, 1980a; Tversky and Kahneman, 1982a; Bar-Hillel, 
1983). It is still unknown whether the insignificant effect of the specific base rate 
was due to insufficient manipulation of the variable or due to the effect of having 
different types of subject. Certainly further studies to resolve this question are 
needed. 
Auditors are required to make judgments on the basis of a broad set of evidence. 
While some evidence is diagnostic, some other is nondiagnostic. It was found in 
psychology research that when subjects were given a mixture of diagnostic and 
� nondiagnostic evidence, they made less extreme (more regressive) judgments than 
I 
I those who were given only diagnostic evidence (Nisbett，Zukier and Lemley, 1981; 
\ Zukier, 1982; Tetlock and Boettger, 1989). This phenomenon is called the "dilution 
effect." 
Hackenbrack (1992) tested the dilution effect in an audit context. Thirty-nine 
, , auditors were asked to assess the change in a company's exposure to fraudulent 
1丨： reporting upon providing both diagnostic evidence and non-diagnostic evidence, 
il' Diagnostic evidence was manipulated as evidence pointing to increasing (or 
^ decreasing) the company's exposure to fraudulent reporting. Non-diagnostic 
“ evidence was not related to the company's exposure to fraudulent reporting, and was 
i manipulated as favourable, unfavourable or neutral evidence. The results suggested 
： that auditors' assessments of the change in a company's exposure to fraudulent 
I reporting were found to be less extreme when nondiagnostic evidence was available 
than when it was not available. In addition, auditors' assessments were found to be 
less extreme when nonneutral-nondiagnostic evidence was available than when 
I ： 
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3.3.10.3 Attention to Source Reliability 
Source reliability is an important topic in accounting. Information on financial 
statements is provided by the management of a firm, which in tum is audited by 
auditors. The quality of this information therefore depends highly on the reliabHity of 
the firm's management and its auditors. Also, auditors rely on the representation 
made by the management to confirm some important information not being audited. 
The reliability of this representation should be used by auditors in estimating the risk 
of issuing a wrong opinion. Moreover, senior auditors rely on the work done by 
junior auditors to make judgments. The question of how senior auditors evaluate the 
� reliability of the work done by junior auditors is also an interesting and important 
^ empirical issue. 
Accounting research in source reliability focuses mainly on how auditors evaluate the 
source reliability of a firm's management, who makes representation and estimation 
on certain financial information of its firm for the purpose of performing an audit. 
This type of accounting research was found in the areas of evaluating the collectibility 
of accounts receivable (Joyce and Biddle, 1981b; Rebele, Heintz and Briden, 1988), 
evaluating internal control systems (Bamber, 1983), and analytical review (Cohen and 
Kida, 1989; Anderson, Koonce and Marchant, 1994; Hirst, 1994). In other 
accounting areas, only one study was found to address the evaluation of the 
；； characters of firms' management by lenders in lending decisions (Beaulieu, 1994). 
[ These studies are discussed below. 
, Two of the experiments (Experiments 3A and 3B) conducted by Joyce and Biddle 
(1981b) were to investigate the effect of source reliability in terms of customer 
credit-worthiness on auditors' probability assessments on the collectibility of accounts 
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receivable. These two experiments differed primarily in their experimental designs. 
One experiment used a between-subjects design, whereas the other used a within-
subjects design. Source reliability was manipulated by customer description. In the 
丨 low source-reliability condition, information was provided by client's credit manager, 
whereas in the high source-reliability condition, information was provided by an 
independent credit agency. The results of the two experiments were not conclusive. 
Source reliability was found to significantly affect auditors' judgments in the within-
subjects manipulation, but not in the between-subjects one. Joyce and Biddle 
(1981b) speculated that these mixed results might be caused by their insufficient 
manipulation of source reliability in their between-subjects design. 
！ 
I 
Rebele et al. (1988) tested this proposed cause for the conflicting results in Joyce and 
:+ Biddle's (1981b) study. Auditors were asked to make judgments on the true value of 
a client's uncollectible receivables. Rebele et al. used a stronger manipulation for 
source reliability by describing the expertise of a client's employee as either high or 
low. They found that their subjects placed more reliance on the evidence obtained 
‘ f r o m the high-expertise source than on that obtained from the low-expertise source. 
The issue of how source reliability affects audit judgment made at successively higher 
levels of auditors was addressed by Bamber (1983). Auditors were asked to assume 
the role of audit managers who were required to evaluate the strength of a client's 
internal control system, based on the results of sampling procedures conducted by 
subordinates with different reliability. Source reliability was manipulated as either 
high or low technical ability of the subordinates. The results strongly indicated that 
source reliability within an audit firm had a significant impact on audit managers, 
judgment. In fact, a comparison of the auditors' posterior judgment with the 
丨 normative probability estimates suggested somewhat excessive discounting for less-
than-perfect source reliability. This finding was inconsistent with cascaded inference 
research that found insufficient discounting for source-reliability information (Schum 
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and DuCharme, 1971; Schum, DuCharme and DePitts, 1973; Schum, 1980). 
Although the findings might be due, in part, to the use of a repeated measures design, 
this design represented a common situation for an audit in practice. 
The extent of substantive tests in an audit should be affected by the reliability of an 
internal control system. All things being equal, the stronger the system, the less the 
extent of detailed substantive tests required to achieve the same level of confidence of 
an opinion issued by auditors. To test this premise, Cohen and Kida (1989) asked a 
group of auditors to determine if the nature and/or the extent of this typical audit plan 
would require any modifications after viewing the description of the firm's internal 
control and the analytical review results. They adopted a between-subjects design in 
which the firm's internal control was manipulated as either strong or weak, and the 
analytical review results were manipulated as pointing to either an error or no error. 
In Cohen and Kida's study, it was found that both the firm's internal control and the 
analytical review results had significant effects on the auditors' judgments on the 
number of hours allocated to the subsequent detailed audits. Auditors were found to 
allocate more hours of audit work to a weak intemal control system than to a strong 
internal control system. Auditors were also found to allocate more hours of audit 
work when the analytical review results pointed to an error than to no error. 
Furthermore, consistent with other accounting studies that auditors had a tendency 
towards conservatism, auditors in this study did not reduce the amount of audit work 
when the analytical review results signalled no error. 
Auditors inevitably rely on the representation provided by the management of a firm 
to explain any unexpected fluctuation found during an analytical review. Anderson et 
a i (1994) investigated the effects of source competence and the timing of receiving 
the source-competence information on assessing the likelihood that a client manager's 
explanation accounted for substantially all the increase in gross margin, and on 
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recalling case information. Auditors were assigned to one of the four treatment 
groups determined by crossing two levels of source competence (high or low) and 
two timings of receiving the source-competence information (before versus after 
receiving the client manager's explanation). The results indicated that the client 
manager's explanation was considered by auditors to more likely account for 
substantially all the increase in gross margin when the source was highly competent, 
than when the source was less competent. In addition, auditors recalled more case 
information when the source was highly competent and the source-competence 
information was received by the auditors before the manager's explanation was given 
to them, than when the source was less competent and the source-competence 
information was received by the auditors after being given the manager's explanation. 
Source competence was further investigated by Hirst (1994) in two experiments. 
The first experiment investigated the effects of source competence and source 
objectivity on auditors' probability estimation of inventory misstatement. Source 
competence was manipulated on two levels. The high source competence described 
the source as a specialist with excellent technical ability, whereas the low source 
competence described the source as a specialist with below average technical ability. 
Source objectivity was manipulated as either an independent audit firm or a client's 
chief financial officer. Certainly, the independent audit firm was a more objective 
source than the client's chief financial officer. Hirst found that the high competence-
high objectivity source's report had greater inferential value to the auditors' judgment 
than any other reports. 
Hirst's second experiment investigated the effects of source objectivity and source 
verifiability on auditors' probability estimation of inventory misstatement. Source 
verifiability was manipulated on two levels. The less verifiable report dealt with 
provision for obsolete inventory, whereas the more verifiable report dealt with 
inventory pricing and cut-off. Like the results of the first experiment, source 
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objectivity was found to have a similar effect on the auditors' probability estimation. 
Source verifiability was, however, found to have no such effect. 
The only accounting study examining source reliability not related to auditing was 
performed by Beaulieu (1994) who examined the effects of a loan applicant's 
character on lending decisions and risk assessments of the loan. One hundred and 
thirty bank loan officers were provided with both accounting and character facts 
which were manipulated as either positive or negative. The results indicated that 
bank loan officers were more likely to grant loans to applicants with positive 
accounting and character facts than those with positive accounting facts but negative 
character facts. When accounting facts were negative, bank loan officers' decisions 
were not affected by character facts at all. The results for the risk assessments made 
by bank loan officers were similar to those of the loan granting decisions. 
3.3.10.4 Insensitivity to Sample Size 
In view of a high cost and practical impossibility of testing all evidence that supports 
financial statements, auditors are frequently required to rely on sample evidence to 
assess the characteristics of an audit population. They are regularly called on to 
determine appropriate sample sizes or to analyse and interpret sample results. 
Therefore, auditors' insensitivity to sample size could lead to serious mistakes in their 
judgments. Although this issue is important, only two accounting studies were found 
to address it. These are described below. 
Swieringa et al (1976) conducted a series of experiments to replicate the results of 
insensitivity to sample size found in previous psychology studies. In two of their 
experiments, they adopted the "hospital problem" as described by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) and constructed a problem of similar structure but in a business 
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context. These problems were then presented to a group of students. The results of 
these two experiments suggested a general failure among their subjects to recognise 
more variable sample results in smaller samples. 
In another set of experiments, Swieringa et al. first replicated and presented the "ums 
problem" described by Kahneman and Tversky to a group of students. They then 
presented an accounting-oriented problem of similar structure to another group of 
students. Once again, a large number of subjects were found to be insensitive to 
sample size. A simple translation from the ums problem to an accounting-oriented 
problem was, however, found to have a significant effect on the subjects' judgments. 
Subjects in the accounting-oriented problem were found to choose the correct 
answers more often than those in the more abstract ums problem. This indicated the 
situational sensitivity of the results and suggested that the problem of insensitivity to 
sample size would be mitigated when auditors were dealing with familiar audit tasks. 
i 
I This suggestion was investigated by Uecker and Kinney (1977). 
I 
[ Uecker and Kinney presented an audit situation involving a compliance test to 112 
auditors, and provided in each problem a finite population, a sample size, the number 
of errors, and a sample error rate. Subjects were asked to select the sample results 
that provided better evidence with a population error rate of 5% or less. Overall, 
69% of the responses were correct, which was much higher than those reported by 
the other studies in psychology using students as subjects. These results suggested 
that many auditors were insensitive to sample size, but their sensitivity was much 







3.3.10.5 Summary for Accounting Research on the Base-Rate Fallacy 
1 
I i • , i 
Similar to previous psychology studies, business students, auditors and lenders were 
found to commit the base-rate fallacy. Fortunately, when they were asked to make 
I judgments in more practical accounting tasks, the extent of this fallacy was found to 
|, be much less serious than that in psychology studies. However, only few accounting 
studies were found to investigate this fallacy, especially in those tasks other than 
I auditing. Certainly, these results are not conclusive and this research area warrants 




3.3.11 Overconfidence Effect 
I Auditors and financial statement users are frequently required to make probabilistic 
judgments for future uncertain events. For example, auditors need to issue an audit 
opinion, which is a kind of probability assessment, based on the strength of evidence 
collected and examined. As documented previously in Section 2.5.13 of Chapter II， 
the extant literature of probabilistic judgments in psychology suggested that people 
tend to be overconfident. Several accounting studies can be found to investigate 
whether auditors were also overconfident and what the major factors affecting the 
appropriateness of auditors' confidence were (Tomassini et al., 1982; Solomon et al., 
1985; Moeckel and Plumlee, 1989; Dilla et al., 1991; Ismail and Simnett, 1991; 
� Pincus, 1991; Mladenovic and Simnett, 1994; Simnett, 1994). These studies are 
reviewed below. 
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3.3.11.1 Appropriateness of Auditors' Confidence 
Tomassini et al. (1982) investigated whether auditors were well-calibrated when 
making judgments in practical audit settings. Fifty-eight auditors were asked to 
assess prior probability distributions in testing a client's account balances. Subjects' 
probability assessments were elicited through the cumulative distribution function 
fractiles method in which subjects were asked to specify the estimated values for each 
of the fractiles of 0.50, 0.25，0.75, 0.1, 0.9, 0.01, and 0.99. The assessments were 
then analysed by the interquarter index and the surprise index. The interquarter index 
was the percentage of observations for which the actual outcome had fallen within 
the interquartile range. The surprise index was the percentage of true values falling 
outside the extreme fractiles. The results showed that auditors were found to be less 
overconfident than those subjects in previous psychology studies. In fact, the 
auditors were found to exhibit a tendency towards underconfidence. The authors 
attributed these results to the inherent motivation of the auditors to be successful in 
the task, the nature of an audit process directing auditors' attention to their legal 
liability, and the training that auditors received. All these factors made auditors 
particularly cautious and risk-averse in making probabilistic judgments. 
The appropriateness of auditors' confidence was further investigated in a task of 
going-concem judgments. Dilla et al. (1991) provided 36 auditors with six financial 
ratios and a base rate for bankruptcy. Subjects were asked to assess bankruptcy 
probability for each firm. Similar to the findings noted by Tomassini et al. (1982) and 
Solomon et al. (1985), the results indicated that the aggregate auditor calibration 
curve showed a slight, but insignificant, underconfidence. The results for the 
individual types of predictions, however, revealed a highly significant 
underconfidence for non-bankruptcy predictions and a moderately significant 
tendency towards overconfidence for bankruptcy predictions. Also, the performance 
of individual auditors suggested that the majority of subjects were underconfident. 
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3.3.11.2 Factors Affecting the Appropriateness of Auditors' Confidence 
In view ofthe finding ofTomassini et al. (1982) that auditors were less susceptible to 
the overconfidence effect than novice subjects reported in previous psychology 
studies, Solomon et al. (1985) investigated why this was so. They proposed that task 
context was the major reason to account for the differences. The results showed that 
auditors were overconfident in answering some general-knowledge questions, but 
were predominantly underconfident in performing a more practical audit task. 
Therefore, these results supported the explanations provided by Tomassini et al. for 
the underconfidence effect among auditors. 
However, there were two major shortcomings in Solomon et al:s study. First, the 
predictability of two tasks had not been taken into consideration. Therefore, the 
extent of overconfidence in Solomon et aVs study might not be driven by different 
task contexts. Instead, different predictability between the two tasks could be a 
major reason to account for their results. Second, Solomon et al. used only auditors 
as the subjects of their study. Whether auditors' risk attitude towards audit tasks and 
that towards answering general-knowledge questions are the same remains 
unanswered. 
The above two issues were addtessed by Mladenovic and Simnett (1994). They 
examined two competing explanations of task predictability and the contextual effect 
丨 for divergence among the studies in psychology and auditing. Task predictability is 
the extent to which the outcome of a task can be predicted by the given information. 
The task predictability explanation suggested that as the task became more 
predictable, the degree of overconfidence decreased (Lichtenstein et al., 1982). The 
contextual effect explanation suggested that auditors were sensitive to the 
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asymmetric risk consequences associated with wrong judgments. To investigate 
which of these two competing explanations was more plausible, a group of auditors 
and a group of students were asked to answer both auditing and general-knowledge 
questions across two levels of task predictability. The results revealed that both task 
predictability and the contextual effect were found to have significant effects on the 
degree of overconfidence when these factors were examined separately. When task 
predictability was controlled for, however, most of the contextual effect disappeared. 
They concluded therefore that difference between task predictability among various 
studies could be used to reconcile the conflicting findings of the audit and psychology 
calibration literature. 
Most calibration studies to date treated decision-making as a static process in which 
decision makers rendered a decision on the basis of whatever information given to 
them. Pincus (1991), however, questioned about whether the use of a static process 
for the research of auditjudgment confidence is appropriate in view of the fact that in 
most of the audit tasks, auditors are allowed to select the amount and type of 
information they examine before reaching a decision. Pincus suggested two 
alternative views on audit judgment confidence: an output variable view and a 
process variable view. Whenjudgment confidence is viewed as an output variable, an 
auditor chooses the best subset of evidence from the potential evidence available, 
given certain resource and cost constraints. On the basis of this evidence set, the 
auditor reaches a decision to which a degree of confidence is attached. The degree of 
confidence indicates the auditor's subjective probability that the decision reached is 
correct. Therefore, confidence is the post-decision self-assessment of the correctness 
of the decision made. In this case, there is an ideal relationship between confidence 
and accuracy, and confidence should be higher for correct decisions and lower for 
incorrect decision. 
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When confidence is viewed as a process variable, auditjudgment confidence serves as 
an indicator of when a decision point is reached. Once an auditor has accumulated 
sufficient evidence to pass a desired confidence threshold for a particular decision 
alternative, the auditor stops gathering evidence and that decision alternative is 
chosen. Therefore, judges have a pre-decision confidence threshold for determining 
when to stop gathering evidence and make a decision. This threshold will be set at a 
level to maximise the net benefit (or minimise the net cost). Under this view, there is 
no expected relationship between confidence and accuracy in audit judgment tasks, 
nor any difference in confidence for making correct and incorrect decisions. 
One hundred and twenty-five auditors were asked to decide if the year-end inventory 
account of a client was fairly presented or not. Subjects controlled their own 
information selection and decided when they were ready to make their decision. The 
I results indicated that judgment confidence and accuracy were not significantly 
correlated, which was consistent with confidence being viewed as a process variable, 
rather than an output variable. 
Simnett (1994) examined the effect of information selection and task predictability on 
auditors' confidence and the appropriateness of their confidence. Eighty-four audit 
seniors were allocated to one of the four treatment groups crossed by information 
selection and task predictability. Information selection was manipulated on two 
levels. On the one level, subjects were asked to identify four ratios out of the ten 
provided that they would like to be supplied with in order to distinguish between 
bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy firms. On the other level of information selection, 
subjects were provided with the four ratios selected by a discriminant analysis model 
as the most useful for identifying firms being in bankruptcy. Task predictability was 
manipulated as providing the subjects with financial ratios of either one year or two 
years prior to the events (i.e., bankruptcy or non-bankruptcy). The results indicated 




:, Contrary to the Pincus's findings of no significant relationship between auditors' 
decision accuracy and decision confidence, Simnett found his subjects' judgment 
confidence varied positively with the change in task predictability. Specifically, a 
higher level of auditors' judgment confidence was associated with a more predictable 
丨’., 
task. However, the changes in auditors' judgment confidence did not fully reflect 
changes in their decision accuracy. As a result, auditors tended to have 
underconfidence, with more pronounced underconfidence on the more predictable 
task. 
Since auditors are required to evaluate large quantities of information in order to 
comply with audit standards, they frequently rely on their memory to make 
|i ！ judgments. Moeckel and Plumlee (1989) investigated the confidence and calibration 
; t of relying on memory among auditors, rather than referring to working papers or 
•:.?;. 
source documentation. They asked a group of auditors to review a set of 
‘ hypothetical audit work. They classified audit evidence into three types of items: 
i explicit items (i.e., items directly drawn from working papers), new items (i.e., items 
i not mentioned in the working papers), and inferential items (i.e., items that could be 
inferred from the working papers). The results revealed that the subjects were found 
to be well-calibrated for explicit items, underconfident for new items, and 
underconfident at low levels of confidence and overconfident at high levels of 
i 
I confidence for inferential items. 
[：；• 
Since in practice most audits are conducted in teams or groups, the effect of audit 
groups on judgment confidence is an important issue influencing the effectiveness of 
audits. This issue was investigated by Ismail and Simnett (1991) in a task in which a 
group of auditors were asked to estimate an interval of an expected dollar error in the 
total inventory of a firm. Two forms of audit groups were investigated: an 
interacting group composed of two audit seniors, and a hierarchical review group 
consisting of an audit senior and an audit manager. The results were consistent with 
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the findings of psychology and accounting research in that group interaction was 
found to increase judgment confidence. Experience was found to moderate this 
effect with more experience for lower confidence. The results also indicated that 
when compared with individual judgments, confidence was found to be higher in the 
interacting group but similar to that in the hierarchical review group. Furthermore, 
the hierarchical review group was found to be less confident than the interacting 
group. 
In addition to comparing the confidence among individual auditors and the two audit 
groups, Ismail and Simnett (1991) conducted an additional analysis for the 
appropriateness of auditors, confidence. The results revealed that individuals and 
i: 
both types of audit groups were found to be significantly overconfident. The 
hierarchical review group, however, displayed less overconfidence than individual 
I auditors and the interacting group. This finding supported the suggestion of 
Tomassini et al that an audit review process might reduce judgment biases among 
individual auditors. 
In summary, although only a small number of studies were conducted to investigate 
the appropriateness of auditors' confidence in some audit tasks, the results were fairly 
consistent and indicated that auditors were less overconfident than novice subjects 
examined in the majority of psychology studies. The major reason to account for this 
difference, as suggested by accounting researchers, was that the auditing environment 
has imposed a high cost upon auditors if they are overconfident. This environment 




3.4 Behavioural Decision Research in Financial Distress Prediction 
3.4.1 Overview 
Financial distress prediction (also known as firm failure prediction or bankruptcy 
prediction in some studies) is a major task of bank loan officers when they evaluate 
the financial soundness of potential and existing borrowers. Although bank loan 
officers are required to examine a large amount of evidence on various aspects 
related to the financial viability ofborrowers, financial statement information remains 
the focus of the extant accounting research in this area. 
� This section provides a detailed review of the literature related to the decision 
1 ,7(；' • 
； behaviour of bank loan officers when predicting the probabilities of firms being in 
..;.,iV -
financial distress. Although the Heuristics-and-Biases framework is important for 
this line of research, some of the studies in this research area have adopted other 
research frameworks in BDT. In order to provide a comprehensive picture on this 
research area and assist in developing the research model of the current study, aU 
these previous studies are discussed in this section. 
Three major issues were addressed by researchers in this area. The first issue is the 
I prediction performance of individual bank loan officers. The second issue deals with 
i：!' the major factors affecting the prfediction performance of bank loan officers. The 
final issue is concerned with comparing the prediction performance of bank loan 
i officers individually and in groups. These issues are described below. 
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3.4.2 Prediction Performance 
Two major measures of prediction performance were used by researchers in this area: 
prediction accuracy and appropriateness of confidence. The early research focused 
mainly on prediction accuracy which is the proportion of correct judgments. The 
recent research began to recognise appropriateness of confidence as a finer measure 
of bank loan officers' prediction performance in this prediction task (see Section 1.1 
of Chapter I for a discussion of how to measure appropriateness of confidence). 
3.4.2.1 Prediction Accuracy 
目、 
Several studies can be found to examine the prediction performance of bank loan 
officers when predicting firms being in financial distress by using prediction accuracy. 
Libby (1975b) asked a group of professional lending officers to identify firms being in 
financial distress from a sample of 60 firms of which 30 firms were healthy and the 
others were in financial distress. The result indicated that the overall prediction 
accuracy of bank loan officers was around 74%, which was far better than a random 
guess. A study of Australian bank loan officers, prediction of firms being in financial 
distress by Zimmer (1980) revealed a similar result. The overall prediction accuracy 
of the subjects in Zimmer's study was around 77%, which was comparable to Libby's 
result. 
I 
In a questionnaire study conducted by Casey (1980b), a less clear picture was shown. 
Casey (1980b) asked 46 bank loan officers to predict whether the given firms would 
be in financial distress. The results showed that the overall prediction accuracy of the 
subjects was around 57%. Although this accuracy rate was still higher than a random 
guess, it was much lower than the results indicated in the other two accounting 
studies as described above. 
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3.4.2.2 Appropriateness of Confidence 
As discussed previously in Section 2.5.13 of Chapter II, overconfidence results from 
a higher judges' confidence rating than the actual probability. Several accounting 
studies examined the relationship between the bank loan officers' confidence and their 
accuracy. The results of these studies were mixed. While Libby (1975b) and Zimmer 
(1980) did not find any significant relationship, Casey (1983) did find a significant 
relationship between these two variables. So far, little theory has been put forward to 
specify this relationship. 
‘ Although the appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence is a fmer measure of 
their prediction performance, only two accounting studies were found to use this 
measure. As mentioned earlier in this section, Casey and Selling (1986) asked a 
‘ . 
group of students to predict whether the given firms were in financial distress. The 
results revealed that their subjects were overall overconfident. Similarly, Selling 
(1993) also investigated the appropriateness of confidence for a group of students 
when predicting firms being in financial distress. The results of this investigation also 
indicated that the subjects were overconfident. However, since both studies used 
students as the subjects, their results should be interpreted with caution. Further 
studies using real subjects are warranted. The current study has taken up this 
research opportunity and used re^l bank loan officers to investigate their judgment 
performance on a task of their expertise. 
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|. As mentioned earlier in Section 3.4.2.1, the early research on the decision behaviour 
of bank loan officers revealed that their accuracy of predicting firms being in financial 
I distress was in general significantly better than a random guess (Libby, 1975b; 
Zimmer, 1980; Casey, 1980b). Later research in this area focused on identifying the 
！ 
I 
I major factors affecting their prediction accuracy. Regarding the other measure of 
i prediction performance, only two studies can be found to examine the major factors 
affecting the appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence. Previous studies 
examining these factors are reviewed below. 
f 
3.4.3.2 Information Load 
Financial ratios are recognised as being useful for predicting firms being in financial 
distress. Bank loan officers who are provided with more financial ratios are therefore 
expected to be more accurate than those who have fewer ratios. However, since 
human beings are recognised to have only a limited human information processing 
capacity (Simon, 1955; Miller, 1956; Simon and Newell, 1971), providing more 
financial ratios does not necessarily lead bank loan officers to have more accurate 
predictions. Schroder, Driver and Streufert (1967) developed a model that identifies 
a peak in human cognitive performance as information load increases, where 
performance deteriorates as information load further increases beyond that point. 
This model therefore suggests that each individual has a ceiling of information 
processing capability upon which the individual's performance cannot be further 
improved. This ceiling, however, varies from person to person. Only one study was 
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found to address the effect of information load on bank loan officers' prediction 
performance. 
Casey (1980a) asked 122 bank loan officers to predict firms being in financial 
distress. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the three treatment groups with 
different degrees of information load. In the low-load group, subjects were given six 
ratios for each firm. In the median-load group, subjects were given the same six 
ratios together with the firm's income statement and balance sheet, but without the 
notes to accounts. In the high-load group, subjects were given the same information 
as given to those subjects in the median-loan group as well as the notes to accounts. 
K^  
The results indicated that the prediction accuracy of the median-load group was 
二 better than the other two groups. The results also showed that the time spent by the 
subjects in the median-load group was significantly less than the time spent by those 
in the high-load group, but not significantly different from that spent by those in the 
low-load group. Finally, the prediction accuracy for all bank loan officers was found 
to be not correlated with the time spent on completing the tasks. Therefore, these 
findings were in line with the model proposed by Schroder et al (1967). 
3.4.3.3 Information Cue Choice Versus Weighing of Cues 
In discussing a real-life decision situation, Einhom (1976) suggested that when 
forming judgments, judges more actively searched for information and consolidated 
the information acquired than researchers in BDT had previously assumed. To test 
this premise, Abdel-khalik and El-Sheshai (1980) asked 28 bank loan officers to 
predict firms being in financial distress, by allowing them to purchase up to four 
financial ratios. The results revealed that the choice of information cues was 
significantly more important than the weights assigned to the selected cues in 
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determining the prediction accuracy of bank loan officers. These results were also 
consistent with the suggestion by some researchers in the Lens Model framework of 
BDT (see Section 2.4 of Chapter II for more detailed discussion) that the 
effectiveness of a linear model used for predicting human decision behaviour 
depended largely on identifying and including the right cues in the model (Dawes and 
Corrigan, 1974). However, the subjects in Abdel-khalik and El-Sheshai's study were 
found to make a suboptimal choice of the cues. 
3.4.3.4 Base-Rate Information 
In view of only few firms in the population being in financial distress, base-rate 
information on financial distress may have a significant effect on the prediction 
) 
! performance of bank loan officers. Accounting studies that investigated the 
relationships between the prediction performance of bank loan officers and base-rate 
information addressed two major issues: (1) whether the provision of base-rate 
information would promote better prediction performance; and (2) if base-rate 
information was provided, whether the value of a base rate could affect prediction 
performance. Several accounting studies were found to address these issues (e.g., 
Abdel-khalik and El-Sheshai, 1980; Casey, 1983; Houghton, 1984; Breda and Ferris, 
1992) and these studies are discussed below. 
Abdel-khalik and El-Sheshai (1980) did not provide base-rate information to their 
subjects in the first part of personal interviews. In the second part of the replication, 
a base rate of 50% was provided to the subjects. The results showed that provision 




一 Similarly, Casey (1983) investigated the difference in prediction accuracy of 
identifying firms being in financial distress between two groups of bank loan officers. 
Bank loan officers in the one group were given only financial data, whereas those in 
the other group were given both the same financial data and a base rate of 30%. The 
results also indicated no difference in the prediction accuracy between the two 
groups. 
Houghton (1984) tested the effects of specification of base-rate information and the 
period of financial data prior to financial distress on bank loan officers' prediction 
accuracy. He found that specification of base-rate information interacted with the 
,;| period of financial data prior to financial distress to affect the prediction accuracy of 
I the subjects. Those subjects who were given a base rate of 50% together with the 
f most recent financial data prior to financial distress were found to be the most 
[ j i ( 
= 
s - accurate. 
, r , • ；••' 
I ” 
j ：  Casey and Selling (1986) examined the prediction accuracy for a group of graduate 
students when predicting firms being in financial distress. Subjects were assigned to 
： six treatment groups determined by crossing two levels of task predictability and 
； three levels of base rates. The levels of base rates were manipulated as non-
； specification, 50% and 35%. The results also showed no difference in the prediction 
I '.:.'.. 
： accuracy among the subjects given the different base rates. 
I .-. 
Breda and Ferris (1992) investigat6d the prediction accuracy of a group of bank loan 
officers by field experiments. Three independent variables were tested. Availability 
of base-rate information was manipulated as either given or not given. The value of 
base rates was manipulated as either 25% or 50%. The order of presenting the base 
rates was manipulated as either 50%/25% (i.e., a base rate of 50% was given first, 
then followed by a base rate of 25%) or 25%/50%. The results suggested that the 
prediction accuracy of bank loan officers was neither affected by whether base-rate 
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information was provided, nor the order of presenting base-rate information. The 
層 
\ value of base rates, however, was found to affect the subjects' performance. Subjects 
: who were given a base rate of 25% were found to have a higher prediction accuracy 
1 than those who were given a base rate of 50%. 
m . 
爷 
_i The effect of the value of base rates on the prediction accuracy of bank loan officers 
- was also examined by Houghton and Sengupta (1984). Subjects in the one group 
： were given a 33% base rate, whereas subjects in the other group were given a base 
：•,' rate of 50%. Contradictory to the results of Breda and Ferris, Houghton and 
I Sengupta reported no significant difference in the prediction accuracy between the 
I two groups. 
I： 
f ' In summary，the results of the first issue about whether provision of base-rate 
： information would improve the prediction performance of bank loan officers were 
I fairly consistent. Four out of the five studies being reviewed indicated that provision 
� of base-rate information did not affect the prediction accuracy of bank loan officers. 
w> 
‘ The results of Houghton (1984), however, suggested that provision of base-rate &,' 
^ information interacted with the period of financial data prior to financial distress to 
I 
： affect prediction accuracy, 
i 
\ The results of the second issue about whether the value of base rates could affect the • 
； prediction accuracy of bank loan officers were mixed. While Breda and Ferris (1992) 
= revealed that provision of an extreme base rate promoted higher prediction accuracy, 
i Houghton and Sengupta (1984)，and Casey and Selling (1986) did not show any 
： difference in the prediction accuracy between the subjects who were given an 
• extreme base rate and those who were provided with a base rate of 50%. It is 
； possible that some important factors affecting bank loan officers' prediction accuracy 
i 
I have been neglected in those studies. One such possible factor is task predictability 
1 . 






3.4.3.5 Task Predictability 
The effect of task predictability on the prediction performance of bank loan officers 
was examined by two accounting studies. Casey and Selling (1986) randomly 
assigneda group of graduate students to six between-subjects groups determined by 
crossing two independent variables. Task predictability was manipulated on two 
levels. Thirty firms were identified by a procedure in such a way that the difference 
in classification accuracy between using the financial data of one year prior to 
H bankruptcy and that of two years prior to bankruptcy was maximised. All the sample 
.；' firms were accurately classified using the financial data of one year prior to 
, bankruptcy, and this set of data was defined as being of high task predictability. Only 
around half of the same group of firms were, however, correctly classified by using 
‘ the financial data of two years prior to bankruptcy. This set of data was therefore 
i defined as being of low task predictability. 
|. 
丨 The results indicated that the overall prediction accuracy was significantly affected by 
5 
I task predictability. Subjects in the high task-predictability group were found to have 
i • 
I significantly higher prediction accuracy and less overconfidence than those in the low 
� task-predictability group. The effect of task predictability on prediction accuracy and 
the extent of overconfidence was further supported by Selling (1993) in a similar 
experiment with the same type of Student subjects. In addition, Selling revealed that 
subjects in the high task-predictability group were found to be less overconfident as 
more financial data was given, whereas those in the low task-predictability group 
were not affected by the amount of financial data provided. 
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3.4.3.6 Reward Structure 
In general, almost all the accounting researchers who examined the decision 
behaviour of bank loan officers when predicting firms being in financial distress did 
not take reward structure into account in designing their research. Houghton and 
Robinson (1989), however, suspected that reward structure might have a significant 
effect on the prediction accuracy of bank loan officers. Forty-four bank loan officers 
were randomly assigned to two reward-structure groups. Subjects in the "avoid 
default reward structure" group were highly penalised by their misclassification of 
distressed firms as being healthy firms. On the contrary, subjects in the "implicit 




The results revealed that the overall prediction accuracy of the two groups was found 
to be not significantly different from each other. However, when the overall 
prediction accuracy was broken down into the distressed- and healthy-firms 
prediction accuracy, the prediction accuracy for distressed firms of the "avoid default 
reward structure" group was found to be higher than that of the other group. 
Conversely, the prediction accuracy for healthy firms of the "avoid default reward 
structure" group was found to be significantly lower than that of the other group. 
3.4.3.7 Individual Differences 
The effects of some individual difference factors on the prediction performance of 
bank loan officers when predicting firms being in financial distress were examined in 
several accounting studies. These factors included the time spent on the task (Casey, 
1980b; Zimmer, 1980), qualification (Zimmer, 1980; Houghton and Sengupta, 1984)， 
experience (Zimmer, 1980; Houghton and Sengupta, 1984) and age (Houghton and 
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Sengupta, 1984). The results showed that all these factors were found to have no 
significant effect on prediction accuracy. 
The type of subjects was also investigated by two studies. For example, Zimmer 
(1980) compared the prediction accuracy of bank loan officers with that of students. 
The results also suggested no significant difference in the prediction accuracy of 
individual subjects, total confidence, the overall accuracy and the time spent on 
completing this task. 
Holt and Morrow (1992) compared the risk assessments between bank loan officers 
and auditors in two dimensions. Experience of the subjects was manipulated on four 
levels. Type of cases was manipulated as either financially strong prospective cases 
仏 
or financially weak prospective cases. The results indicated that auditors' risk 
assessment was similar to that of bank loan officers. These results also suggested 
that auditors' risk assessment was closer to the Bayesian rule as their experience 
increased, whereas bank loan officers' did not follow this relation. Finally, it was 
found that the financial strength of the client case had little effect on the auditors’ use 
of the Bayesian rule for evidence integration, whereas bank loan officers deviated 
from the Bayesian rule in evaluating financially weak clients. 
3.4.4 Group Judgment Accuracy 
I 
In reality, lending decisions are usually made by a group of bank loan officers or a 
committee, rather than by individual bank loan officers. However, only one study 
was found to examine the group judgments of bank loan officers. Libby, Trotman 
and Zimmer (1987) asked a group of bank loan officers to predict firms being in 
financial distress both individually and in groups. The prediction accuracy of these 
bank loan officers was evaluated by averaging the predictions of all the individual 
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bank loan officers, by a composite group (that was a simple average of all the 
predictions of the individual bank loan officers in a group), and by an interacting 
group (group members were allowed to discuss and agree on the best answers). 
The results indicated that the prediction accuracy of both the composite group and 
the interacting group was better than that of simply averaging the predictions of aU 
individual bank loan officers, but the prediction accuracy of the composite group and 
the interacting group did not differ significantly. The results also showed that as the 
ranking of the most influential member or the variation in individual performance 
increased, the difference between the prediction accuracy of the interacting and 
composite groups also increased. 
3.4.5 Section Summary 
V 
This section summarises the findings on the decision behaviour of bank loan officers 
when predicting firms being in financial distress. Three major findings were noted. 
First, financial information was found to be useful for bank loan officers when 
predicting firms being in financial distress. The prediction accuracy of bank loan 
officers using financial information was found to be significantly higher than a 
1 
‘ random guess. When appropriateness of confidence was used to measure the 
subjects' prediction performance, they were found to be overconfident. However, the 
two studies (Casey and Selling, 1986; Selling，1993) that investigated 
I appropriateness of confidence used students as the surrogates for bank loan officers. 
Therefore, the generalisation of their conclusions to real subjects might be difficult. 
Second, several factors were identified to affect the prediction performance of bank 
loan officers. The results indicated that information load, information cue choice, 
provision of base-rate information, and task predictability were found to affect the 
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prediction accuracy of bank loan officers. In addition, task predictability was found 
to have a significant effect on appropriateness of confidence. Specifically, subjects 
who were given a task of high predictability were found to have less overconfidence 
than those who were given a task of low predictability. However, some of these 
studies used students as subjects, which limited the external validity of their findings. 
Conversely, individual difference factors, such as the time spent on the task, 
qualification, experience, age and type of subjects, were found to have no significant 
effects on prediction accuracy. However, some of these studies used students as 
« 
subjects which limited the external validity of their findings. 
： The results of the value of base rates were mixed. While Breda and Ferris (1992) 
showed that bank loan officers who were given an extreme base rate were found to 
have a significantly higher prediction accuracy than those who were given a base rate 
[j 
� of 50%, Houghton and Sengupta (1984) and Casey and Selling (1986) did not 
support this relation. Moreover, reward structure was found to affect the prediction 
accuracy for either distressed firms or healthy firms only, but not the overall 
prediction accuracy. 
•1 -
'•i . • 
j Third, the prediction accuracy of both a composite group and an interacting group 
I 
： was found to be better than that of simply averaging the predictions of all individual 
bank loan officers. In addition, the extent to which the interacting group 
outperformed the composite group in prediction accuracy was found to directly relate 
to the ranking of the most influential member or the variation in the performance of 
individual bank loan officers within the groups. 
] ‘ i 
.1 • 
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3.5 Motivation for the Current Study 
This chapter and the last have reviewed a substantial body of literature on BDT, BDR 
in accounting that adopted the Heuristics-and-Biases research framework, and BDR 
in financial distress prediction. From this literature review, at least four research 
opportunities related to financial distress prediction by bank loan officers can be 
identified. These identified research opportunities in tum motivate the conduct of the 










i The review of literature on the BDR in financial distress prediction in Section 3.4 
revealed that although financial distress prediction is one type of probabilistic 
judgments, and appropriateness of confidence is recognised by psychology 
researchers in BDT to be a finer measure for the performance of these judgments 
I 
(Wright et al., 1994), very few studies can be found to use this measure for 
examining the decision behaviour of bank loan officers. Prediction accuracy 
remained the predominant measure of prediction performance in almost all the 
previous studies in this line of research. A similar problem was also noted in 
1 
psychology, in that research in BDT focused mainly on choices but ignored the 
confidence of these choices (Sniezek and Buckley, 1993, p.l05): 
"Decision-making research and theory has given centre stage to the 
behaviour of deciding — choosing from a set of alternative courses 
I of action. The decision maker's uncertainty about the relative 
i . 
quality of those alternatives is frequently neglected or viewed merely 
as a by-product of the decision-making process. Measures of 
uncertainty — or, conversely, confidence — often appear to be an 
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afterthought. But the argument can be made that the decision 
maker's uncertainty about that choice may be as important to 
decision theory and practice as (the) choice itself." 
Two studies (Casey and Selling, 1986; Selling, 1993) were found to use 
appropriateness of confidence as the measure of prediction performance to 
investigate human decision behaviour in a lending decision context. The results of 
both studies showed that their subjects were found to be significantly overconfident. 
However, both studies used students as surrogates for bank loan officers. As 
discussed earlier in Section 3.2, the characteristics of decision makers are one major 
determinant of decision-making performance. In particular, the task knowledge of 
decision makers was identified as one such characteristic. It is therefore still 
unknown whether the difference in task knowledge between students and bank loan 
officers will lead to a different conclusion on bank loan officers' overconfidence. 
Additional research efforts on using this measure for studying the prediction 
performance of bank loan officers are warranted. 
Therefore, the first research opportunity is to investigate whether bank loan officers 
are overconfident when predicting firms being in financial distress. 
I [ � i 
3.5.2 Research Opportunity 2 
‘ ( 
Since task predictability is the only factor that was consistently supported by previous 
accounting studies as affecting the appropriateness of subjects' confidence when 
predicting firms being in financial distress, the general understanding of the other 
major factors that could affect the appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence is 
rather limited. Additional efforts on identifying these factors are much needed for 
developing better theories in this line of research. This point of view was also shared 
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by psychology researchers who highlighted the need of better understanding the 
major factors that could affect the performance of general probabilistic judgments. 
For instance, Wright et al, (1994, p.7) contended that: 
"Plainly, experts can be expected to outperform novices in many 
judgment tasks, although even this brief review has shown that 
experts will not always be immune to the biases observed in simple 
laboratory experiments with naive subjects. Identifying the precise 
factors which contribute to optimal judgmental performance 
1 
remains a taskforfuture research: (emphasis added) 
In order to identify the major factors affecting the appropriateness of bank loan 
officers' confidence, it is necessary to refer to the literature of BDR in accounting and 
BDT. As mentioned earlier, there is only few firms being in financial distress. 
i 
1 Therefore, base-rate information is an important piece of information for assisting 
bank loan officers to make better judgments. A. meta-analysis for a number of 
accounting studies that examined the prediction of financial distress by bank loan 
officers also expressed a similar view on the importance of base-rate information in 
this task (Hite, 1987). Hite suggested that base-rate information could be a 
significant variable for explaining the differences in prediction performance of bank 
loan officers among the various accounting studies reviewed. In fact, the relevance 
of base-rate information is one of the key independent variables of the current study. 
In investigating the auditors' going-concemjudgments in an audit engagement, Kida 
(1984a) revealed that the relevance of base-rate information affected auditors' 
judgments. This result was also in line with the extant psychology literature in BDT 
showing that the more relevant base-rate information was more likely to be used than 
the less relevant (Ajzen, 1977; Carroll and Siegler, 1977; Tversky and Kahneman, 
1982a; Bar-Hillel, 1980a; 1983). However, Kida (1984a) did not address any effect 
of the relevance of base-rate information on the auditors, judgment performance, such 
151 
？. 
as the appropriateness of their confidence. Since the task of predicting firms being in 
financial distress by bank loan officers is very similar to that of auditors' going-
concemjudgments, it is expected that the relevance ofbase-rate information may also 
affect bank loan officers' judgment performance. However, the relationships between 
the relevance of base-rate information and bank loan officers' judgment or their 
judgment performance have not been investigated by previous accounting studies in 
BDR in financial distress prediction. 
'* 
The second research opportunity is, therefore, to investigate whether the relevance of 
base-rate information is a major factor affecting the appropriateness of bank loan 
officers' confidence when they predict firms being in financial distress. 
3.5.3 Research Opportunity 3 
Closely related to base-rate information is case-specific evidence that has been 
considered to be affecting the judges' use of base-rate information. In investigating 
how a group of students used the representativeness heuristic in making going-
concern judgments, Johnson (1983) found that base-rate information was more likely 
to be used when case-specific evidence was perceived as less representative and thus 
less informative. However, Johnson did not address the subjects' judgment 
performance, such as the appropriateness of their confidence. In view of the 
similarity of these two tasks, it is expected that the perceived informativeness of case-
specific evidence may also be a major factor affecting the bank loan officers' 
judgment performance. Nevertheless, this factor was not investigated by previous 
studies in either BDT or BDR in financial distress prediction. 
I Accordingly, the third research opportunity is to investigate whether the perceived 
informativeness of case-specific evidence is a major factor affecting the 
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appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence when predicting firms being in 
financial distress. Due to the newness of this variable in the literature and its inherent 
limitation in the measurement approach, this independent variable was only treated as 
of exploratory and supplementary nature in the current study. 
3.5.4 Research Opportunity 4 
<» 
As discussed earlier in Section 3.2, the characteristics of decision makers are an 
important determinant of their decision-making performance. One such characteristic 
is the motivation of decision makers, which determines the extent of their effort 
expended on a task. Research in BDT also found that judges' efforts affected their 
performance (Mayseless and Kmglanski, 1987; Paese and Sniezek, 1991). The need 
for cognition (NC) trait of judges represents their tendency to expend cognitive 
effort. This trait was suggested to affect the extent of the base-rate fallacy (Ahlering 
and Parker, 1989). However, the effects of the NC trait of bank loan officers on the 
extent of the base-rate fallacy or their prediction performance have not been 
investigated by previous studies in accounting, nor in psychology. 
Thus, the fourth research opportunity is to explore whether the NC trait of bank loan 
officers is a major factor affecting the appropriateness of their confidence when 
predicting firms being in financial distress. 
I 
These four research opportunities can be summarised in the two related research 
problems ofthe current study as presented previously in Section 1.2 of Chapter I: (1) 
Do bank loan officers tend to have appropriate confidence when predicting the 
probabilities of firms being in financial distress? and (2) What are the effects of some 
selected major factors on the appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence when 
predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial distress? The first research 
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opportunity is equivalent to the first research problem, and the three remaining 
research opportunities are incorporated into the second research problem. 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter extended the literature review on behavioural decision theory (BDT) 
discussed in Chapter II to behavioural decision research (BDR) in accounting, the 
« 
immediate discipline of the current study. It was found that some of the theories 
proposed by psychology researchers in the literature of BDT have been well adopted 
in BDR in accounting. 
f Since bank loan officers may be susceptible to using various heuristics and 
committing a variety of biases when predicting firms being in financial distress, 
studies of BDR in accounting that adopted the Heuristics-and-Biases framework 
were reviewed. The extant literature in this area examined mainly the judgments of 
auditors. The general findings from this review were that auditors were also 
susceptible to various heuristics and biases, but their conservative tendency led them 
to commit these biases to a much less extent than the student subjects in previous 
psychology research. These results lend some comfort to the audit profession in view 
of the legal liability in an audit environment. 
This chapter also reviewed the literature of the decision behaviour of bank loan 
officers when predicting firms being in financial distress. Three major findings were 
noted in this line of research. First, prediction accuracy was mainly used to examine 
the prediction performance of bank loan officers in most of the previous studies. The 
results of these studies indicated that the prediction accuracy of bank loan officers 
was found to be significantly higher than a random guess. Two studies did adopt 
appropriateness of confidence as a measure of their subjects' prediction performance, 
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and indicated that the subjects tended to have overconfidence. However, these two 
studies used students as the surrogates for bank loan officers to investigate the issue. 
Therefore, the external validity of their findings was limited. 
Second, some factors were found to affect the prediction accuracy of bank loan 
officers. These factors included information load, information cue choice, provision 
of base-rate information, and task predictability. Task predictability was also found 
to affect the extent of overconfidence among subjects, but once again, students were 
( 
used as the surrogates for bank loan officers. Third, group judgments were identified 
as a potential means of improving the prediction performance of bank loan officers. 
The prediction accuracy of both a composite group and an interacting group was 
found to be better than that of simply averaging the predictions of all individual bank 
loan officers. 
This chapter and the last provided a detailed review on the literature related to this 
thesis. From this literature review, four research opportunities were identified. 
These research opportunities were summarised by the two research problems as 
presented in Section 1.2 of Chapter 1. On this foundation, the next chapter wiU 
I discuss the research model and the specific research hypotheses developed. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
4.1 Introduction 
i 
The preceding two chapters reviewed the literature of behavioural decision theory 
(BDT) and behavioural decision research (BDR) in accounting, which are considered 
to be the parent and immediate disciplines of the current study respectively. The aim 
of this chapter is to develop the research model and hypotheses for the current study 
on the basis of the four research opportunities identified from the literature review. 
This chapter is organised into two major sections. Section 4.2 develops the research 
model delineating all the hypothesised relationships among the variables of interest. 
i 
Section 4.3 then proposes five research hypotheses for testing the specific 
relationships among the various variables as depicted in the research model, and 
discusses the theoretical support for each of these hypotheses. Finally, Section 4.4 
provides a summary of the chapter. 
i 
4.2 Research Model 
As discussed earlier in Section 3.5 of Chapter III，four research opportunities relating 
to the decision behaviour of bank loan officers when predicting the probabilities of 
firms being in financial distress were identified from the literature review on BDT, 
BDR in accounting that adopted the Heuristics-and-Biases research framework, and 
BDR in financial distress predictions. This section attempts to integrate all these 
closely related research opportunities into the study's research model with two 
research objectives in mind. The first research objective is to investigate whether 
bank loan officers are overconfident when predicting the probabilities of firms being 
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in financial distress. Therefore, the appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence 
I 
is the focus of the investigation. 
I 
• The second research objective is to further investigate some selected major factors 
affecting the appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence in this task. Three 
potential factors were identified from the literature review: the relevance of base-rate 
information, the need for cognition (NC) trait of bank loan officers, and the perceived 
informativeness of case-specific evidence. As mentioned previously in Chapters I, II 
• , 
‘ and III, the last factor was only treated as an exploratory and supplementary nature 
I • 
I due to its novelty in the accounting literature and the inherent limitations in its 
1 measuring approach. Task predictability (or a similar concept called task difficulty) 
m .. 
i was not studied because it was not related directly to base-rate information which 
was the focus of the current study. The research model, which was shown in Figure 
t 
1.1 of Chapter I and is reproduced here in Figure 4.1 for ease of reference, depicted 
the relationships among the various variables investigated in the current study. 
s 
As shown in the model, the appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence was the 
dependent variable. The relevance of base-rate information, the NC trait of bank loan 
I officers, and the perceived informativeness of case-specific evidence were the 
independent variables that were considered to have certain effects on the 
I appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence. Since there was no theoretical 
I 
support for any interaction effects involving the perceived informativeness of case-
! specific evidence, only the interaction between the relevance of base-rate information 
and the NC trait of bank loan officers was investigated in the current study. 
Five research hypotheses were proposed to test the specific relationships among the 
variables as depicted in the research model. The development of these hypotheses 
and their theoretical support are discussed in detail in the next section. 
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Figure 4.1 Research Model 
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4.3 Research Hypotheses 
4.3.1 Hypothesis 1 
The testing of this hypothesis aims to investigate whether bank loan officers tend to 
have overconfidence when predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial 
distress. Only two studies were found to address the appropriateness of bank loan 
officers' confidence in financial distress prediction. Both the studies of Casey and 
Selling (1986) and Selling (1993) used students as surrogates to examine bank loan 
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officers' judgments when predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial 
distress. Their results were similar and found that their subjects were overconfident. 
The major shortcoming of these two studies is that both studies used students as 
surrogates for bank loan officers. It is still not clear whether bank loan officers are 
I 
overconfident to a similar degree as those student subjects in these two accounting 
studies in this prediction task. The use of students as surrogates for bank loan 
officers may not be appropriate because students are not expected to have the 
� 
expertise of bank loan officers in this task. Also, it was a robust finding in the extant 
literature in psychology that students were overconfident in answering general-
knowledge questions (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1977; Lichtenstein et al., 1982; 
Griffm and Tversky, 1992). It is therefore still not clear whether the findings of 
overconfidence in the experiments conducted by Casey and Selling (1986) and Selling 
(1993) were the results of using student subjects or the results of the task nature. 
Some experts, when performing tasks within the scope of their expertise, were found 
to have relatively appropriate confidence. For example, auditors were found to have 
fairly appropriate confidence (Tomassini et al； 1982; Solomon et al., 1985; Dilla et 
al., 1991; Mladenovic and Simnett, 1994; Simnett, 1994) due mainly to their 
extensive job-related training and the legal liability resulted from their inappropriate 
confidence. Weather reporters (Murphy and Brown, 1984) and economists (Braun 
and Yaniv, 1992) were also found to have relatively appropriate confidence for the 
reasons of having extensive training and timely feedback. 
Bank loan officers usually receive extensive training and this background may lead 
some people to believe that bank loan officers have relatively appropriate confidence. 
However, bank loan officers are different from the other types of experts. For 
instance, the feedback given to bank loan officers on their lending decisions is usually 
more incomplete than that available to the other types of experts. The subsequent 
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financial conditions of rejected loan applicants are usually not available to bank loan 
officers for further evaluation (Einhom and Hogarth, 1978). Even if this information 
is available, bank loan officers may not give it the same attention as they would to 
those firms to which loans have been granted (Selling, 1993). 
In addition, the decision of whether a loan is granted may have a significant impact 
on the financial and operational success of a firm. Those who are granted loans wiU 
have more chance to pursue their profitable objectives (Einhom and Hogarth, 1978; 
^ 
Einhom, 1980; Selling, 1993). Therefore, the results of imbalance of attention and 
the financial effect of the loans granted on the borrowers' success, may lead bank loan 
officers to believe that they have made the right judgments in granting the loans to 
good clients. This inflated impression resulting from directing bank loan officers' 
attention only to their correct judgments may reinforce their confidence further. 
On the basis of the previous findings from studies examining student subjects' 
judgments in similar tasks and the other reasons given above, the null hypothesis 
suggests that bank loan officers do not tend to have overconfidence. The alternative 
hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
H1: Bank loan officers tend to have overconfidence when 
predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial 
distress. 
t 
4.3.2 Hypothesis 2 
The testing of this hypothesis attempts to investigate the main effect of the relevance 
of base-rate information on the appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence. 
Previous studies in psychology supported the notion that people usually tend to 
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under-utilise base-rate information in making probabilistic judgments (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1973; Bar-Hillel, 1979; 1980a; 1980b; 1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 
1982b; Bar-Hillel, 1984; 1990). This bias can be reduced in many ways. One such 
way, as discussed earlier in Section 2.5.12 of Chapter II, is based on the concept 
underlying the anchoring and adjustment heuristic (see also Section 2.5.3 for more 
detailed discussion of this heuristic). When two or more items of information are 
integrated in arriving at a probabilistic judgment, the more relevant information item 
will serve as an anchor and will dominate the judgment. The less relevant 
* 
information item either will be ignored or will produce a minor adjustment to the 
initialjudgment (the anchor). 
If people use the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, their probabilistic judgments 
can be improved by increasing the relevance of base-rate information. The relevance 
of base-rate information is defined as the degree to which base-rate information is 
perceived as being relevant to a particular judgmental task (Bar-Hillel, 1980a). 
Previous studies in psychology showed that people who were given the more relevant 
； . 
base-rate information were more likely to use the given base-rate information in 
making probabilistic judgments (Ajzen, 1977; Carroll and Siegler, 1977; Bar-Hillel, 
1980a; Tversky and Kahneman, 1982a). 
Studies in psychology also showed that people tend to have more overconfidence 
when making probabilistic judgments for events with low base rates than for events 
with high base rates (Dunning et al:, 1990; Vallone et al., 1990; Griffin and Tversky, 
1992). In investigating the effects of the value of a base rate on appropriateness of 
confidence, Griffin and Tversky (1992) asked a group of students to imagine that 
they had three different biased foreign coins with a known bias of 3:2. Subjects were 
told that whether the bias of each coin was in favour of heads (H) or in favour of tails 
(T) was not known. Different base rates of the two hypotheses (H and T) were 
given. For one half of the subjects, the probability of H was 0.50 for the first type of 
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coin, 0.67 for the second type of coin, and 0.90 for the third type of coin. For the 
other half of the subjects, the base rates of H were 0.50, 0.33, and 0.10 respectively. 
Subjects were presented with samples of size ten, which included from five to nine 
heads. They were then asked to give their confidence that the coin under 
consideration was biased in favour of heads. 
The results of Griffin and Tversky's study revealed that their subjects overweighed 
the strength of case-specific evidence and underweight the given base rates. It was 
i., . “ 
also found that subjects were overconfident in the low base-rate condition (i.e., the 
base rates were 0.50, 0.33，and 0.10) and underconfident in the high base-rate 
condition (i.e., the base rates were 0.50，0.67，and 0.90). Two other studies in social 
psychology also observed this pattern and found that their subjects' overconfidence 
was much more pronounced when the given base rates were low than when they 
were high (Dunning et al., 1990; Vallone et al., 1990). 
Accounting studies also supported the notion that various types of subjects, including 
auditors and business students, tended to under-utilise base-rate information in 
probabilistic judgments (Swieringa et al., 1976; Joyce and Biddle, 1981b; Johnson, 
1983； Holt, 1987). Another accounting study was also found to support the premise 
that provision of the more relevant base-rate information will lead to better 
judgments. Kida (1984a) investigated the effect of the relevance of base-rate 
information on auditors' going-concem judgments. Auditors were randomly assigned 
� to groups that differed in the relevance of base-rate information provided. The 
: results revealed that auditors who were given the more relevant base-rate information 
were more likely to use the given base-rate information than those who were given 
the less relevant base-rate information. These accounting studies, however, did not 
address the effect of under-utilising base-rate information on judgment performance, 
such as appropriateness of confidence. 
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On the basis of the previous studies discussed above and the base rate of financial 
distress being relatively small, it follows that although bank loan officers may tend to 
have overconfidence due mainly to under-utilisation of base-rate information, they 
tend to have less overconfidence when they are given the more relevant base-rate 
information than when they are given the less relevant base-rate information. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis suggests that bank loan officers who are given the 
more relevant base-rate information do not tend to have less overconfidence than do 
those who are given the less relevant base-rate information. The alternative 
V 
hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
H2: Bank loan officers who are given the more relevant base-
rate information tend to have less overconfidence when 
predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial 
distress than do those who are given the less relevant base-
rate information. 
4.3.3 Hypothesis 3 
The testing of this hypothesis attempts to investigate the main effect of the need for 
cognition (NC) trait of bank loan officers on the appropriateness of their confidence 
when predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial distress. NC was defined 
in Section 2.5.12.2 of Chapter II as the tendency of an individual to engage in and 
enjoy expending more cognitive effort to do a task (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982; 
Cacioppo et aL, 1984; Verplanken et aL, 1992). 
Cognitive effort has been identified in Chapter II as being one major factor that 
determines human judgment performance. For example, the Principle of Bounded 
Rationality (Simon, 1955) suggested that people have a limited information 
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processing capacity. Therefore, cognitive effort has been recognised as a scarce 
resource (Simon, 1978). Up to a certain point, an increase in cognitive effort wiU 
lead people to increase their information processing capacity and thus improve their 
judgment performance (see Section 2.3 in Chapter II for more detailed discussion). 
In BDT research within the Heuristics-and-Biases framework, several environmental 
factors were recognised to induce people's effort. For example, accountability was 
one such factor that would lead people to expend more effort on using cognitively 
S 
complex rules (Tetlock, 1983a). Accountability was also found to lead people to be 
more aware of the determinants of their judgments and to have greater consistency : 
and stability of the judgments (Hagafors and Brehmer, 1983). Moreover, ； 
accountability increased people's willingness to pay attention to all the evidence and , 
； . I 
modify initial impressions in response to contradictory evidence (Tetlock, 1983b). 
Furthermore, accountability was found to reduce the sunk cost effect in a personal 
finance context by directing people's attention to the irrelevance of sunk costs 
(Simonson and Nye, 1992). All these studies indicated that an increase in cognitive 
effort induced by accountability led to better judgments. 
Previous studies also found that an increase in cognitive effort promoted appropriate 
confidence. For example, accountability was found to reduce the overconfidence 
effect in a personality-prediction context by increasing awareness of complexities in 
the behaviour of others (Tetlock and Kim, 1987). Providing incentives shares a 
similar effect on promoting cognitive efforts. It was found that giving an incentive 
led people to have more appropriate confidence, by making people less likely to 
assign very large or very small probabilities and therefore to perform better (Fischer, 
1982). The contention that the degree of overconfidence decreases as the amount of 
cognitive processing in choice increases has consistently been supported in the 
psychology literature (Peterson and Pitz, 1988; Sniezek et al., 1990). 
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In addition, high NC individuals were found to be more active in information 
processing and more effective in problem solving than low NC individuals (Heppner 
et al, 1983). High NC individuals were also found to recall more message 
arguments (Cacioppo et aL, 1983), to be more affected by argument quality but not 
the attractiveness of an endorser (Ahlering, 1987; Haugtvedt et al., 1988)，and to 
process more information items (Verplanken et al, 1992). 
Moreover, in investigating the primacy bias when evaluating a person described by 
� 
serially presenting various trait adjectives, Ahlering and Parker (1989) revealed that ^ 
high NC subjects were found to commit the primacy bias to a lesser extent than low j 
NC subjects. All the studies relating to the NC literature suggested that high NC j 
individuals tend to have better judgment performance than low NC individuals. ^ 
Following this argument, high NC bank loan officers are expected to expend more ‘ 
* 
cognitive effort and thus have more appropriate confidence than low NC bank loan 
officers when predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial distress. ^ 
Therefore, the null hypothesis suggests that high NC bank loan officers do not tend 
to have less overconfidence when predicting the probabilities of firms being in 
financial distress than do low NC bank loan officers. The alternative hypothesis can 
be stated as follows: 
H3: High NC bank loan officers tend to have less 
overconfidence when predicting the probabilities of firms 
being in financial distress than do low NC bank loan 
officers. 
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4.3.4 Hypothesis 4 
The testing of this hypothesis attempts to investigate the moderating effect of NC on 
the relation between the relevance of base-rate information and appropriateness of 
confidence. Similarly, the theoretical support related to these two factors, as 
discussed earlier in Sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4, is also applicable to developing this 
hypothesis. 
� 
The moderating effect of NC on information processing biases was explored by . 
Ahlering and Parker (1989). They asked a group of students to evaluate a person ;j 
who was described by serially presenting some trait adjectives. Ahlering and Parker \ 
suggested that their subjects would follow the "attention decrement hypothesis" in ^ 
this task. This hypothesis proposed that the weight given by the subjects to each \ 
\ 
adjective for the overall judgment decreased with each successive adjective, resulting 
» 
in a primacy bias in which those trait adjectives presented earlier were weighted • 
higher than those presented later. • 
n 
I I 
The results supported both the "attention decrement hypothesis" and the moderating 1 
I 
effect of NC on the primacy bias. Although high NC subjects were found to commit 
the primacy bias similar to low NC subjects, the extent of this bias committed by high 
NC subjects was found to be significantly lower than that committed by low NC 
subjects. These results provided additional evidence to the contention that high and 
low NC individuals process information differently. 
Ahlering and Parker (1989) also contended that the judges' NC trait might moderate 
other information process biases, and the base-rate fallacy had specifically been 
highlighted (p. 314): 
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"...cognitive miserliness may be moderated by individual differences in 
information processing. This opens the door for investigation into 
how need for cognition moderates other information processing 
biases such as the base rate fallacy, the availability heuristic, the 
actor-observer bias, and others." (emphasis added) 
� 
The theory described above suggests that the bank loan officers' NC trait is expected 
to have moderating effect on the tendency to use base-rate information when ^ 
predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial distress. The difference j 
between high and low NC bank loan officers in using base-rate information is ^ 
expected to be more pronounced when the less relevant base-rate information is \ 
given to them because this base-rate information is more likely to be under-utilised in ^ 
i 
this situation. Therefore, high NC bank loan officers are expected to utilise base-rate • 
information more properly and to have more appropriate confidence than low NC • 
bank loan officers in this situation. When the more relevant base-rate information is i 
given, both high and low NC bank loan officers are expected to use this base-rate i 
information to a similar extent. Their judgments are thus expected to be similar. 
Following this argument, the null hypothesis suggests that high NC bank loan officers 
do not tend to have less overconfidence than do low NC bank loan officers when they 
are given the less relevant base-rate information. Conversely, high NC bank loan 
officers tend to have less overconfidence when they are given the more relevant base-
rate information. The alternative hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
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H4: High NC bank loan officers tend to have less 
overconfidence when predicting the probabilities of firms 
being in financial distress than do low NC bank loan 
officers when they are given the less relevant base-rate 
information. Conversely, high NC bank loan officers do 
not tend to have less overconfidence when predicting the 
probabilities of firms being in financial distress than do 
low NC bank loan officers when they are given the more 
s 
relevant base-rate information. ^ 
I 
J 
4.3.5 Hypothesis 5 ^ 
I 
I 
The testing of this hypothesis attempts to investigate the main effect of the perceived 
i 
informativeness of case-specific evidence on the appropriateness of bank loan • 
officers' confidence. The perceived informativeness of case-specific evidence is • 
defined as how informative case-specific evidence is perceived to help predict the i 
I 
probability that a firm will or will not be in financial distress. The more informative i 
case-specific evidence enables a subject to judge a specific firm as being either very 丨 
likely (say > 70%) or very unlikely (say < 30%) to be in financial distress. On the 
contrary, the less informative case-specific evidence (say between 30% and 70%) 
does not help the subject much make such ajudgment. 
I 
The Bayesian rule indicates that although base-rate information is always relevant, its 
impact on the normative probability assessment decreases as case-specific evidence 
becomes more informative. Specifically, when case-specific evidence is highly 
informative, base-rate information has a lesser impact on the normative probability 
which is dominated by case-specific evidence alone. As case-specific evidence 
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becomes less informative, the normative probability becomes regressive or closer to 
the base rate^. 
For example, assuming that the base rate of financial distress is 30%, Table 4.1 shows 
the relationships between case-specific evidence, the normative probability, and their 
difference: 
Table 4.1 
Relationships Between Case-Specific Evidence, ^ 
the Normative Probability, and the Difference between \ 
Case-Specific Evidence and the Normative Probability | 
Case- The ^ 
Specific Evidence Normative Probability Difference l| 
0.00 0.00 0.00 j 
0.10 0.05 0.05 « 
0.20 0.10 0.10 I 
0.30 0.16 0.14 ^ 
0.40 0.22 0.18 
0.50 0.30 0.20 •丨 
0.60 0.39 0.21 , 
0.70 0.50 0.20 
0.80 0.63 0.17 ！ 
0.90 0.79 0.11 丨 
i_m L L ^ ^ , 
5 To illustrate this, consider the events of financial distress [D] and non-financial distress [D’] in a 
prediction problem in which case-specific evidence [E] and the base rates of the events [P(D) and 
i p(D,)] are combined to form the normative probability of financial distress and financial non-
distress [P(D/E) and P(D'/E)]. According to the Bayesian rule, the optimal integration of case-
specific evidence and the base rates in odds form is given by: 
P(D/E) P(EA)) P(D) 
= X 
P _ ) P(E/D') P(D,) 
The informativeness of case-specific evidence is given by the value of the conditional likelihood, and 
the conditional likelihood ratio [P(E/D) / P(E/D')] indicates the degree to which the sample favours 
financial distress over financial non-distress. When case-specific evidence is less informative, the 
conditional likelihood is approaching 0.50 from either the upper or lower direction. In this case, the 
value of .this likelihood ratio approaches one and the normative probabilities are governed by the 
base rates of P(D) and P(D'). However, the base rates have a minimal impact on predictions, when 
case-specific evidence is highly informative and the conditional likelihood approaches either 0.00 or 




Table 4.1 suggests that the adjustments from case-specific evidence to the 
corresponding normative probability are minimal when case-specific evidence is 
highly informative; that is when case-specific evidence is close to either 0.00 or 1.00. 
However, the amounts of these adjustments increase as case-specific evidence 
becomes less informative; that is when case-specific evidence is approaching 0.50 
from either direction. 
� 
i 
Studies in psychology showed that individuals were found to behave in a pattem ;j 
similar to the Bayesian rule when making probabilistic judgments. As mentioned J 
previously in Section 2.5.12 of Chapter II, the anchoring and adjustment heuristic ^ 
* 
predicts that when two or more items of information are integrated in arriving at a i 
probabilistic judgment, the more relevant item of information will serve as an anchor ^ 
» 
and will dominate the judgment. For example, the results of Ginossar and Trope's • 
(1980) study suggested that base-rate information was under-utilised when case- • 
i specific evidence was perceived as being informative. However, base-rate ！ 
information was found to be used properly when case-specific evidence was i 
• 1 
perceived as being uninformative. 
As mentioned earlier in Section 3.3.10.2 of Chapter III, Johnson (1983) also 
supported the premise that the less informative case-specific evidence promoted the 
use of base-rate information in a going-concern judgment task. To investigate the 
tendency to ignore the base rates of bankruptcy and to rely exclusively on the 
representativeness of a company's financial profile, Johnson (1983) asked a group of 
students to make going-concern judgments. The results indicated that although base-
rate information was in general under-utilised by the subjects, this information was 
more likely utilised when a fim's financial profile was perceived as being of little 
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value in discriminating between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy than when a firm's 
financial profile was perceived as being informative. 
However, Johnson investigated only whether base-rate information was under-
utilised. The effect of under-utilisation of base-rate information on prediction 
performance was not investigated in his study. It is therefore still unknown whether a 
less informative corporate financial profile will lead to more appropriate confidence 
than a more informative corporate financial profile. 
Accordingly, if base-rate information is not utilised by the subjects when they 
perceive case-specific evidence as being less informative, they are expected to have 
more overconfidence than when they perceive case-specific evidence as being more 
informative, as it is suggested by the Bayesian rule and illustrated in the example 
shown in Table 4.1. Conversely, ifbase-rate information is used by the subjects when 
they perceive case-specific evidence as being less informative, they are not expected 
to have more overconfidence than when they perceive case-specific evidence as being 
more informative, as it was implied from the results of Ginossar and Trope's (1980) 
study. 
Since the extant literature in psychology and accounting suggests that people tend to 
under-utilise base-rate information, the extent of bank loan officers' appropriate 
confidence is expected to follow more closely the pattern of the normative probability 
described by the Bayesian rule rather than the results of Ginossar and Trope. 
Therefore, bank loan officers are expected to have less overconfidence when they 
perceive case-specific evidence as being more informative, than when they perceive 
case-specific evidence as being less informative. 
Following this argument, the null hypothesis suggests that bank loan officers who 
perceive case-specific evidence as being more informative do not tend to have less 
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overconfidence than those who perceive case-specific evidence as being less 
informative. The alternative hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
H5: Bank loan officers who perceive case-specific evidence as 
being more informative tend to have less overconfidence 
when predicting the probabilities of firms being in 
financial distress than do those who perceive case-specific 
evidence as being less informative. 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
The aim of this chapter was to develop the research model and hypotheses for the 
current study on the basis of the four research opportunities identified from the 
literature reviewed in the last two chapters. The focus of the first research 
opportunity was on examining whether bank loan officers have appropriate 
confidence when predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial distress. The 
other research opportunities focused on testing the three selected potential factors 
affecting the appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence (i.e., the dependent 
variable). These factors were the independent variables of the current study and 
included the relevance of base-rate information, the bank loan officers' NC trait, and 
the perceived informativeness of case-specific evidence. The research model 
delineated the various relationships among these variables. Five research hypotheses 
were then proposed to test these relationships and their underlying logic were 
discussed. The next chapter will describe the research method and design used to 




RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research method and design used to test 
the five research hypotheses developed in the last chapter. The remainder of this 
chapter is organised around eight sections. Section 5.2 first describes the research 
method ofthe current study. Section 5.3 then outlines the experimental design which 
is a two-group design with before and after treatment observations. Section 5.4 
discusses how and why the subjects of the current study were selected for the 
experiments. Section 5.5 explains some of the major issues in constructing the 
experiment instrument, whereas Section 5.6 describes the procedures of 
administrating the experiments. Section 5.7 gives the details of measuring the 
independent and dependent variables. Section 5.8 discusses the data analysis 
methods used for testing the research hypotheses, and the assumptions of these 
methods are specified. Finally, Section5.9 provides a summary ofthe chapter. 
5.2 Research Method 
Research methods can broadly be classified into experimental (causal-type) and non-
experimental (correlational-type) (Spector, 1981; Brown and Melamed, 1990). The 
major difference between these two research methods is the degree to which an 
investigator can control specific conditions (events or situations). The experimental 
method allows the investigator to manipulate certain conditions, so that causal 
relationships can be established, if any. In the non-experimental method the 
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investigator can only observe these conditions in naturally occurring environments, so 
that any association between two variables can be examined. 
Calder, Phillips and Tybout (1981) identified the conditions under which the 
experimental or non-experimental research method should be used. They argued that 
when the research goal is for theory testing, the experimental method is preferred 
because it allows the strongest test. This method permits the investigator to minimise 
the possibility that third variables cause any observed relation between the 
independent and dependent variables. This method also allows the investigator to 
establish that the independent variable precedes the dependent variable in time, thus 
ruling out the possibility that the dependent variable initiates changes in the 
independent variable. These two features are important for eliminating the most 
plausible threats to the conclusion that a demonstrated statistical relationship between 
the independent and dependent variables implies causality (Cook and Campbell, 
1976). Since the focus of the current study is theory testing, the experimental 
method should be and was actually used as the primary research approach. 
One major limitation of the experimental method is the realism of the experimental 
task. However, if the difference between the experimental task and the 
corresponding real setting is not great and this difference does not have any 
significant effect on the dependent or independent variables, this method is deemed to 
be appropriate. In the current study, the experimental task was designed and 
conducted as realistically as possible in order to cater for this limitation. First, the ten 
firms given in the experiment instrument for the subjects to make financial distress 
predictions were real industrial firms publicly listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong Limited (SEHK). Second, pilot interviews with some senior bank loan officers 
were conducted to ensure that the financial ratios provided to the subjects were 
commonly used by them in practice. Third, the experiments were conducted in the 
subjects' offices during office hours. 
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The experimental method was commonly adopted to solicit the judgments from bank 
loan officers by most of the relevant behavioural decision research in accounting 
(e.g., Kennedy, 1975; Libby, 1975a; 1975b; Abdel-khalik and El-Sheshai, 1980; 
Casey, 1983; Houghton, 1984; Houghton and Sengupta, 1984; Houghton and 
Robinson, 1989; Breda and Ferris, 1992). The experimental method was also the 
most popular research method for accounting researchers to investigate the 
appropriateness of confidence (e.g., Tomassini et al., 1982; Solomon et al., 1985; 
Casey and Selling, 1986; Moeckel and Plumlee, 1989; Dilla et al., 1991; Ismail and 
Simnett, 1991; Selling, 1993; Mladenovic and Simnett, 1994). Therefore, the 
experimental method is considered to be a more appropriate research method than 
the non-experimental or correlational method for the current study. 
5.3 Experimental Design 
The experimental design adopted in the current study is a two-group design with 
before and after treatment observations. Since the relevance of base-rate information 
is the primary and only manipulative independent variable in the experiments, each 
subject was therefore first randomly assigned (R) to one of these two groups before 
Task 1 was conducted: Group 1 with the more relevant base-rate information 
(Gl(FP)) and Group 2 with the less relevant base-rate information (G2(FP)). Each 
subject in either group was given the same ten corporate financial profiles (FP) one at 
a time and then asked to assess the financial distress likelihood (observation 0(1) or 
0(2)) for each of these ten corporate financial profiles in Task 1. Therefore, each 
subject had to make ten assessments of the financial distress likelihood before he/she 
received base-rate information treatment in Task 2. 
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In Task 2, subjects were given additional base-rate information. Subjects in the more 
relevant base-rate information group (Gl(FP, RBR)) were provided with the base-
rate information which was more industry-specific and causal than the base-rate 
information provided to the subjects in the less relevant base-rate information group 
(G2(FP, LBR)) (see Section 5.7.1 for more detailed discussion of the relevance of 
base-rate information). Subjects in both groups were given back their own financial 
distress likelihood estimations in Task 1 and were then asked again to assess the 
probability of financial distress (observation 0(3) or 0(4)) for each of the same ten 
corporate financial profiles. The incremental effect of the relevance of base-rate 
information can then be measured by the difference between [0(3) - 0(1)] and [0(4) 
_ o(2)]. This two-group design with before and after treatment observations is 
shown in Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1 Two-Group with Before and After Treatment 
Observations Experimental Design 
Task1 Task2 
> Gl(FP) ^ 0(1) • Gl(FP,RBR) • 0(3) 
R \ 




Possible biases such as history, maturation, testing, instrumentation, experimental 
mortality, selection-maturation interaction, reactive effect of testing, subject selection 
biases, and reactive effects of experimental arrangements in an experiment, had been 
well controlled for in the current study and it is therefore believed that they would 
not cause any visible effect on the reliability of the findings. 
5.4 Subjects 
Bank loan officers are frequently required to evaluate whether their clients will be in 
financial distress by using information extracted from the clients' financial statements. 
Bank loan officers from the Bank of China Group were selected as the subjects for 
the current study. This Group is a major banking group in Hong Kong in terms of 
the number of member banks. It consists of 14 sister banks of which most of them 
are incorporated in mainland China. Each of these member banks has its own branch 
network and independent responsibility for its profit and loss. Some of the 
operations among the member banks in the Group are, however, controlled centrally. 
These operations, among others, include the computerised banking systems and 
lending policy. 
As Hong Kong is going to retum to mainland China in 1997, the importance of this 
banking group to the economy of Hong Kong has been growing rapidly in recent 
years. For example, the Bank of China has been authorised to issue local bank notes 
since 1994. In view of its size and its increasing influence in the local society, bank 
loan officers of this banking group were selected as the sample frame of the current 
study. Although restricting its external validity, choosing all loan officers from the 




Since there were only limited potential subjects available in the chosen banking 
group, and in view of the resource constraints in completing the current study, the 
sample size was targeted at 50. The number of subjects used for the current study 
was also determined by making reference to some previous studies of behavioural 
decision research in financial distress prediction which used similar subjects and 
experimental designs. For example, Libby (1975a) used 43 bank loan officers for an 
experimental design with three between-subjects variables. Houghton and Sengupta 
(1984) used 45 bank loan officers for an experimental design with two between-
subjects variables. Similarly, Breda and Ferris (1992) used 32 bank loan officers for 
an experimental design with two between-subjects variables. 
The number of subjects determined in the current study also took account of the 
discussion by Keppel (1982, p.336) regarding the minimum sample size for a 
treatment cell. Keppel argued that to achieve the desired reliability associated with 
each of the basic treatment means, the minimum sample size for a treatment cell 
acceptable to researchers in social science ranges from 8 to 12 subjects. This number 
also depends upon the size of the within-groups variance. The two between-subjects 
variables with two levels each in the current study resulted in four treatment cells. 
The minimum sample size should be in the range of 32 (4 x 8) to 48 (4 x 12) subjects. 
Therefore, the size of 50 subjects used in the current study should also be able to 
satisfy the minimum sample size as suggested by Keppel. 
The bank loan officers recruited had at least one year's working experience in analysis 
or administration of commercial loan applications. Since co-operation from the 
subjects is crucial to the success of any experiment, support from the management of 
the chosen banking group was important for their bank loan officers' active 
participation in the current study. As it was impossible to obtain a list of all bank 
loan officers in the chosen banking group, the sample of subjects in the current study 




manager of the banking group, who had voluntarily participated in co-ordinating the 
recruiting project, contacted the potential subjects directly on a non-random basis and 
solicited their willingness to participate in the experiments. Ultimately, 50 bank loan 
officers agreed to participate. 
5.5 Construction of the Experiment Instrument 
The experiment instrument was divided into four parts. The first part provided an 
introduction of this research to the subjects. The research objective was first given 
and the definition of a firm in financial distress was then provided. The importance of 
the subjects' participation in the research and their contribution to the research was 
also emphasised. Finally, the subjects were asked to indicate whether they would like 
to have a report on the results of the research. In the second part, the subjects were 
asked to assess the "financial distress likelihood" of the ten given firms based on the 
financial ratios contained in their respective corporate financial profiles. Each profile 
and its related assessment question were presented in a separate page. 
The third part contained additional base-rate information (either the more relevant 
type or the less relevant type). The subjects were then asked to make a "financial 
distress probability" estimation for each of the ten original financial profiles. The last 
part of the instrument measured the information processing characteristic of the 
subjects (i.e., the NC trait) as a subject variable. A sample copy of the experiment 





5.5.1 Selection of Sample Firms for Prediction Tasks 
There were two major purposes in selecting a portfolio of sample firms in the current 
study. The first purpose was to include the chosen firms in the experimental 
instrument for the subjects to make financial distress predictions. The second 
purpose was to extract the appropriate financial ratios to be included in the financial 
profiles. The rest of this section is divided into four parts. Section 5.5.1.1 first 
provides the definition of a firm being in financial distress. With this given definition, 
Section 5.5.1.2 describes the process of identifying those firms in financial distress. 
Section 5.5.1.3 then discusses how the matching healthy firms were selected in order 
to identify those specific financial characteristics that could be used to predict firms 
being in financial distress. Finally, Section 5.5.1.4 explains how the sample firms 
were chosen to be included in the experiment instrument. 
5.5.1.1 Definition of Firms being in Financial Distress 
While most behavioural studies of financial distress prediction in the U.S. and 
Australia mainly included firms that had filed bankruptcy (Libby, 1975b; Abdel-khalik 
and El-Sheshai, 1980; Casey, 1980a; 1980b; Zimmer, 1980; Casey, 1983; Houghton, 
1984; Casey and Selling, 1986; Breda and Ferris, 1992; Selling, 1993), some other 
studies used a broader scope for defining financial distress and included firms not 
only in bankruptcy, but also in insolvency, loan default or asset liquidation due to 
financial difficulty (Chalos, 1985; Chewning and Harrell, 1990; Stocks, 1991). In 
fact, both bankruptcy and technical insolvency can be considered as legal forms of 
firm failure and the difference between these two types of firm failure is only in 
degree of financial difficulty. 
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A firm in financial distress is defined in the current study as a publicly listed company 
that has been suspended or de-listed from listing on the SEHK due to financial 
difficulty (e.g., inability to pay debts when they come due, bankruptcy, loan default, 
insolvency or asset liquidation) during the period of 1986 to 1992. This broader 
definition was adopted by the current study for two reasons. First, although bank 
loan officers pay much attention to whether their clients will be bankrupt, any events 
that will impair repayment of loans attract the same attention from them. These 
events include loan default or liquidation of major assets due to financial difficulty. 
、 
This definition of financial distress is therefore considered to be more appropriate for | 
bank loan officers to make lending decisions in practice. Second, publicly listed ！ 
companies in Hong Kong that filed bankruptcy were rare. With more sample firms i 
under this broader definition of financial distress, the subjects would not be so easily , 
able to guess the real identity of these firms in the experiment. Thus, this definition ‘ 
j 
of financial distress could avoid some possible biases that decreased the internal 
validity of the study results. 
The sample firms selected for the current study were listed during the period of 1986 
to 1992. Such restriction on the selected period was due to the fact that the SEHK 
was incorporated in 1986 and complete records for publicly listed companies have 
been readily available only since then. In addition, although the current study 
attempted to include the latest financial statement information available, the PACAP 
Database 1993, a major source for the financial information of publicly listed 
companies in Hong Kong, includes the information of the publicly listing companies 




5.5.1.2 Identification of Firms in Financial Distress 
Suspended or de-listed firms during the said period could be identified from The 
Weekly Stock Price Quotations and the yearly Fact Books (the SEHK, 1986; 1987; 
1988; 1989; 1990; 1991; 1992) published by the SEHK. The reasons for these 
suspensions and de-listings were found by studying the major events and the history 
of the firms concerned as documented in Wardley Cards. Unclear reasons were 
further investigated by referring to the company news published in financial 
newspapers, such as The Hong Kong Economic Journal, around the days of 
suspension or de-listing. 
Twenty-one firms were initially identified as being in financial distress during the said 
period. Of these firms, four companies in finance (including commercial banks) were 
deleted because they were governed by different regulations and their financial 
statements differed substantially from those of non-finance companies. A further four 
firms were deleted due to unavailability or incompleteness of financial statements. 
The final sample consisted of 13 financially distressed firms. 
5.5.1.3 Selection of Healthy Firms 
To identify those financial characteristics that could be used to predict firms being in 
financial distress, a sample of healthy firms were found by matching their industry 
type, firm size and fiscal year of financial statements with those of the sample of 
financially distressed firms as identified in Section 5.5.1.2. These matching criteria 
were recognised as the dimensions most commonly used in the previous studies 
(Beaver, 1966; Altman, 1968; Deakin, 1972; Casey and Bartczak, 1985; Tai and Tai, 
1986; Platt and Platt, 1990; Baldwin and Glezen, 1992; Koh, 1992; Platt, Platt and 





proxy for firm size, and the industry codes that were assigned by the SEHK to the 
firms were adopted as the proxy for their industry type. By using these proxies, each 
financially distressed firm identified in the current study was matched with two 
healthy firms by industry type, the fiscal year of financial statements, and firtn size so 
that a portfolio of mixed firms could be made available for this prediction task. The 
reason for using this method of matching, instead of using the commonly used 
method of one-to-one matching, was to satisfy the basic assumption of the statistical 
tool on sufficient sample size for identifying useful financial ratios from a sample of 
potential ratios (see Section 5.5.2.1 for more detailed discussion). By using this 
matching method, the final sample contained 13 financially distressed firms and 26 
healthy firms. 
There are both advantages and disadvantages of using the matching method to select 
a sample of healthy firms for investigating the characteristics of firms in financial 
distress. On the one hand, this method provides an efficient way to achieve a 
statistical power which can only be obtained from using a large sample. On the other 
hand, the criteria used for matching will not be identified as important characteristics 
offirms in financial distress even they actually are. 
5.5.1.4 Sample Firms in the Instrument 
Ten sample firms were selected to be included in the experiment instrument and all 
the subjects were provided with these same sample firms for making the financial 
distress predictions. This number of sample firms was determined by the feedback 
from the pilot interviews with four experienced bank loan officers who suggested this 
number of sample firms as the acceptable maximum for bank loan officers to 
participate in such an experiment (see Section 5.5.5 for more detailed discussion of 




rate of 30% adopted in the experiment (see Section 5.7.1)，three firms were randomly 
selected from the 13 firms in financial distress as identified earlier in Section 5.5.1.2. 
The six healthy firms matching these three firms in financial distress were also 
included in the instrument. The last healthy firm was randomly selected from the 
remaining 20 healthy firms. Altogether there were a total of ten (3 + 6 + 1) financial 
profiles included in the instrument. 
5.5.2 Selection of Financial Ratios 
The types of financial ratios included in the corporate financial profiles were selected 
on the basis of two criteria. First, the financial ratios selected should actually be 
useful for predicting firms being in financial distress. A large number of financial 
ratios that had been identified as being useful for predicting firms being in financial 
distress in the literature were tested by logit analysis in the current study. Eight 
useful financial ratios were finally identified. The results of this logit analysis are 
presented in the next section, Section 5.5.2.1. Second, the financial ratios selected 
should also be perceived as being useful by bank loan officers for this prediction task 
(see Section 5.7.3 for a discussion of the distinction between "useful" and 
"informative"). To obtain ideas about which financial ratios were perceived to be 
useful, pilot interviews with four experienced bank loan officers were conducted. 
These interviews and the results are discussed in more detail in Section 5.5.2.2. As 
to be discussed later, by consolidating the findings from these two procedures, nine 




5.5.2.1 Logit Analysis 
Logit analysis is the most popular technique adopted by those recent studies 
examining the characteristics of financially distressed firms. Its S-shaped curve of 
logistic distribution function is used to specify the functional relationship between the 
firm's financial ratios and its financial distress likelihood: 
p(i) = l / [ l + e-P x(0]. (5 .1) 
where p(i) is the probability that the firm i will be in financial distress in the coming 
year, x(i) is a vector of financial ratios of the firm i, and p is a vector of unknown 
parameters to be estimated. After rearranging Equation (5.1), a logit model can also 
be expressed as: 
Logit = ln[p(i)/(l - p(i))] = P x(i) (5.2) 
A logit model can be used to estimate the probability of an event that is related to 
some measurable factors. Logit estimation can also be used to compare the relative 
importance of the explanatory variables in determining the likelihood of an event. 
Little guidance can be found from the literature as to which financial ratios are useful 
for this prediction task. For this reason, a large number of financial ratios that were 
examined in previous financial distress studies were initially included in the model as 
the potentially useful ratios. To single out the most useful financial ratios from this 
large pool of potential ones, a sample of firms composed of both firms in financial 
distress and healthy firms were needed for statistical analysis. These sample firms 
have already been identified in Sections 5.5.1.2 and 5.5.1.3，and included 13 firms in 
financial distress and 26 healthy firms. Financial statement information required to 
compile the financial ratios of these sample firms was extracted from the PACAP 
Database. Those ratios that required information not available in this Database were 
dropped to preserve consistency and reliability of data. Out of the original 40 ratios, 




Of these 36 financial ratios, the ratio of sales to total shareholders' equity was 
dropped because this ratio had a value of both positive and negative infinities as the 
total shareholders' equity of a firm approached zero. Two other financial ratios (i.e., 
working capital to total assets, and total liabilities to total assets) were also dropped 
because these two ratios were linear combinations of the other existing ratios. 
Specifically, working capital to total assets was equivalent to current assets to total 
assets minus current liabilities to total assets, whereas the ratio of total liabilities to 
I 
total assets was equivalent to one minus the ratio of total shareholders' equity to total j 
assets. The elimination of these two ratios was necessary as this statistical tool 
requires that no independent variable is a linear combination of the other independent 
variables (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984; DeMaris, 1992). Finally, a total of 33 potential 
financial ratios were put in the logit analysis. The results of the analysis indicated 
that the model of one year prior to financial distress contained eight significant 
explanatory variables as follows: 
• Current assets to current liabilities 
• Quick assets to total assets 
• Working capital to equity 
• Sales to cash 
• Sales to total assets 
• Sales to equity 
• Total debt to equity 
• Total debt to total assets 
The details of the prediction model and the findings will be reported in Section 6.3 of 






5.5.2.2 Pilot Interviews 
To ensure that the financial ratios identified by the logit analysis were also perceived 
as being useful by bank loan officers for predicting firms being in financial distress, 
interviews with four senior bankers (not included in the final sample) from the Bank 
of China Group with extensive experience in commercial lending were conducted. 
These pilot interviews also allowed the author to become more familiar with the real 
practice of the loan decision process and to provide insights into refining the research 
model of the current study. The average banking experience of these interviewees 
was 14 years, ranging from 10 to 20 years. Their average lending experience was 9 
years, ranging from 8 to 10 years. The interviews were unstructured with a purpose 
of giving more opportunities to the interviewees to express their ideas. Each of these 
interviews lasted for about half an hour. 
The first interview confirmed that financial ratio analysis was important for evaluating 
a commercial loan application. In general, a large number of financial ratios were 
used to analyse applicants' financial strengths. Their focus was not only on particular 
types of ratios, but also on the consistency among various ratios. Six types of 
information were particularly highlighted as being useful. Of these six types of 
information mentioned, five could be found in the client firms' financial statements 
and included liquidity, leverage, turnover, profitability and security. Some examples 
were cited for each type of information, but the interviewee emphasised that these 
examples were not exhaustive. For instance, liquidity included working capital ratio; 
leverage included debt ratio; turnover included sales to total assets; profitability 
included net income to total assets and retum on investment; and security included 
the amount of various classes of assets. Finally, some non-financial information was 
also considered to be important for their evaluation, even though it might not be 
given in financial statements. The latter information included the financial strength of 




The second interview suggested similar financial ratios, except that security was not 
mentioned. Also, non-financial factors, such as the company background and the 
relationships with its bankers, were mentioned. The third interview provided further 
support for the results of the previous two interviews. Liquidity (such as current 
ratio and quick ratio), turnover (such as sales to total assets) and profitability were 
suggested to be the important factors. In addition, the interviewee suggested looking 
into the fixed costs structure of a firm. However, similar to the second interview, 
security was not mentioned. Finally, non-financial factors, such as industry risk and 
the character of management, were also mentioned. 
The fourth interview also indicated similar factors. For example, liquidity, 
particularly the information on cash flow statement, was highlighted. Leverage, such 
as debt ratio, was also mentioned. Furthermore, security was considered to be 
important. Some insightful comments were given on the profitability of a firm. The 
interviewee suggested that although profitability was not a crucial factor in 
determining whether a firm would be in financial distress, most of the bankers in 
Hong Kong were reluctant to grant loans to unprofitable settings. 
In order to understand more about the real practice of the loan decision process of 
the Bank of China group, these interviewees were also asked to indicate whether any 
decision aids were commonly used when evaluating a loan application. All of them 
indicated that very few formal decision aids were regularly used in their banking 
group. 
5.5.2.3 Final Financial Ratios Used in the Instrument 
Since all the eight financial ratios identified by the logit analysis were also mentioned 




for this prediction task, all these ratios were included in the instrument. However, 
the profitability ratios of a firm, as suggested by these bank loan officers, were not 
included in the results of the logit analysis. The ratio of net income to total assets 
(also known as return on investment), a profitability ratio mentioned by all these bank 
loan officers, was also added to the list in order to cater for the information need of 
the subjects. Therefore, there were a total of nine financial ratios contained in the 
instrument as shown below: 
1. Liquidity 
• Current assets to current liabilities 
• Quick assets to total assets 
• Working capital to equity 
2. Turnover 
• Sales to cash 
• Sales to total assets 
• Sales to equity 
3. Leverage 
• Total debt to equity 
• Total debt to total assets 
4. Profitability 
• Net income to total assets 
5.5.3 Modification of the Need for Cognition Scale 
The last part of the experiment instrument was used to measure the information-
processing characteristic of the subjects, that is their need for cognition (NC) trait. 
This trait was measured by the 18-item NC scale as developed by Cacioppo et al., 
(1984). This scale was well tested and found to have one dominant factor that 
accounted for 37% of total variance and the Cronbach,s alpha coefficient was +0.90 
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(Cacioppo et aL, 1984). Subjects were asked to indicate their degree of agreement 
or disagreement to each statement on a seven-point likert scale, ranging from +3 to -
3. The points of+3, +2 and +1 were equivalent to "strong", "moderate" and "slight" 
agreement with the statement respectively. The point of 0 represented neutral. The 
points of -1, -2 and -3 indicated "slight", "moderate" and "strong" disagreement with 
the statement respectively. 
In order to ensure that this NC instrument could be understood by the subjects, it was 
passed to a linguistic and business communication lecturer in a tertiary institute in 
Hong Kong for comments. Overall, he found that the instrument should be 
comprehensible to bank loan officers. However, he also found that some of the 
questions in the original instrument had grammatical problems and a few others were 
difficult for Hong Kong business people to understand. Therefore, some wordings of 
the original questions were modified upon his recommendations. 
For example, "would prefer" in Question 1 and Question 15 was replaced by a 
simpler word "prefer". "Thinking is not my idea of fun" in Question 2 was changed 
to "Thinking is no fun for me". The word "deliberating" in Questions 6 and 18 was 
changed to "thinking". "I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term 
ones" in Question 8 was changed to "I prefer thinking about small, daily projects to 
thinking about long-term ones". "The idea of relying on thought to make my way to 
the top appeals to me” in Question 10 was changed to ”I like to rely on thinking to 
make my jobs perfect". These modifications did not intend to change the meanings of 
the original questions; they only made the questions clearer and more understandable 






5.5.4 Translation of the Experiment Instrument 
Since Chinese language is commonly used in the Bank of China Group and all the 
subjects of the current study are Chinese, the original instrument in the English 
version was translated into Chinese to provide the subjects with an option to select 
their preferred language (in fact, all these subjects selected the instrument in the 
Chinese version in the experiments). In order to ensure that the experiment 
instruments of the two versions were equivalent, back translation method (Brislin, 
、 
1980) was used. This method has been commonly adopted for the purpose of doing j 
I 




After the instrument was prepared in English, a bilingual who has extensive 彳 
experience in commercial lending and translation was asked to translate the 
instrument into Chinese. The use of a translator with extensive banking experience 
was to ensure that the instrument was written in a language understandable to the 
subjects. A second bilingual was asked to independently translate the Chinese 
instrument back into English. The two versions were then compared by the author to 
identify any discrepancies. Some minor discrepancies were found and resolved with 
the two translators together. 
5.5.5 Pretest of the Experiment Instrument 
The preliminary experiment instrument was pretested by four experienced bankers 
who had also participated in the pilot interviews as discussed earlier in Section 
5 5 2.2. Some helpful comments were solicited from them. Specifically, they 
considered that the original instrument was too long and time consuming for bank 
loan officers to complete. On the basis of their recommendations, the number of 
firms included in the instrument was reduced from the original 15 to final ten. Some 
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other minor adjustments to the instrument were also made to make it more easy to 
follow. These changes aimed to elicit better responses from the subjects. 
5.6 Administration ofExperiment 
Altogether 50 bank loan officers were interviewed for collecting the needed data to 
test the hypotheses. All interviews were conducted in the subjects' offices during the 
office hours. Before arrival at each subject's office, the subject had been randomly f 
assigned to one of the two base-rate information groups. The experiment instrument | 
was assembled in a booklet and distributed to each subject personally at the beginning 
I 
of the interview. 
i 
In an introduction, subjects were first given the definition of a fmn being in fmancial 
distress. The importance of the subjects' participation in the current study and their 
contribution to this research were also emphasised. The purpose was to motivate 
them to undertake the experiment seriously. Also, the instructions given at the 
beginning of the instrument stressed the importance of answering the questions for 
each sample firm independently and according to the order they appeared in the 
booklet. 
The experiment was divided into two consecutive tasks. In Task 1, subjects were 
asked to assess how likely it was each of the ten given sample firms (financial 
profiles) would be in financial distress in the coming year. All subjects were given the 
same ten sample firms. Subjects were told that these ten industrial firms were real 
firms and publicly listed in Hong Kong during the period from 1986 to 1992. These 
firms included both firms in financial distress and healthy firms. The financial ratios 
of a firm in financial distress were extracted from its annual report one year before its 





of its annual reports selected from the same period. Subjects were also told that the 
order of firms and the order of financial ratios were presented to them in random. 
After this, subjects were given the financial ratios of each firm on a separate page, 
and were asked to assess how likely it was the specific firm would be in financial 
distress in the coming year. This likelihood was expressed by a number ranging from 
0 (i.e., the firm certainly would not be in financial distress in the coming year) to 100 
(i.e., the firm certainly would be in financial distress in the coming year), while 50 
1 
represented indifference. When the subjects had answered this same question for aU j 
the ten firms, Task 1 of the experiment was completed. i 
In Task 2 of the experiment, each subject was given additional base-rate information 
along with the same corporate financial profiles given in Task 1 and hisy^er 
estimation of the financial distress likelihood of these firms. Subjects were asked 
again to estimate the probability that each of the sample firms would be in financial 
distress in the coming year. The specific base-rate information received by a subject 
depended on the relevance group he/she had been assigned (see Section 5.7.1 for the 
manipulations ofthe relevance ofbase-rate information). Finally, subjects were asked 
to complete the modified NC instrument. 
5.7 Operationalisation and Measurement of Variables 
5.7.1 Relevance of Base-Rate Information 
The relevance of base-rate information was manipulated by assigning each subject 
randomly to one of the two groups: the more relevant base-rate information and the 




rate of 30%, but their relevance was different. Subjects in the less relevant base-rate 
information group were simply given the general base-rate information as follows: 
"The ten (10) given corporate financial profiles were in fact selected 
randomly from 100 firms of which 30 firms have been in financial 
distress and 70 firms have not been in financial distress." 
The description of this general base rate of 30% followed those used by the 
psychology researchers when investigating the base-rate fallacy (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1973; Bar-Hillel, 1979; 1980a; 1980b; 1982; Tversky and Kahneman, , 
1982a; Bar-Hillel, 1984). The description of this general base rate was also adopted 
by accounting studies in investigating auditors, going-concem judgments (Johnson, 
1983; Kida, 1984a). 
In contrast, subjects in the more relevant base-rate information group were provided 
with the more specific base-rate information as follows: 
"The ten (10) given corporate financial profiles were in fact selected 
randomly from a sample of 100 firms in an industry of which 30 firms 
have been in financial distress and 70 firms have not been in financial 
distress. This industry was regarded as risky in terms of very keen 
competition in the industry and highly fluctuating demands for its 
products." 
Specificity was operationalised as industry specific and causal (Bar-Hillel, 1980a). 
The industry-specific base rate indicated that the 30 firms in financial distress were 
selected from an industry, of which the targeted firm was a member (Carroll and 
Siegler, 1977). This operational definition of the specific base rate was similar to that 
adopted by Kida (1984a). Kida operationalised the specific base rate by telling 
subjects that 2% of the firms in the selected industry failed. The name of the specific 
industry was not given because the number of publicly listed companies in Hong 
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Kong was not large. Otherwise, it would be easy for the subjects to guest the real 
identities of those firms included in the instrument, and would lead to a potential 
threat to the internal validity of the current study. The pretest of the instrument used 
in the current study was indicated the subjects were sensitised to this treatment 
information. 
Causality means that the base rate of financial distress could be perceived as having a 
cause-and-effect relationship (Ajzen, 1977; Tversky and Kahneman, 1982a; Bar- , 
Hillel, 1983). Kida (1984a) operationalised the causal base rate for failure firms by | 
describing the firms as having similar cash flows as failed firms. This 
operationalisation was not adopted in the current study because this definition would 
mislead the subjects to pay more attention to the liquidity of the firms. In the pilot 
interviews, the senior bank loan officers revealed that bank loan officers particularly 
related the financial distress of a firm to its industry risk. Therefore, industry risk was 
used as the operational definition of the causal base rate in the current study. 
5.7.2 Need for Cognition 
As mentioned in Section 5.5.3, the subjects' need for cognition (NC) trait was 
measured by the 18-item NC scale as developed by Cacioppo et al (1984). Each 
subject's NC score was obtained by summing up the score for each statement. Since 
half of the statements were asked in opposite directions to enhance the reliability of 
the data collected (including the statements 3，4, 5, 7，8，9, 12, 16 and 17), the scores 
of these statements needed to be multiplied by -1 before the summation. 
Subjects were split at the median of their NC scores into two groups. Subjects who 
scored above the median were classified as high NC, whereas subjects who scored 
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below the median were classified as low NC (no scores equal to the median were 
found in the data set). 
The major reasons why the subjects' NC scores were analysed primarily as a class 
(discrete) variable instead of a continuous variable in the current study were that the 
main objective of the current study was to compare the higher NC group with the 
lower NC group in terms of the appropriateness of their confidence, rather than the 
association between NC and appropriateness of confidence. In addition, the Likert 
H 
scale of this rather newly developed instrument was mainly interpreted as an interval ^ 
scale by previous NC studies rather than a continuous scale. j 
(. j 
Although analysing the NC scores as a continuous variable would gain more : 
information and increase the statistical power, it may also lead to a less reliable 丨 
I 
conclusion. Possibly partly due to this reason and the exploratory nature of the 
studies, most previous NC research in psychology adopted NC as a class variable for 
testing group means (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982; Cacioppo et aL., 1983; Cacioppo, 
Petty, Kao and Rodriguez; 1986; Ahlering, 1987; Haugtvedt et aL; 1988; Ahlering 
and Parker, 1989; Haugtvedt and Petty, 1989; D'agostino and Fincher-kiefer; 1992; 
Verplanken et al., 1992). A similar approach was also adopted in the current study 
so that the findings could be compared with those previous ones. 
Although NC was mainly analysed as a class variable in the current study, 
supplementary tests taking NC as a continuous variable were also conducted to 
provide additional insights into the findings (see Section 6.5.3 of Chapter VI). It was 
found that the effect of NC on appropriateness of confidence was improved when NC 
was treated as a continuous variable, but this effect was still unable to reach a 
significant level. Therefore, whether treating NC as a class or a continuous variable 
did not affect the conclusions on the hypotheses related to this variable. 
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5.7.3 Perceived Informativeness of Case-Specific Evidence 
The perceived informativeness of case-specific evidence is considered to be a 
different construct from task predictability. To investigate the differences between 
these two terms, it is necessary to refer to their definitions and measurements. For 
example, Casey and Selling (1986) defined task predictability as the ability of the 
financial ratio cues used to predict the financial distress of a firm by a statistical 
» 
prediction model. This definition of task predictability was also adopted by later , 
accounting studies in a similar research context (Selling, 1993; Mladenovic and ！ 
Simnett, 1994; Simnett, 1994). 
Also, Casey and Selling (1986) measured task predictability by using an iterative 
computer-based algorithm to identify 30 firms (15 bankrupt and 15 non-bankrupt) 
from 145 firms in such a way that the difference in classification accuracy between 
using the financial statement information of one year and two years prior to 
bankruptcy was maximised. All 30 firms were accurately classified by using their 
financial data of one year prior to bankruptcy, whereas only 53.3% of these firms 
were classified correctly by using the same types of financial data but of two years 
prior to bankruptcy. Therefore, task predictability was measured by the prediction 
accuracy of a statistical prediction model using model-selected information (see 
Simnett and Trotman, 1989 for more discussions of model and information). 
In contrast, the perceived informativeness of case-specific evidence can be defined as 
how informative the case-specific evidence is perceived by a judge in terms of the 
financial distress likelihood of a sample firm. This perceived likelihood represented a 
human judgment made by using human-selected information and might not 
necessarily have any direct relationships with the actual prediction accuracy. It was 




subjects in Task 1 into two groups of an approximately equal number of 
observations. The more informative case-specific evidence group contained financial 
distress likelihood of more extreme values in both directions (say < 30% or > 70%), 
which indicated that the firms were either very likely or very unlikely to be in 
financial distress. In contrast, the less informative case-specific group contained 
financial distress likelihood around the median (say between 30% and 70%), which 




Although some people may suspect that task predictability would have a confounding | 
effect on the perceived informativeness of case-specific evidence, no study has so far ； 
been conducted to address these two constructs together. From their operational i 
t 
definitions, no theoretical relationships between them can be identified. Therefore, 丨 
I 
these two variables were considered to be two different constructs. However, to 
investigate any possible confounding effect of task predictability, additional analysis 
was performed in the current study to examine whether the original conclusions 
would be changed after controlling for the effect of task predictability. The results of 
this additional analysis were in line with the above discussions that task predictability 
and the perceived informativeness of case-specific evidence were two different 
constructs. These results will be described in detail in Chapter VL 
To allow more efficient grouping of observations, financial distress likelihood with a 
value of less than 0.5 was first converted by the following method: 
Converted financial distress likelihood = 1 - financial distress likelihood 
The purpose of this conversion was to ensure that all the financial distress likelihood 
values were in the range between 0.50 to 1.00. After this conversion, the financial 
distress likelihood with a value of 1.00 indicated that the firms would either certainly 
be in financial distress or certainly not be in financial distress, whereas a value of 0.50 
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represented neutral on whether the firms would or would not be in financial distress. 
Then the median of all these converted likelihood values was found. While likelihood 
values greater than or equal to the median were classified into the more informative 
case-specific evidence group, those likelihood values that were less than the median 
were classified into the less informative case-specific evidence group. This 
operationalisation is quite similar to that adopted by Johnson (1983) to group case-
specific evidence by the perceived similarity of financial distress. 
«4 
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5.7.4 Appropriateness of Confidence \ 
V 
1 
Appropriateness of confidence was the dependent variable of the current study. This i 
； 
variable was measured by comparing the subjects' probability judgments of financial 
distress solicited in Task 2 of the experiment with a normative standard. Since the 
subjects had indicated the financial distress likelihood in Task 1 of the experiment and 
base-rate information was also given to the subjects in Task 2, the posterior 
normative probabilities calculated by using the Bayesian rule could be used to 
determine the appropriateness of the subjects' confidence. 
For example, consider the events of financial distress [D] and financial non-distress 
[D,] in a prediction problem in which the likelihood [P(E/D) and P(E/D,)] and the 
base rates of the events [P(D) and P(D')] are combined to form the posterior 
normative probabilities of financial distress and non-distress [P(D/^) and P(D'/E)]. 
According to the Bayesian rule, the optimal integration of sample evidence and base-
rate information is given by 
P(D/E) P(E/D) P(D) 
= X —— (5.3) 
P(D'/E) P(E/D') P(D') 
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Since the sum of the probabilities of financial distress and financial non-distress is 
one, the following equations can be stated as: 
P(D,) + P ( D ) = 1, (5 .4) 
P(D7E) + P _ ) = 1 , (5.5) 
and 
P(EyD') + P(E/D)=l . (5.6) 
Also, P(D) was given in the instrument as 0.30 (see Section 5.7.1 for the discussion 
S 
of the financial distress base rate). By substituting the value of P(D) and Equations || 
(5.4) to (5.6) into Equation (5.3) and rearranging the formula, the following equation jj 
'I 




P(D/E) = . (5-7) 
0.70 - 0.4 [P(EyD)] 
1 I 
Examples of how to apply Equation (5.7) to find the posterior normative probabilities 
can also be found in Table 4.1 of Chapter IV. In .Table 4.1，the first column was 
"Case-specific evidence" and was measured by the financial distress likelihood 
estimated by the subjects (P(E/D)) and the second column was "The normative 
probability" and represented the corresponding posterior normative probabilities 
(P(D/E)) calculated by using financial distress likelihood and Equation (5.7). For 
instance, if P(E/D) is substituted by 0.5 in Equation (5.7), P(D/E) will be equal to 
0.3. The same result can be obtained from Table 4.1 by referring to 0.5 in the first 
column, and 0.3 is the corresponding normative probability in the second column. 
The measurement of appropriateness of confidence for each financial distress 
prediction was determined by comparing the subject's estimation of each financial 
distress probability in Task 2 with the corresponding normative probability as being 





higher than the corresponding normative probability, the subject was said to be 
overconfident. Otherwise, the subject was said to be underconfident (i.e., if his/her 
subjective probabilistic judgment was lower than the corresponding normative 
probability). 
5.8 Data Analysis Methods 
、 
A t-test was used to investigate the overall appropriateness of bank loan officers' || 
confidence as tested in Hypothesis 1. Since a t-test is a special case of an analysis of i| 
variance (ANOVA) test, the assumptions of the ANOVA test as discussed later in i| 
1 




An unbalanced ANOVA test was used as the primary tool to investigate the mam 丨 
effects of the three independent variables: the relevance of base-rate information, the 
NC trait of bank loan officers, and the perceived informativeness of case-specific 
evidence. This test was also used to examine the interaction effects of the first two 
independent variables. Although both multiple regression and ANOVA can be used 
to test research hypotheses, ANOVA is usually considered as being more appropriate 
when observations are grouped by categorical independent variables in experiments, 
whereas multiple regression is commonly used when the independent variables of a 
study are metric variables (Ivensen and Norpoth, 1987). 
In conducting data analysis, the following assumptions of ANOVA had been 
observed carefully: normality, homogeneity of variances, and independent errors 
(Hays, 1969, pp. 378-379). To satisfy the normality assumption, a large number of 
observations for each treatment cell were used (see Sections 6.3 and 6.4 of Chapter 
VI for the discussion of the number of observations in each treatment cell). Hays 
(1969，p.239) suggested that a treatment cell size of 30 or more is considered to be 
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I , 
large enough for assuming the satisfaction of the normality requirement in many 
psychology studies (the treatment cell sizes of the current study were all over 100). 
Also, Keppel (1982, p.86) argued that violations of the normality assumption do not 
constitute a serious problem except ifthe violations are especially severe. Therefore, 
this assumption is deemed to have been satisfied in the current study. 
The assumption of homogeneity of variances will not be a major problem if the 
treatment cell sizes are more or less equal. However, the treatment cell sizes of the 
'<i 
current study were inevitably not equal to each other. The reason was that subjects | 
were first randomly assigned to the two base-rate information groups, and the S 
subjects in each base-rate information group were then divided into the high and low � 
i 
NC groups by the median of their NC scores. In addition, all the subjects were re-
divided into the more and the less informative case-specific evidence conditions by 
i 
the median of the converted distress likelihood values. These assignments of the 
subjects into groups would result in unequal treatment cell sizes. If a balanced 
ANOVA test were used in this case, the assumption of homogeneity of variances 
would become a serious problem and the results of the analysis might be distorted. 
Following the suggestion given by Keppel (1982，p.351), an unbalanced ANOVA test 
was used instead of a balanced ANOVA test in order to overcome this problem. 
The original intention of the investigator was to assume that the independence 
assumption would not significantly be violated. In the current study however, each 
of subjects was required to make ten assessments in each task. The subjects might 
have "brought" certain characteristics of their own to the task. These characteristics 
might have a consistent effect on the ten assessments that each of them had made, 
and therefore the possibility of some dependence among these assessments could not 
totally be ruled out. For this reason, several steps had been taken in the experiment 
in order to mitigate the dependence among the various assessments made by the same 
subject. For example, the instructions of the experiment instrument emphasised the 
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need for the subject to make independent judgment on each corporate financial 
profile. In addition, each corporate financial profile was presented to the subject on a 
separate page. After these steps had been taken, it was considered that any remaining 
dependence among the observations would not substantially affect findings of the 
current study. 
In addition, in view of the exploratory nature of the current study, the unbalanced 
ANOVA test, which assumes independent observations and has a stronger statistical 
、 
power than other potential statistical tests, was used as the primary data analysis tool | 
in the current study. Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, since it was impossible to j| 
I 
rule out completely the dependence among the observations, a supplementary .； 
I 
analysis by using a repeated measures ANOVA test, which does not assume | 
• :l 
independence among the observations, was also performed. The results of this 
additional analysis were then used to compare with those of the unbalanced ANOVA 
I 
test to enhance the reliability of the findings. This supplementary analysis will be 
discussed in detail in Section 6.5.4 of Chapter VI. 
5.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter described the research method and design used for testing the research 
hypotheses developed. The experimental method was selected because the major 
goal of the current study was to test the causal relationship between the relevance of 
base-rate information and the appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence, if 
any. A two-group experimental design with before and after treatment observations 
was then delineated. The process of selecting the 50 subjects was explained and the 
development of the experiment instrument was presented. The administration of the 
experiment, and the operationalisation and measurement of the concerned variables 
were then described in detail. Finally, the data analysis methods used and their major 
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assumptions were discussed. On this basis, the next chapter will proceed to analyse 













ANALYSIS OF DATA 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of analysing the data collected 
from the experiments. The remainder of the chapter is arranged around five sections. 
、 
Section 6.2 first provides the descriptive data about the subjects: their ages, banking j 
and lending experience, and need for cognition (NC) scores. Section 6.3 then j 
presents the results of stepwise logit analysis for identifying the useful financial ratios ^ 
I 
to be used by the subjects for predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial : 
I 
distress. Section 6.4 discusses the findings on testing each hypothesis. Section 6.5 
describes the results of some additional analyses on the data and compares these 
results with those presented in Section 6.4. Finally, Section 6.6 provides a summary 
of the chapter. 
6.2 Descriptive Data about the Subjects 
A total of 50 bank loan officers participated in the current study. As shown in Table 
6.1，the subjects ranged in age from 24 to 45 years old with a mean of 33.8’ a median 
of 36 and a standard deviation of 6.4. The banking experience of the subjects ranged 
from 1 year to 28 years with a mean of 11.3, a median of 10 and a standard deviation 
of 7.6. The lending experience of the subjects ranged from 1 year to 15 years with a 
mean of 6.7, a median of 6 and a standard deviation of 4.1. This descriptive data 
confirms that the minimum requirement of one year's lending experience for the 




Descriptive Characteristics about the Subjects 
The NC Score 
Banking Lending Low High 
Experience Experience NC NC 
Age (in years) (in years) Group Group Overall 、 
Mean 33.8 11.3 6.7 5.1 20.0 12.5 ‘ 
t^  
I 
Standard ^ ^ ！ 




Maximum 45 28 15 13 32 32 
Median 36 10 6 7 20 13.5 
Minimum 24 1 1 _8 14 -8 
Table 6.1 also shows the descriptive data about the NC scores of the subjects. The 
NC scale contained 18 questions, and the subjects were asked to indicate their degree 
of agreement or disagreement for each of these questions on a 7-point Likert scale 
ranged from -3 to 3, with 0 indicating indifference. Therefore, the minimum score for 
this scale that each subject could have was -54 (-3 x 18) and the maximum score was 
54 (3 X 18) with an average of 0. The overall NC scores of the subjects in the current 
study ranged from -8 to 32 with a mean of 12.5, a median of 13.5 (i.e., the average of 
the two middle observations) and a standard deviation of 9.2. When subjects were 
divided into two groups by the median, the NC scores of low NC group ranged from 
_8 to 13 with a mean of 5.1, a median of 7 and a standard deviation of 6.0. The NC 
scores of high NC group ranged from 14 to 32 with a mean of 20, a median of 20 and 
a standard deviation of 4.5. 
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i 
1 A t-test was also performed to investigate whether the overall mean NC score of the 
i 
� subjects was significantly different from 0. With a t-value of 9.66 and a p-value of 
less than 0.0001, it suggested that the mean NC score of the subjects was 
significantly different from 0. Since the mean NC score of the subjects was much 
larger than zero, on average the subjects seemed to have a relatively high tendency to 
engage in and enjoy expending cognitive effort to do this prediction task. 
、 
In order to ensure the reliability of the NC scale being used in the current study, the | 
Cronbach's alpha coefficient was calculated. This coefficient is an indicator for j 
determining the reliability of a multi-item question based on the average correlation 
among items within the question (Nunnully, 1978, p. 210). The value of this 
coefficient for the current study was found to be 0.6481. Although the coefficient of 
this value was lower than that found in the previous NC studies, Nunnully (1978, p. 
226) suggested that instruments having a Cronbach's alpha coefficient of 0.60 or even 
0.50 is deemed to be acceptable for basic research. 
6.3 Stepwise Logit Analysis 
Although stepwise logit analysis was used mainly for model development rather than 
for testing hypotheses in the current study, the results of this analysis were reported 
here for ease of reference. As mentioned earlier in Section 5.5.2.1 of Chapter V, 33 
potential financial ratios were identified from the literature for further examination. 
Logit analysis was applied to 13 financially distressed and 26 healthy firms and was 
used to select the most useful financial ratios to be included in the experiment 
instrument. In the stepwise model-selection method, independent variables which 
had already been selected at the intermediate steps did not necessarily remain in the 




way that each forward selection step was followed by one or more backward 
elimination steps. This process terminated when no further variable could be added 
to the model. The results of stepwise logit analysis are shown in Appendix C and 
discussed below. 
There were 14 steps involved in the stepwise selection procedure. After each 
variable had been introduced to or removed from the model, a table of four criteria 
for assessing the model fit was provided (see Appendix C). The figures under the 
N 
column of "Intercept Only" indicated the extent of the model fitting the intercept | 
only. The figures under the column of "Intercept and Covariates" showed the extent | 
of the model fitting the intercept and explanatory variables. The figures under the | 
last column of "Chi-Square for Covariates" gave tests for the joint significance of the ^ 
independent variables in the model by means of Chi-Square test statistics. The 
*i 
figures in the first two columns only provided statistics primarily used for comparing ^ 
different models for the same data. In general, the lower values of these two ] 
A 
statistics suggested a better model. A summary of the stepwise procedure was , 
provided at the end of the model-building process. | 
i 
The table of "Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates" provided the major 
estimates of the model, such as the parameter estimates. The results of this table 
suggested that the model contained eight explanatory variables as shown below: 
• Current assets to current liabilities 
• Quick assets to total assets 
• Working capital to equity 
• Sales to cash 
• Sales to total assets 
• Sales to equity 
• Total debt to equity 
• Total debt to total assets 
208 
The table of "Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Response" showed 
four measures of association for assessing the predictive ability of a model. They 
were based on the number of pairs of observations with different response values, the 
number of concordant pairs, and the number of discordant pairs. 
Finally, a classification table indicated the prediction accuracy of the model. As 
shown in this table, the overall correct prediction percentage of the model was 
、 
74.4%. This percentage could further be broken down into two components: 
sensitivity and specificity of 53.8% and 84.6% respectively. Sensitivity was the j 
proportion of firms in financial distress that were correctly predicted to be in financial ! 
k 
distress. Specificity was the proportion of healthy firms that were correctly predicted 
to be healthy. Similarly, the overall incorrect prediction percentage of 25.6% (1 -
7 4 . 4 % ) could also be broken down into two parts: the false positive rate and the false 
negative rate, being 36.4% and 21.4% respectively. The false positive rate was the 
proportion of firms in financial distress that were incorrectly predicted to be healthy. 
The false negative rate was the proportion of healthy firms that were incorrectly 
predicted to be in financial distress. With a relatively high prediction accuracy, the 
eight extracted financial ratios (plus the one found during the pilot interviews) were 
deemed to be useful for predicting firms being in financial distress. 
Some apparently odd financial ratios in the corporate financial profiles as shown in 
the experiment instrument were noted. For example, the values of total debt to total 
shareholders' equity and total debt to total assets were the same in both the corporate 
financial profiles of Company A and Company I. Also in the corporate financial 
profile of Company I, both of these debt ratios were zero, but the current ratio 
indicated that the company's current liabilities were greater than its current assets. 
After careful investigation, it was found that the major reason for the existence of 





i places. For example, in the corporate financial profile of Company A, total debt to 
total shareholders' equity and total debt to total assets were 0.161710 and 0.156998 
respectively. Both of them were rounded to the same value of 0.16. However, it is 
believed that these apparently odd ratios would not have any significant effects on the 
subjects' responses. 
6.4 Statistical Testing for Hypotheses \ 、 
^ 
Sniezek and Buckley (1993) suggested that most of the confidence research in j 
_ 'I 
psychology aggregated data across large numbers of subjects and judgment items to ； , 
obtain sufficient data for performing statistical analysis. Accounting researchers also i 
1 
adopted this approach for undertaking this type of research (such as Johnson, 1983). 
( 
However, this approach has been recognised as having its own limitations. May 
(1986) argued that aggregating across heterogeneous items may contaminate the 
i 
results by different item characteristics, such as task predictability (Casey and Selling, 
1986; Selling, 1993; Mladenovic and Simnett, 1994). With a similar argument, 
Sniezek and Buckley also pointed out that aggregating data across people may mask 
the effects of their individual differences on the outcomes. 
The current study also adopted this approach because it was commonly used among 
researchers of both accounting and psychology and its potential threats as discussed 
above did not seem to be a major concem to this research. For example, in the 
current study, subjects in the two base-rate information groups and the two NC 
groups were given the same set of corporate financial profiles. The existence of 
heterogeneous profiles was expected to affect both groups of subjects to a similar 
extent. Therefore, the problem associated with heterogeneous items did not seem to 
apply to these two variables. In addition, since these subjects were randomly 
assigned to the two base-rate information groups, the effects of some basic individual 
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difference factors of the subjects on their performance in these two groups were 
expected to be similar. Therefore, aggregating data across subjects also did not seem 
to cause any problem to this variable. However, the perceived informativeness of 
case-specific evidence was one important item characteristic investigated in the 
current study; the effects of heterogeneous items and individual differences on this 
variable cannot be totally eliminated. 
Under this approach, each individual prediction by a subject was taken as being an 
V 
independent observation. Since each subject made ten individual assessments of the j 
financial distress probability for the ten given corporate financial profiles, the total 
number of 500 observations were obtained by summing up all data across the 50 | 
t 
subjects and ten corporate financial profiles for each subject (50 x 10 = 500). As < 
mentioned in Section 5.8 of Chapter V, the major limitation of this approach is that ‘ 
! 
the ten assessments made by each subject would not completely independent. For 
this reason, additional analysis by using repeated measures ANOVA was also 
( 
performed and the results of this analysis will be discussed in detail later in Section 
6.5.4. 
6.4.1 Testing Hypothesis 1 
The purpose of testing Hypothesis 1 is to investigate whether bank loan officers tend 
to have inappropriate confidence. The null hypothesis suggests that bank loan 
officers do not tend to have overconfidence when predicting the probabilities of firms 
being in financial distress. The alternative hypothesis states that bank loan officers 
tend to have overconfidence when predicting the probabilities of firms being in 
financial distress. This hypothesis was tested by a t-test with a purpose to investigate 
whether the mean appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence was significantly 
different from zero. 
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The result of the t-test as shown in Table 6.2 indicated that the t-statistic was 22.62 
and was found to be highly significant with a p-value less than 0.0001. This 
suggested that bank loan officers had inappropriate confidence. The type of 
inappropriate confidence was further examined by referring to the direction of the 
mean appropriateness of confidence. Since the mean appropriateness of confidence 
was 12.50% and a positive value of it indicated that bank loan officers tended to have 
s 
overconfidence, the null hypothesis was rejected and the alternative hypothesis was j 




Table 6.2 ] 
t-test for Appropriateness of Confidence 
I 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = " " " " ^ ^ ^ " ^ " ^ " ^ " " ^ ^ " ^ " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ , 
I 
Mean Standard Deviation t-value p-value 丨 
0.1250 0.1235 22.62 0.0001 
6.4.2 Unbalanced ANOVA Model 
A model is used for delineating the relationships of the dependent variable and the 
three independent variables examined in the current study. This model is given in 




AC = BR + NC + BR * NC + CS + £. (6.1) 
where 
AC = Appropriateness of confidence, 
BR = The relevance of base-rate information, 
NG = The NC trait of bank loan officers, 
s 
CS = The perceived informativeness of case-specific evidence, and ^ 




Testing the first four terms of the above model corresponds to testing Hypotheses 2 ^ 
、 
to 5. As discussed previously in Chapter V, unequal treatment cell sizes would result ^ 
from grouping the bank loan officers' NC trait and the perceived informativeness of | 
1 
case-specific evidence after the experiments were conducted. The numbers of , 
observations in the cells being constructed from the combinations of the independent ： 
variables specified in the model are given in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. As shown in Table ‘ 
6.3, the number of observations for high NC bank loan officers was found to be 
larger than that of low NC bank loan officers in the more relevant base-rate 
information group. Conversely, there were more observations for high NC subjects 
than for low NC subjects in the less relevant base-rate information group. Similarly, 
as shown in Table 6.4，more observations were classified in the more informative 







Distribution of the Numbers of Observations for 
the Relevance of Base-Rate Information and Need for Cognition 
Need for Cognition 
Relevance of Base-
Rate Information High Low Total 
More Relevant 140 110 250 
Less Relevant 110 140 250 、 》 





Table 6.4 、 
j 
Distribution of the Numbers of Observations for 、 
the Perceived Informativeness of Case-Specific Evidence I 
^ ^ ^ = = = = = = = I ‘ 、 
Perceived Informativeness ‘ 
of Case-Specific Evidence Total , 
More Informative 286 
Less Informative 214 
Total 500 
As discussed previously in Section 5.8 of Chapter V, unequal treatment cell sizes wiU 
lead to biases if an ANOVA test is used without any adjustment. Therefore, the 
model shown in Equation (6.1) was instead tested by an unbalanced ANOVA test. 




discussed in more detail later in Sections 6.4.4 to 6.4.7. The next section will first 
present the results of testing the assumption that subjects were not pre-occupied with 
a certain base rate other than an even-odd base rate (i.e., a base rate of 0.5). 
6.4.3 Testing the Base Rate Pre-occupied by the Subjects 
One possible competing explanation for any results of testing Hypotheses 2 to 5 is 
、 
that subjects were pre-occupied with a certain financial distress base rate other than j^  
an even-odd one when they estimated the financial distress likelihood in Task 1 of the | 
experiments. Jf the subjects did use such a base rate, their adjustments to the | 
financial distress likelihood in Task 2 will be different from the adjustments if they ‘ 
» 
used an even-odd base rate. Therefore, the first task before examining the results of ‘ 




Three possible ways can be used to perform this test. The first method is to mn a t- ] 
test for comparing the ratio of the percentage of financial distress predictions to the 丨 
percentage of financial non-distress predictions with one. The second method is to 
mn a t-test to compare the percentage of financial distress predictions (or financial 
non-distress predictions) with 0.5. The third method is to use a matched pair t-test to 
compare the percentage of financial distress predictions with the percentage of 
financial non-distress predictions for each subject, and to investigate whether they are 
significantly different from each other. Significant results obtained from any one of 
these tests would indicate that the possible competing explanation could not be 
rejected. 
However, the first method could not be used to test this possible competing 




either financial distress or financial non-distress predictions, leading to a value of 
infinity. Therefore, only the second and the third methods were used to examine this 
issue. The results of these two tests are shown in Tables 6.5 and 6.6. 
Table 6.5 
t-Test to Compare the Percentage of Financial Distress Predictions with 0.5 
Number of Standard 
Observations Mean Deviation t-value p-value 、 
— 》 






Matched Pair t-Test to Compare \ 
the Percentage of Financial Distress Predictions with i 
the Percentage ofFinancial Non-Distress Predictions 
V 
) 
Number of Standard 
Observations Mean Deviation t-value p-value 1 
< 
50 -0.0983 0.0688 -1.4283 0.1595 
The result of the matched pair t-test as shown in Table 6.5 suggested that the 
percentage of financial distress predictions was not significantly different from the 
percentage of financial non-distress predictions. The t-test as shown in Table 6.6 also 
revealed that the percentage of financial distress predictions was not significantly 
different from 0.5. Therefore, both tests drew exactly the same conclusion with the 
same p-value of 0.1595 that the subjects were not pre-occupied with a certain base 
rate other than an even-odd one when estimating the financial distress likelihood in 
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Task 1 of the experiment. The results of these tests should lend much comfort to the 
results of testing Hypotheses 2 to 5 as presented in the next several sections. 
6.4.4 Testing Hypothesis 2 
The purpose of testing Hypothesis 2 is to investigate the main effect of the relevance 
of base-rate information on the appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence. 
、 
The null hypothesis suggests that bank loan officers who are given the more relevant ^ 
base-rate information do not tend to have less overconfidence when predicting the ‘ 
< 
probabilities of firms being in financial distress than do those who are given the less ； 
relevant base-rate information. The alternative hypothesis states that bank loan I 
麥 
officers who are given the more relevant base-rate information tend to have less ‘ 
\ 
overconfidence when predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial distress , 
than do those who are given the less relevant base-rate information. ) 
气 
This hypothesis was tested by examining the first term of the unbalanced ANOVA ! 
model as shown in Equation (6.1). The result of testing this hypothesis is shown in I 
I 
the first row of Table 6.7. This indicated that the relevance of base-rate information 
was found to be statistically significant with a p-value of 0.0273. Table 6.8 further 
shows the means (and standard deviations) of the appropriateness of confidence for 
the two base-rate information groups, with the means of the more and the less 
relevant base-rate information groups being 11.28% and 13.72% respectively. These 
results indicated that although both groups were found to be overconfident, on 
average the subjects in the less relevant base-rate information group were 
significantly more overconfident than those in the more relevant base-rate information 
group. Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected and the alternative hypothesis was 
supported accordingly. 
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6.4.5 Testing Hypothesis 3 
The testing of this hypothesis attempts to examine the main effect of the bank loan 
officers, NC trait on the appropriateness of their confidence. The null hypothesis 
suggests that high NC bank loan officers do not tend to have less overconfidence 
when predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial distress than do low NC 
bank loan officers. The alternative hypothesis states that high NC bank loan officers 
\ 
tend to have less overconfidence than do low NC bank loan officers. j 
条 
\ 
Table 6.7 丨 
i 
Unbalanced Analysis of Variance 
^ ^ ^ ^ = ^ = = = = = = = = = = = ^ = = " = " " ^ ^ ^ " ^ ^ ^ " " ^ ^ " " ^ " ^ ^ ^ ^ 、 
( 
Source df Mean Square F-value p-value 
< 
、 
Relevance of B ase-Rate 
Information (BR) 1 0.0659 4.90 0.0273 i 
Need for Cognition (NC) 1 0.0048 0.36 0.5496 丨 
BRxNC 1 0.0102 0.76 0.3830 
Perceived Informativeness of 本木 
Case-Specific Evidence (CS) 1 0.8622 64.15 0.0001 
Error 495 0.0134 
Total 499 
R-Square 0.1264 
* p < 0.05 





Means of Appropriateness of Confidence 
in Unbalanced ANOVA: the Relevance of Base-Rate Information 
Relevance of Means of 
Base-Rate Information Appropriateness of Confidence 
N 
) 
More Relevant 0.1128 > 
(s.d. = 0.1018) 
Less Relevant 0.1372 





The result of testing this hypothesis is shown in the second row of Table 6.7. This 
V 
indicated that the bank loan officers' NC trait was found to be statistically ^ 
insignificant with a p-value of 0.5496. Table 6.9 further shows the means (and ^ 
standard deviations) of the appropriateness of confidence for both NC groups, with ’ 
the means ofhigh and low NC groups being 12.37% and 12.63% respectively. These 
indicated that although both groups were overconfident, on average the subjects in 
low NC group were found to be more overconfident than those in high NC group. 
However, the extent of overconfidence of the two NC groups did not differ 
significantly from each other. Therefore, the null hypothesis could not be rejected 





Means of Appropriateness of Confidence 
in Unbalanced ANOVA: Need for Cognition 
！ Means of 
i Need for Cognition Appropriateness of Confidence 
I 
High 0.1237 
(s.d. = 0.1006) 
Low 0.1263 V, 




6.4.6 Testing Hypothesis 4 
i 
The purpose of testing this hypothesis is to investigate the moderating effect of the 
bank loan officers' NC trait on the relationship between the relevance of base-rate 
information and appropriateness of confidence. The null hypothesis suggests that ^ 
high NC bank loan officers do not tend to have less overconfidence when predicting 
the probabilities of firms being in financial distress than do low NC bank loan officers, , 
no matter whether they are given the more or the less relevant base-rate information. 
The alternative hypothesis states that high NC bank loan officers tend to have less 
overconfidence than do low NC bank loan officers when they are given the less 
relevant base-rate information. Conversely, high NC bank loan officers do not tend to 
have less overconfidence than do low NC bank loan officers when they are given the 
more relevant base-rate information. 
The result of testing this hypothesis is shown in the third row of Table 6.7. This 
indicated that the interaction of the relevance of base-rate information and the bank 
loan officers' NC trait was found to be statistically insignificant with a p-value of 
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0.3830. Table 6.10 further shows the means (and standard deviations) of the 
appropriateness of confidence for the cells formed by the combinations of the two 
NC groups and the two base-rate information groups, with the means of high and low 
NC groups when they were given the less relevant base-rate information being 
14.55% and 13.06% respectively. However, the order of these means for subjects in 
high and low NC groups was reversed when they were given the more relevant base-
rate information, that is，10.65% and 12.07% respectively. 
\ 
！ 
Table 6.10 » 
Means of Appropriateness of Confidence in Unbalanced ANOVA: 
The Interaction of the Relevance of Base-Rate Information 
and Need for Cognition 
_ = — — — = — — — — — — — 、 
Need for Cognition 
Relevance of 
Base-Rate Information High Low 
I: 
More Relevant 0.1065 0.1207 
(s.d. = 0.1058) (s.d. = 0.0965) ； 
、 
Less Relevant 0.1455 0.1306 
(s.d. = 0.0895) (s.d. = 0.1712) 
Figure 6.1 plotted these results on a line chart and indicated the existence of 
interaction effects between these two variables. It showed that although subjects in 
all cells were overconfident, high NC subjects were more overconfident than low NC 
ones when they were given the less relevant base-rate information, whereas high NC 
subjects were less overconfident than low NC ones when they were given the more 
relevant base-rate information. Surprisingly, the directions of these interaction 
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effects were opposite to those predicted by the alternative hypothesis. In conclusion, 
the null hypothesis could not be rejected and the alternative hypothesis was not 
supported. 
Figure 6.1 
Means of Appropriateness of Confidence: 
The Relevance of Base-Rate Information by 
NeedforCognition , 
i? ^ 
0.15 丁 High NC * 
0.14 •• / 
/ Low NC 
Appropriate- 0.13 • 7^,>-^ 
ness of ^ ^ . ^ y 
Confidence 0.12 / 
0.11 / 
O . J — ‘ 
More Less 
Relevant Relevant 
The Relevance ofBase-Rate Information 
6.4.7 Testing Hypothesis 5 
The purpose of testing this exploratory hypothesis is to investigate the main effect of 
the perceived informativeness of case-specific evidence on the appropriateness of 
bank loan officers, confidence. The null hypothesis suggests that bank loan officers 
who perceive case-specific evidence as being more informative do not tend to have 
less overconfidence when predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial 
distress than do those who perceive case-specific evidence as being less informative. 
The alternative hypothesis states that bank loan officers who perceive case-specific 
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evidence as being more informative tend to have less overconfidence than do those 
who perceive case-specific evidence as being less informative. 
The result of testing this hypothesis is shown in the fourth row of Table 6.7. This 
indicated that the perceived informativeness of case-specific evidence was found to 
be statistically highly significant with a p-value of 0.0001. Table6.11 further shows 
the means (and standard deviations) of the appropriateness of confidence for both the 丨 
case-specific evidence groups, with the means of the more and the less informative 
case-specific evidence groups being 8.86% and 17.36% respectively. These indicated 
that although both groups were overconfident, on average the subjects in the more 
informative group were found to have less overconfidence than those in the less 
informative group. Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis was supported accordingly. 
Table 6.11 
Means of Appropriateness of Confidence in Unbalanced ANOVA: 
the Perceived Informativeness of Case-Specific Evidence 
Perceived Informativeness Meanof 
of Case-Specific Evidence Appropriateness of Confidence 
MoreInformative ( s . ^ O S ) 
— I n f o n n a t i v e ( s . d ' = a H 0 3 ) 
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6.5 Supplementary Statistical Testing of Hypotheses 
6.5.1 Separate Models for Hypotheses 2 to 5 
As mentioned in Section 6.4, Hypotheses 2 to 5 were tested by a single unbalance 
ANOVA model as shown in Equation (6.1). The perceived informativeness of case-
specific evidence could not be manipulated in the experiments but was measured 
instead by the subjects' self-perception. In order not to confound the other findings in 
the model because of any possible measurement biases, it is desirable to run 
additional tests on the hypothesised relationship between this variable and 
appropriateness of confidence as depicted in Hypothesis 5 in a separate sub-model as 
shown below in Equation (6.2). Hypotheses 2 to 4 are then tested in the other sub-
model as shown in Equation (6.3). 
AC = CS + £. (6.2) 
AC = BR + NC + BR * NC + £. (6.3) 
The results of testing Hypotheses 2 to 5 by using these two separate sub-models were 
found to be the same as those reported in Section 6.4. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the results for Hypotheses 2 to 5 were not sensitive to the use of different 
unbalanced ANOVA models. 
6.5.2 Effects of Other Interactions 
Although the two two-way interactions between the relevance of base-rate 
information and the perceived informativeness of case-specific evidence (BR x CS) 
and between the NC trait and the perceived informativeness of case-specific evidence 
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(NC X CS), and the three-way interaction of all the independent variables (BR x NC x 
CS) have not been hypothesised in the current study due to a lack of theoretical 
support for these interactions, the tests of these unhypothesised interactions were 
also run as additional exploration in order to detect any potential significant 
interactions. The testing of these interaction effects can be investigated by the fuU 
unbalanced ANOVA model that incorporates all the possible combinations of the 
independent variables examined in the current study. This model is shown below in 
Equation (6.4): 
AC = BR + NC + CS + BR * NC + BR * CS 
+ NC * CS + BR * NC * CS + 8. (6.4) 
As expected, the interactions that have not been hypothesised and investigated in the 
current study were found to be statistically insignificant. The results of testing 
Hypotheses 2 to 5 by the above model were also found to be the same as those 
reported in Section 6.4. Again, these results further supported the premise that the 
findings on testing Hypotheses 2 to 5 were not sensitive to the use of different 
unbalanced ANOVA models. 
6.5.3 Analysing NC As a Continuous Variable 
As mentioned previously in Section 5.7.3 of Chapter V, although NC was mainly 
analysed as a class (discrete) variable in the current study in order to meet its primary 
objective of comparing high NC group with low NC group in terms of 
appropriateness of confidence, a supplementary unbalanced ANOVA test assuming 
the NC scores as a continuous variable was also conducted to gain additional insights 
into the findings. It was found that the effect of NC on appropriateness of confidence 





treating NC as a class or a continuous variable did not affect the conclusions drawn 
on the hypotheses related to this variable. 
6.5.4 Repeated Measures ANOVA 
As mentioned previously in Section 5.8 of Chapter V, all steps were taken to ensure 
the independence among different judgmental responses given by each subject. 
However, it was possible that the ten assessments made by each subject would not be 
completely independent. For this reason, an additional supplementary analysis of 
repeated measures ANOVA with both the relevance of base-rate information and the 
bank loan officers, NC trait as the between-subjects variables, was performed to 
investigate the sensitivity of the unbalanced ANOVA results to the independence 
assumption. The results of this analysis as shown in Table 6.12 indicated that both 
the direct and the moderating effects of the bank loan officers, NC trait were 
statistically insignificant, with p-values of 0.9828 and 0.3790 respectively. These 
results were similar to those of the unbalanced ANOVA related to these effects as 
discussed early in Sections 6.4.5 and 6.4.6. Therefore, this analysis provided further 
support for the original conclusions drawn on Hypotheses 3 and 4. 
The result of testing Hypothesis 2 by the repeated measures ANOVA is shown in the 
first row of Table 6.12. Although the subjects in the less relevant base-rate 
information group were more overconfident than those in the more relevant base-rate 
information group, the result of this analysis indicated that the difference in the extent 
of overconfidence between the two relevant base-rate information groups was 






Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance: Test for the Between-Subjects 
Effects of the Relevance of Base-Rate Information and Need for Cognition 
Source df Mean Square F-value p-value 
Relevance of B ase-Rate 
Information (BR) 1 0.0736 2.24 0.1413 
Need for Cognition (NC) 1 0.0000 0.00 0.9828 
BR * NC 1 0.0259 0.79 0.3790 
Error 46 0.0329. 
Total 49 
In summary, when comparing the results of this repeated measures ANOVA with 
those of the unbalanced ANOVA, it was found that the conclusions on Hypotheses 3 
and 4 by these two analyses were exactly the same. Some differences were, however, 
found in the conclusion on Hypothesis 2. The results of the unbalanced ANOVA 
supported Hypothesis 2 in its alternative form, while those of the repeated measures 
ANOVA did not, though the direction of these results was the same. In view of the 
different results obtained from the two analyses, the conclusions drawn on this 
hypothesis by the unbalanced ANOVA as described in Section 6.4.4 should be 
interpreted with caution. The implications of this difference will further be discussed 





6.5.5 Additional Analysis 一 Controlling for Task Predictability 
Since task predictability has been supported in the literature as one robust factor 
affecting appropriateness of confidence, neglecting this factor may reduce the 
explanatory power of the models, and may confound the effects of the other variables 
investigated in the current study. For example, if the effects of some significant 
variables found in the current study disappeared after controlling for the effect of the 
differences in task predictability, the conclusions drawn on those significant variables 
would thus be premature. For this reason, controlling for task predictability can 
provide a more clear picture on the effects of these other variables. 
The major problem of controlling for task predictability is to find an objective proxy 
for this variable. Following the definition and operationalisation of task predictability 
as adopted by Casey and Selling (1986) which was discussed in Section 5.7.3 of 
Chapter V, the current study used the task predictability score as the proxy for this 
variable. The task predictability score is defined as the absolute difference between 
the probability of financial distress predicted by the logit model and the actual 
probability of financial distress for a corporate financial profile. If the logit model can 
accurately predict the actual probability of financial distress for a particular corporate 
financial profile, then the probability of financial distress predicted by the model wiU 
be very close to the actual probability of financial distress of the profile, and its task 
predictability score will be close to zero. Such a profile can then be classified as 
having high task predictability. Conversely, if the logit model cannot accurately 
predict the actual probability of financial distress for a corporate financial profile, 
then the probability of financial distress predicted by the model will deviate from the 
actual probability of financial distress of the profile, and its task predictability score 
will be larger than zero. In this case, that profile is classified as having low task 
predictability. The task predictability scores for the ten given corporate financial 





Task Predictability Scores for the Corporate Financial Profiles 
Corporate Probability of financial Actual probability Task predictability 
financial profile distress predicted by of financial Score (absolute 
of company the logit model (a) distress (b) value of (a-b)) 
A 0.0000 0 0.0000 
B 1.0000 1 0.0000 
C 0.0038 0 0.0038 
D 0.0000 0 0.0000 
E 0.8838 1 0.1162 
F 0.0008 0 0.0008 
G 0.5339 0 0.5339 
H 0.5335 1 0.4665 
I 0.2029 0 0.2029 
j 0.0995 0 0.0995 
The major advantage of this proxy is that it is a continuous variable and the task 
predictability score for each corporate financial profile can be calculated individually. 
Therefore, the statistical power of testing a model involving task predictability by 
using this proxy is stronger than if this variable is measured as a class variable. 
However, unlike those used in the literature which manipulated the variable in the 
experiments, the proxy used in the current study classifies task predictability of the 
given corporate financial profiles after the experiments were conducted. This 
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approach may lead to confounding effects on the other independent variables. For 
this reason, additional analysis related to the interaction effect of this proxy and the 
perceived informativeness of case-specific evidence, the other major independent 
variable, was also conducted. 
To retest the effects of the original variables examined in the current study after 
controlling for the effect of task predictability, an unbalanced ANOVA is again used 
by including the variable of task predictability in the model. A repeated measures 
ANOVA is not used for examining this issue because the corporate financial profile is 
a repeated measures factor and the proxy for task predictability in the current study 
varies only among the given profiles. The new model which includes the variable of 
task predictability is shown in Equation (6.5) below: 
AC = BR + NC + CS + TP + BR * NC + £. (6.5) 
where 
AC = Appropriateness of confidence, 
BR = The relevance of base-rate information, 
NC = The NC trait of bank loan officers, 
CS = The perceived informativeness of case-specific evidence, 
TP = The task predictability of corporate financial profiles, and 
£ = The error term of the model. 
The results of testing this new model are shown in Table 6.14 and indicated that task 
predictability was a significant variable affecting the appropriateness of bank loan 
officers' confidence, with a p-value of 0.0329. The positive coefficient of the task 
predictability variable (not shown in the table) suggested that subjects given 
corporate financial profiles with high task predictability had more appropriate 
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confidence. This positive finding on task predictability in the current study was 
consistent with the extant literature that task predictability had a significantly positive 
effect on appropriateness of confidence (Lichtenstein et al, 1982; Wright, 1982; 
Casey and Selling, 1986; Ronis and Yates, 1987; Sniezek et al, 1990; Keren, 1991; 
Selling, 1993; Simnett, 1994). 
Table 6.14 
Unbalanced ANOVA: Test for the Effects of 
the Relevance of Base-Rate Information, Need for Cognition, 
the Perceived Informativeness of Case-Specific Evidence, 
and Task Predictability 
Source df Mean Square F-value p-value 
Relevance of Base-Rate 
Information (BR) 1 0.0659 4.94 0.0267 
Need for Cognition (NC) 1 0.0048 0.36 0.5503 
Perceived Informativeness of 
Case-Specific Evidence (CS) 1 0.8524 63.88 0.0001 
Task Predictability (TP) 1 0.0611 4.58 0.0329 
BR * NC 1 0.0103 0.77 0.3797 




Given that task predictability is a significant variable, it is therefore important to 
reexamine Hypotheses 2 to 5 under this new model. The results are also shown in 
Table 6.14 and indicated that the relevance of base-rate information and the 
perceived informativeness of case-specific evidence were statistically significant with 
p-values of 0.0267 and 0.0001 respectively. These were consistent with the original 
conclusions on testing Hypotheses 2 and 5 without controlling for the effect of task 
predictability with similar p-values (refer to the first and the fourth rows of Table 6.7 
for comparisons). In addition, the results indicated that NC and the interaction of NC 
and the relevance of base-rate information were found to be statistically insignificant 
with p-values of 0.5503 and 0.3797 respectively, which were also consistent with the 
original conclusions on testing Hypotheses 3 and 4 (refer to the second and the third 
rows of Table 6.7). In summary, the conclusions on testing Hypotheses 2 to 5 in 
Sections 6.4.4 to 6.4.7 were not affected by controlling for the effect of task 
predictability^. 
6.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter first presented the descriptive data about the subjects: their average age, 
banking and lending experience, and NC scores. In addition, the Cronbach's alpha 
coefficient of the NC scale was found to be acceptable. On the basis of the results of 
stepwise logit analysis, eight financial ratios were selected and the model was found 
to have an overall classification accuracy of74.4%. 
6 The interaction effect of task predictability and the perceived informativeness of case-specific 
evidence on appropriateness of confidence was also examined. The result indicated that the 
interaction was statistically insignificant, with a p-value of 0.3634. This result further confirmed 
that the findings on the significant effect ofthe perceived informativeness of case-specific evidence 




In testing the five research hypotheses, Hypothesis 1 was tested by a t-test. Since the 
numbers of observations in the cells for the different combinations of the various 
independent variables were unequal, an unbalanced ANOVA test was therefore first 
used for testing Hypotheses 2 to 5. The results of these tests indicated that the 
alternative hypotheses for Hypotheses 1, 2 and 5 were supported. However, the null 
hypotheses for Hypotheses 3 and 4 could not be rejected. 
Additional supplementary analyses were also performed to investigate whether the 
conclusions on testing Hypotheses 2 to 5 were sensitive to different ANOVA models, 
treating NC as a continuous variable, different independence assumption, and 
controlling for the effect of task predictability. In general, except Hypothesis 2, these 
supplementary analyses provided further support for the results of the unbalanced 
ANOVA. On the basis of these results, the next chapter will discuss these findings 




SUMMARY, DISCUSSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
7.1 Recap of the Study 
The objectives of the current study are: (1) to investigate whether bank loan officers 
tend to have appropriate confidence when predicting the probabilities of firms being 
in financial distress, and (2) to examine the effects of some selected major factors on 
the appropriateness ofbank loan officers' confidence in this specific prediction task. 
Chapter II presented a detailed literature review on behavioural decision theory 
(BDT) in psychology which examines how individuals make decisions in general. 
The studies reviewed were classified into one principle and three research 
frameworks: the Bounded Rationality Principle; and the Lens Model, Heuristics-and-
Biases, and Contingent Decision Behaviour frameworks. 
Since decision-making is an important topic for a variety of disciplines, BDT is highly 
interdisciplinary and has attracted much research effort from accounting researchers. 
Behavioural decision research (BDR) in accounting represents the accounting 
research being developed on the basis pf BDT. Chapter III reviewed the literature of 
BDR in accounting that adopted the Heuristics-and-Biases framework and the 
literature of BDR in accounting which examined the financial distress predictions 
made by bank loan officers. 
From the literature review described in Chapters II and 111，four research 
opportunities were identified. These research opportunities were related to the 
decision behaviour of bank loan officers when predicting the probabilities of firms 
being in financial distress. This review also indicated that very few previous studies 
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in accounting used appropriateness of confidence as a measure to examine the 
judgmental performance of real experts in accounting tasks. Specifically, no study 
was found to examine the appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence when 
predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial distress. In addition, the 
research on identifying the major factors affecting the performance of probabilistic 
judgments was found to be still in its infancy in both psychology and accounting. 
Therefore, one main goal of the current study is to provide a further linking between 
the theories developed in BDT and BDR in accounting. 
Chapter IV presented the research model developed in the light of the four research 
opportunities identified in previous chapters. In the model, the appropriateness of 
bank loan officers, confidence was treated as a dependent variable, and the relevance 
of base-rate information, the bank loan officers' NC trait, and the perceived 
informativeness of case-specific evidence were identified as independent variables. 
Five research hypotheses were proposed to test the specific relationships as depicted 
in the model and the underlying logic of these hypotheses was explained. These 
hypotheses in their alternative forms are smnmarised below: 
Hl： Bank loan officers tend to have overconfidence when 
predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial distress. 
H2: Bank loan officers who are given the more relevant base-rate 
information tend to have less overconfidence when predicting 
the probabilities of firms being in financial distress than do 
those who are given the less relevant base-rate information. 
H3: High NC bank loan officers tend to have less overconfidence 
when predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial 
distress than do low NC bank loan officers. 
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H4: High N C bank loan officers tend to have less overconfidence 
when predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial 
distress than do low N C bank loan officers when they are 
given the less relevant base-rate information. Conversely, high 
N C bank loan officers do not tend to have less overconfidence 
when predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial 
distress than do low N C bank loan officers when they are 
given the more relevant base-rate information. 
H5: Bank loan officers w h o perceive case-specific evidence as 
being more informative tend to have less overconfidence when 
predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial distress 
than do those who perceive case-specific evidence as being 
less informative. 
Specifically, Hypothesis 1 focused on investigating whether bank loan officers tend to 
have overconfidence when predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial 
distress. Hypotheses 2, 3 and 5 were related to the testing of the main effects of the 
relevance of base-rate information, the bank loan officers, N C trait, and the perceived 
informativeness of case-specific evidence respectively on the appropriateness of bank 
loan officers' confidence. Hypothesis 4 addressed the moderating effect of the bank 
loan officers' N C trait on the relation between the relevance of base-rate information 
and the appropriateness of their confidence. 
Chapter V then described the research method and design of the current study. The 
experimental approach was adopted for testing the stated research hypotheses. Fifty 
bank loan officers from the Bank of China Group were enlisted on the basis of 
recommendations from their management and the willingness of the subjects to 
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participate in this research. Personal interviews were conduced individually at the 
subjects' offices to collect the data for testing the research hypotheses. The data 
collected was primarily analysed by using a t-test and an unbalanced A N O V A test in 
Chapter VI，supplemented by other additional tests. The results of these analyses 
indicated that Hypotheses 1 and 5 were strongly supported and Hypothesis 2 was 
only weakly supported, whereas Hypotheses 3 and 4 were not supported at all. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss the conclusions drawn from the results 
of data analyses as being presented in Chapter VI, and the implications of these 
conclusions. The remainder of this chapter is organised around five sections. 
Section 7.2 first provides the conclusion for each hypothesis and an overall 
conclusion for the current study. Sections 7.3 and 7.4 then discuss the implications 
of these conclusions for theory and practice respectively. Section 7.5 further 
identifies the potential limitations of the current study in order to minimise 
misinterpretations ofthese conclusions. Finally, Section 7.6 suggests some directions 
for further research. 
7.2 Conclusions and Discussions 
7.2.1 Hypothesis 1 
The results of testing this hypothesis indicated that bank loan officers were found to 
have overall significant overconfidence of 12.50%. This implies that the probabilities 
of firms being in financial distress predicted by bank loan officers were significantly 
higher than the calculated normative probabilities. Therefore, one can conclude that 
bank loan officers tend to have significant overconfidence when predicting the 





This finding is consistent with the results of the two previous accounting studies in 
the U.S. that investigated appropriateness of confidence in the context of predicting 
the probabilities of firms being in financial distress. Casey and Selling (1986) asked a 
group of students, as surrogates for bank loan officers, to predict the probabilities of 
firms being in financial distress and found that their subjects were overconfident. 
Similarly, Selling (1993) asked another group of students to perform the same task 
and further supported this result. Since the current study used real bank loan officers 
as subjects and individual interviews were conducted at their offices, the findings of 
the current study would therefore have much higher validity and reliability for 
generalising the results to other bank loan officers. 
This finding is also consistent with the findings of overconfidence among certain 
types of experts, including medical doctors (Christensen-Szalanski and Bushyhead, 
1981; Christensen-Szalanski, et al.，1983), clinical psychologists (Oskamp, 1962; 
1965), psychology graduate students responding to questions about psychological 
propositions (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1977), and bankers when predicting stock 
market movements (Stael von Holstein, 1972). Moreover, this finding is consistent 
with the extant literature in psychology showing that people tend to be overconfident 
in making probabilistic judgments (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1977; Lichtenstein, et 
al., 1982; Sniezek, 1990; Yates, 1990). Particularly relevant to the current study is 
the literature in psychology suggesting that people tend to have overconfidence when 
making probabilistic judgments for events with low base rates (Dunning, et al., 1990; 
Vallone, et al., 1990; Griffin and Tversky, 1992). 
This finding, however, is not in line with the findings of appropriate confidence 
among the three other types of expert judges: auditors (Tomassini et al., 1982; 
Solomon et al., 1985; Dilla et al., 1991; Mladenovic and Simnett, 1994; Simnett, 





! Yaniv, 1992). One major reason suggested to account for the appropriate confidence 
： among these types of expert judges is the instant feedback they receive in the 
I 
continuous judgment process. In contrast, the feedback from lending decisions 
received by bank loan officers is usually incomplete and not timely. For instance, the 
subsequent financial conditions of rejected loan applicants are usually not available to 
bank loan officers for further evaluation (Einhom and Hogarth, 1978). Even though 
this information is available, bank loan officers may not give it the same attention as 
they would to those firms to which loans have been granted (Selling, 1993). 
In addition, the decision of whether a loan is granted may have a significant impact 
on the financial and operational success of a firm. Those who are granted loans wiU 
have more chance to pursue their profitable objectives (Einhom and Hogarth, 1978; 
Einhom, 1980; Selling 1993). Therefore, the results of imbalance of attention and 
the financial effect of the loans granted on the borrowers' success, may lead bank loan 
officers to believe that they have made the right judgments in granting the loans to 
good clients. This inflated impression resulting from directing bank loan officers' 
attention only to their correct judgments may reinforce their confidence further. 
Additional explanations for the bank loan officers' overconfidence will be provided in 
the following sections. 
7.2.2 Hypothesis 2 
Mixed results were obtained on testing this hypothesis. O n the one hand, the result 
of the unbalanced A N O V A test showed a support for this hypothesis. O n the other, 
the result of the repeated measures A N O V A did not provide support for it, although 
the analyses indicated the same direction as hypothesised. Therefore, the current 
study provided only weak support for this hypothesis. O n the basis of the result 
obtained from the unbalanced A N O V A test, one would conclude that although bank 
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loan officers are overconfident, those w h o are given the more relevant base-rate 
information would have less overconfidence than those w h o are given the less 
relevant base-rate information. However, this conclusion should not be strongly 
made in view of the different results from the two analyses. 
This conclusion implies that bank loan officers would be more likely to integrate the 
given base-rate information in the probabilistic judgments when they perceive this 
information as being more relevant to the prediction task than when they perceive it 
as being less relevant. This conclusion is consistent with the findings of Kida's 
(1984a) study in a different task context and with a different type of subjects. Kida 
investigated the effect of the relevance of base-rate information on auditors' going-
concem judgments. The results of Kida's study supported the notion that the 
relevance of base-rate information significantly affected auditors' judgments. Since 
the results of supporting this hypothesis in the current study were similar to those of 
Kida's, the theory on the relevance of base-rate information, though only weakly 
supported, can be strengthened and the ability to generalise this theory to other types 
of tasks and subjects is increased. 
Finally, this conclusion is also consistent with previous studies in psychology which 
found that an increase in the relevance of base-rate information leaded people to 
more properly use the given base-rate information (Ajzen, 1977; Carroll and Siegler, 
1977; Bar-Hillel, 1980a; Tversky and Kahneman, 1982a; Bar-Hillel, 1983; 1990)，and 
that more proper use of the base-rate information when making probabilistic 
judgments will lead to less overconfidence (Griffin and Tversky, 1992). However, 
previous studies did not examine the effectiveness of such an increase in the relevance 
of base-rate information. Specifically, it was not clear whether an increase in the 
relevance of base-rate information would lead judges to have more appropriate 
confidence. This relationship is now weakly supported by the findings of the current 
study. 
240 
I J 1 
7.2.3 Hypothesis 3 
This hypothesis was not supported by the current study. This result can lead one to 
conclude that the bank loan officers' N C trait does not affect the appropriateness of 
their confidence. Specifically, high and low N C bank loan officers would have a 
similar degree of overconfidence when predicting the probabilities of firms being in 
financial distress. 
This conclusion seems to be inconsistent with the previous findings in those 
psychology studies examining the effects of N C on decision-making that high N C 
individuals were found to be more effective judges. For example, Heppner et al. 
(1983) found that high N C individuals were more active in information processing 
and more effective in problem-solving than low N C individuals. Studies also revealed 
that high N C individuals were affected more by the argument quality than the 
attractiveness of an endorser (Ahlering, 1987; Haugtvedt et al., 1988). Furthermore, 
Verplanken et al. (1992) indicated that high N C individuals processed more 
information items than low N C individuals. All these studies suggested that high N C 
individuals should have better judgments than low N C individuals. However, the 
judgment tasks of all these studies were not probabilistic. Therefore, there were 
some reservations about generalising the findings of those previous studies in the N C 
literature as just discussed to other probabilistic judgment tasks. 
The finding of the current study is also contradictory to the previous findings that an 
increase in cognitive effort promoted appropriate confidence. In theory, an increase 
in cognitive effort can be induced by an environment of accountability or provision of 
financial incentives. For example, Tetlock and K i m (1987) found that accountability 





i the awareness of complexities in the behaviour of others. Fischer (1982) suggested 
i 
I that provision of financial incentives led people to have more appropriate confidence 
丨 by making them less likely to assign very large or very small probabilities. It was also 
I supported that the degree of inappropriate confidence decreased as the amount of 
I cognitive processing in choice increased (Peterson and Pitz, 1988; Sniezek et al., 
1990). Since N C is a personality trait that indicates the tendency of an individual to 
engage in and enjoy expending more cognitive effort (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982; 
Cacioppo et al., 1984; Verplanken et al., 1992), high N C individuals should expend 
more cognitive effort than low N C individuals in makingjudgments. 
The results of the current study can be explained by those of Simonson and Nye 
(1992) which investigated the effects of accountability on a variety of decision errors. 
They found that accountability reduced the sunk cost effect in a personal finance 
context by directing the subjects' attention to the irrelevance of sunk costs. 
However, accountability did not seem to reduce those decision errors for which the 
correct response was not known or unlikely to be identified with more thorough 
information processing. Simonson and Nye found that accountability did not 
promote consistent preferences across different preference elicitation procedures, did 
not direct the subjects' attention to the small sample effect and the framing effect, and 
did not mitigate the base-rate fallacy and the conjunction fallacy. 
Therefore, the results of Simonson and Nye's study suggested that an increase in 
cognitive effort does not necessarily lead to improvement in judgments. The effects 
of increasing cognitive effort on judgments depend on the characteristics of decision 
errors. Those decision errors which are caused by the subjects' inability to 
understand the decision rules cannot be improved simply by expending more effort. 
A probabilistic judgment that requires people to integrate base-rate information into 
thejudgment is one such example. This contention was supported by both Simonson 
and Nye's study and the current study. 
242 
I 
7.2.4 Hypothesis 4 
This hypothesis could not be supported by the current study. This result leads one to 
conclude that the bank loan officers' N C trait does not moderate the relation between 
the relevance of base-rate information and the appropriateness of bank loan officers' 
confidence. 
This conclusion seems to be inconsistent with the findings of a previous psychology 
study conducted by Ahlering and Parker (1989). They investigated the moderating 
effect of N C on an information processing bias — primacy bias — in an impression 
evaluation task. In their study, a group of students were asked to evaluate a person 
w h o was described by serially presenting various trait adjectives. The results of their 
study indicated that the weight given by the subjects to each adjective for the overall 
judgment was found to decrease with each successive adjective. Also, both high and 
low N C subjects were found to commit a primacy bias, but the extent of this bias 
committed by high N C subjects was significantly lower than that committed by low 
N C subjects. Ahlering and Parker also contended that the judges' N C trait might 
moderate other information process biases such as the base-rate fallacy. However, 
the findings of the current study do not support their contention. 
Similarly, the results of Simonson and Nye (1992) can be used to explain the 
difference in the results between Ahlering and Parker's study and the current one, 
which suggested that the existence of the moderating effect of N C on information 
process biases may depend on the particular characteristics of those biases. N C does 
not seem to moderate those information processing biases of which the correct 
response was not known or unlikely to be identified with more thorough information 
processing. Under-utilisation of base-rate information in making probabilistic 
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judgments seems to be one such information processing bias. Since only limited 
research has been done on this area, this explanation is subject to further verification 
in future studies. 
7.2.5 Hypothesis 5 
This hypothesis was supported by the current study. This result would lead one to 
conclude that bank loan officers tend to have more appropriate confidence when they 
perceive case-specific evidence as being more informative than when they perceive 
case-specific evidence as being less informative. 
This conclusion is consistent with the predictions of the Bayesian rule. As discussed 
previously in Section 4.3.6 of Chapter IV, the Bayesian rule stipulates that although 
base-rate information is always relevant, its impact on the normative probability 
assessment decreases as case-specific evidence becomes more informative. 
Specifically, when case-specific evidence is highly informative, base-rate information 
has a lesser impact on the normative probability than when case-specific evidence is 
highly uninformative. 
This conclusion is also consistent with the accounting literature that base-rate 
information was under-utilised among accounting experts and auditors in making 
probabilistic judgments in most of the studies (Swieringa et al., 1976; Joyce and 
Biddle, 1981b; Johnson, 1983; Holt, 1987). Previous psychology studies also 
indicated that for an event with a low base rate, subjects' probabilistic judgments 
were found to be overconfident (Dunning et aL, 1990; Vallone et al., 1990; Griffin 
and Tversky, 1992). Therefore, if base-rate information is not properly used by 
subjects when they perceive case-specific evidence as being less informative, they wiU 
have more overconfidence than when they perceive case-specific evidence as being 
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more informative. This is because under-utilisation of base-rate information has less 
impact on theirjudgments when case-specific evidence is more informative than when 
it is less informative. The result obtained from testing this hypothesis in the current 
study supports this contention. 
The above finding, however, seems to be inconsistent with the findings in psychology 
that people were found to under-utilise base-rate information when they perceived 
case-specific evidence as being informative. However, they were found to use base-
rate information more properly when they perceived case-specific evidence as being 
uninformative (e.g., Ginossar and Trope, 1980). Johnson's (1983) findings on his 
subjects' going-concem judgments throw some light on the conclusion of testing this 
hypothesis in the current study. H e found that when his subjects perceived case-
specific evidence as being less informative, they tended to use the given base-rate 
information more, although still far away from the optimal use, than they did when 
they perceived case-specific evidence as being more informative. 
Although Johnson's findings were in line with previous psychology studies (such as 
Ginossar and Trope), his findings also suggested that people's tendency to use base-
rate information more when they perceive case-specific evidence as being less 
informative is not sufficient for them to avoid more overconfidence than when they 
perceive case-specific evidence as being more informative. Only when they perceive 
case-specific evidence as being less informative and properly use base-rate 
information, will they not have more overconfidence than when case-specific 
evidence is perceived as being more informative. However, the findings of the 
current study are still of an exploratory nature and further research on this specific 
relationship is much warranted. 
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7.2.6 Overall Conclusions 
O n the basis of the findings of the current study, one can conclude that bank loan 
officers tend to be overconfident when predicting the probabilities of firms being in 
financial distress. Moreover, it is weakly supported that bank loan officers w h o are 
given the more relevant base-rate information tend to have less overconfidence than 
those w h o are given the less relevant base-rate information. In addition, bank loan 
officers w h o perceive case-specific evidence as being more informative are expected 
to have less overconfidence than those who perceive case-specific evidence as being 
less informative. However, the N C trait of a bank loan officer has no significant 
impact on the extent of hisAier overconfidence, nor does it have any significant 
moderating effect on the relation between the relevance of base-rate information and 
the appropriateness ofbank loan officers' confidence. 
7.3 Implications for Theory 
The findings of the current study can contribute to both B D T and B D R in accounting 
in several ways. First, bank loan officers were found to be overconfident when 
predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial distress. Since no study has 
been found to examine the appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence by using 
real subjects in this prediction task, the current study is the first attempt to address 
this issue and contributes to understanding the prediction performance of this type of 
experts as being measured by the appropriateness of their confidence. 
Second, the current study attempted to determine the effects of the relevance of base-
rate information, the perceived informativeness of case-specific evidence, and the 
bank loan officers' N C trait on the appropriateness of their confidence. The results of 
testing the hypotheses related to these relationships indicated that the perceived 
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informativeness of case-specific evidence had significant main effects on the 
appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence, and the relevance of base-rate 
information was weakly supported to affect the appropriateness ofbank loan officers' 
confidence. These findings contribute to B D R in accounting by identifying these two 
variables as the factors affecting the appropriateness of bank loan officers, 
confidence. Therefore, the current study makes distinct contributions to the body of 
knowledge in its immediate research discipline. 
Third, the current study also contributes to B D T in psychology by generalising some 
of the BDT's findings to other decision-making tasks. The results of the current 
study weakly supported the premise that bank loan officers tend to have less 
overconfidence when they are provided with the more relevant base-rate information, 
than when they are provided with the less relevant base-rate information. The results 
of the current study also suggest that bank loan officers tend to have less 
overconfidence when they perceive case-specific evidence as being more informative, 
than when they perceive case-specific evidence as being less informative. Since no 
studies in either accounting or psychology have examined the impacts of these two 
factors on people's probabilistic judgment performance as measured by the 
appropriateness of their confidence, these findings make distinct contributions to the 
body of knowledge in the parent research discipline of the current study in terms of 
theory development, and provide some insights into B D T research for psychology 
researchers to do further research. 
Fourth, since the bank loan officers, N C trait was found to have no significant effect 
on the degree of their overconfidence, it implies that an increase in cognitive effort 
will not improve the appropriateness of bank loan officers, confidence when they are 
required to make similar probabilistic judgments. Therefore, factors, such as 
accountability and provision of financial incentives, that promote cognitive effort are 
unlikely to improve the appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence in similar 
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tasks. The current study provides a foundation on which further studies investigating 
the impact of the judges' N C trait on their performance in other prediction tasks can 
be conducted. 
7.4 Implications for Practice 
The current study provides several implications for the practice of a variety of users 
and providers of financial statement information. First, the current study found that 
bank loan officers tend to be overconfident. In view of the serious adverse effects of 
inappropriate confidence among bank loan officers .as discussed in Chapter I, every 
effort should be devoted to bringing their attention to this phenomenon and the major 
factors affecting the appropriateness of their confidence. For example, bank loan 
officers should be notified that they might tend to be overconfident, especially when 
they perceive case-specific evidence as being less informative. This information can 
be useful for bank loan officers to adjust their judgment approach and estimations to 
improve their prediction performance. 
The current study also provides useful input for information systems professionals to 
design better information systems for bank loan officers. First, information systems 
designers should provide the more relevant base-rate information to bank loan 
officers. Second, information systems professionals can also provide appropriate 
waming signals and advice in the information systems designed for bank loan officers 
to guard against their inherent limitations and biases in handling probabilistic 
judgments. These signals would serve to bring their attention to the effects of the 
relevance of base-rate information and the perceived informativeness of case-specific 
evidence on their probabilistic judgments. The systems may also be designed so that 
they can give advice on the direction and the extent of adjustment necessary for 
achieving more appropriate confidence. Third, another approach to improving bank 
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loan officers' judgments, other than providing warning signals and leaving bank loan 
officers to make their own adjustments, is to adjust their probabilistic judgments or 
final lending decisions automatically by a carefully designed expert system. 
Finally, the current study can help trainers design better training programmes for 
bank loan officers. As mentioned previously, attaining more appropriate confidence 
is a teachable and leamable skill (Russo and Schoemaker, 1992). B y knowing the 
major factors affecting the appropriateness ofbank loan officers' confidence, a better 
training programme can be designed and conducted to cope with their needs and to 
reduce the degree of their inappropriate confidence. 
7.5 Limitations of the Study 
It is very difficult for a single study such as the current one to firmly establish a new 
theory. Additional follow-up experiments which address some potential limitations 
of the current study would be desirable. Despite their potential usefulness, these 
follow-up experiments have not been conducted in view of the difficulty of obtaining 
similar type and number of subjects in Hong Kong. Future studies should be 
designed to resolve these potential limitations. 
The first limitation is concerned with the subjects of the current study. Since the 
subjects were not selected randomly, but on the basis of availability and their 
willingness to participate in this research, it is unknown whether the conclusions 
drawn from the current study were biased by this mode of subject selection. Also, 
since the purpose of the current study is theory development and testing, the subjects 
were intentionally drawn from one major banking group in Hong Kong (consisting of 
14 different independent banks) in order to increase the internal validity of the 
findings. However, the generalisation of these findings to other bank loan officers 
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outside this banking group should be made with caution. 
The second potential limitation is related to the data collection approach adopted by 
the current study, which used a field experiment by an individual interview as the 
method to collect the necessary data. Although every effort had been devoted to 
ensuring that all the interviews were administered in the same manner with minimal 
biases, these interviews were conducted at different times and locations. However, it 
is believed that the effects of these uncontrollable factors would be rather minimal. 
The third limitation is pertinent to measuring the perceived informativeness of case-
specific evidence in the current study. As this variable could not be manipulated in 
the experiments, it was determined according to the subjects' perceived values of 
their estimated financial distress likelihood. Although a similar method of 
operationalising this variable was also adopted by Johnson (1983) in a study of 
auditors, going-concem judgments, it is still not clear whether the use of this 
measurement approach would induce any self-selection bias. This potential bias 
suggests that bank loan officers who perceive the given corporate financial profiles as 
being less informative may tend to have more overconfidence or vice versa. 
However, since the ten given corporate financial profiles were classified into both the 
"less informative" and the "more informative" groups, even though the number of 
profiles being classified into each of these two groups by each subject might not be 
exactly the same, this practice should lend some comfort to the reliability of the 
findings on this variable. 
Fourth, the amount of total debt appeared in each financial profile of the experiment 
instrument was the sum of short-term loan and long-term loan. This definition of 
"total debt" specifically excluded other short-term and long-term liabilities. 
However, this definition was not provided in the instrument. It was unknown 
whether subjects had been confused by this term. However, since all the subjects 
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used the same information about these two debt ratios in both tasks of the 
experiment, the unspecified definition of total debt is believed not to have any 
significant effects on the results of the current study. 
The fifth limitation is the possible effects of reward structure (or loss function) on the 
appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence during the experiments. Reward 
structure (i.e., the rewards for correct decisions and the penalties for incorrect ones) 
was not controlled in the current study. In practice, the extent of appropriate 
confidence among bank loan officers might depend on the loss functions imposed on 
their overconfidence or underconfidence. The results could be different from real 
situations if the subjects had taken such reward structure into consideration when 
making theirjudgments. Therefore, the potential effect of this variable on the results 
of the current study is unknown and taken as a random background variable. 
Although the experiments of the current study were designed and conducted as 
realistically as possible, the lack of control of this possible effect might be a potential 
limitation of the current study. 
The sixth limitation is connected with the potential change in the subjects' cognitive 
process in performing the two experiment tasks. In Task 1, the subjects were asked 
to assess the likelihood that a firm would be in financial distress in the coming year. 
In Task 2 however, the subjects were asked to estimate the probability that each of 
the sample firms was among one of the 30 firms in financial distress in the coming 
year. Although the wordings of the question in Task 2 were not exactly the same as 
those of the question in Task 1, both questions requested the subjects to make similar 
probability predictions. Therefore, the subjects were not expected to use a 
significantly different cognitive process when they answered the question in Task 2. 
However, since the possibility of this change in the cognitive process among the 
subjects could not be ruled out completely, such possible effects were mentioned as a 
potential limitation of the current study. Future studies in this area should improve 
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the experimental design in order to eliminate this potential limitation. 
Finally, the last limitation is the different results on the second hypothesis obtained 
from the two analyses conducted by the current study. While the unbalanced 
A N O V A revealed a strong support for the existence of the effects of the relevance of 
base-rate information on the appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence, the 
repeated measures A N O V A did not indicate such effects. In view of the difference in 
these results, the second hypothesis can only be weakly supported. Therefore, the 
conclusion drawn on this hypothesis should be interpreted with caution. 
7.6 Recommendations for Further Research 
Besides resolving the above potential limitations, several recommendations for 
further research can be made. First, the current study was concerned only with 
predicting the probabilities of firms being in financial distress. The impact of 
overconfidence on the final lending decisions was not addressed. Further research 
may examine this relationship in order to provide additional insights into the theories 
in this line of research. 
The second recommendation deals with the limitation of the subject selection method 
adopted in the current study as discussed in Section 7.5. The current study selected 
bank loan officers from only one major banking group in Hong Kong. Although this 
banking group consists of 14 different individual banks, further research may 
investigate the appropriateness of bank loan officers' confidence outside this banking 
group. This may help reduce any possible sampling bias of selecting all the subjects 
from one banking group. This may also help compare the confidence levels among 
the bank loan officers from different banking groups and their relationships with the 
specific characteristics of each group. The findings of different studies could then be 
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compared, and the collective findings could add additional reliability to the theories. 
W h e n the judgments of other bank loan officers are examined, corporate policy and 
cultural factors may also be taken into consideration. 
The final recommendation addresses specifically to the scope of the current study, 
which focused only on the judgments of individual bank loan officers. The effects of 
the interactions among bank loan officers in a group or committee on the 
appropriateness of their confidence should be an interesting topic for further research. 
W h e n the group judgments of bank loan officers are investigated, social psychology 
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School of Accountancy 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong 
A STUDY ON HOW BANK LOAN OFFICERS MAKE JUDGMENTS 
IN PREDICTING FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED FIRMS 
Research Questionnaire 
I. Introduction 
Thank you for participating in this study which is supported by the School of 
Accountancy, the Faculty of Business Administration, The Chinese University of 
Hong Kong. The major objective of this study is to investigate how bank loan 
officers make judgments in predicting financially distressed firms. A financially 
distressed firm is defined in this study as an industrial firm that has been suspended 
or de-listed from listing on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong due to financial 
difficulty. 
Your participation in this study is very important for yourself as well as bank loan 
officers in Hong Kong in general. After this study, you will know how well you 
predict firms in financial distress. You will also contribute to the understanding of 
the decision behaviour of bank loan officers in Hong Kong. If you are interested in 
the results of this study, w e are more than willing to send you a copy of the report. 
Please put a "V" below if you would like to have such a report: 
I 1 Please send m e a copy of the report for this study. 
After this short introduction, w e now proceed to the questionnaire with details 
described in the next section. 
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II. Assessing how likely a sample firm will be in fmancial distress 
Ten (10) industrial firms publicly listed in Hong Kong during the period of 1986 to 
1992 were selected for this study. These firms included both financially distressed 
and healthy firms during the period. The corporate financial profile of a financially 
distressed firm was extracted from its annual report one year before it was m 
financial distress, while the corporate financial profile of a healthy firm was 
extracted from one of its annual reports selected randomly from the said period. 
These corporate financial profiles are independent of each other and will be 
presented to you later in random order. 
Nine (9) financial ratios are presented in random order in each corporate financial 
profile. Based on the corporate financial profile provided, please estimate how 
likely it is the given firm will be in financial distress in the coming year. Please 
keep in mind that not all these nine (9) financial ratios are necessarily useful for 
predicting financial distress. You may use as few as one, or as many as all these 
financial ratios. N o w , let us examine these corporate financial profiles, each of 
which will be presented on a separate page starting from the next page. 
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THE FINANCIAL PROFILE OF COMPANY A 
FINANCIAL RATIO VALUE 
1. Current Assets to Current Liabilities 5.76 
2. Quick Assets# to Total Assets ^' ^ ^ 
3. Working Capital* to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.14 
4. Total Debt to Total Shareholders' Equity 〇• ^  ^  
5. Total Debt to Total Assets 0.16 
6. Net Sales to Cash 0.05 
7. Net Sales to Total Assets 0.01 
8. Net Sales to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.01 
0 32 
9. Net Income to Total Assets ^"^ 
QUESTION: 
1 Please estimate how likely it is the frnn with the given corporate financial 
. profile will be in financial distress in the coming year. Please md|c^eyour 
estimation by a number ranging from 0 (i.e., the firm absolutely will N O T be 
in financial distress in the coming year) to 100 (i.e., the firm absolutely will be 
in financial distress in the coming year), while 50 represents indifference. 
I 一 I 一 I 一 I 
# Quick Assets 二 Cash + Short-term Marketable Securities + Accounts Receivable 
* Working Capital = Current Assets - Current Liabilities 
282 
THE FINANCIAL PROFILE OF COMPANY B 
FINANCIAL RATIO VALUE 
1. Current Assets to Current Liabilities 2.35 
2. Quick Assets# to Total Assets 0.34 
3. Working Capital* to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.66 
4. Total Debt to Total Shareholders' Equity 0*82 
5. Total Debt to Total Assets 0.36 
6. Net Sales to Cash 356.11 
0 94 
7. Net Sales to Total Assets ^' 
8. Net Sales to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.56 
9. Net Income to Total Assets _0.94 
QUESTION: 
1 Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate financial 
. profile will be in financial distress in the coming year. Please indicate your 
Estimation by a number ranging from 0 (i.e., the firm absolutely will N O T be 
in financial distress in the coming year) to 100 (i.e., the firm absolutely will be 
in financial distress in the coming year), while 50 represents indifference. 
I 一 I 一 I 一 I 
# Quick Assets 二 Cash + Short-term Marketable Securities + Accounts Receivable 




THE FINANCIAL PROFILE OF COMPANY C 
FINANCIAL RATIO VALUE 
1. Current Assets to Current Liabilities 2.52 
2. Quick Assets# to Total Assets 0.51 
3. Working Capital* to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.56 
4. Total Debt to Total Shareholders' Equity 〇• 18 
0 19 
5. Total Debt to Total Assets ^' 二 
6. Net Sales to Cash ^'^^ 
7. Net Sales to Total Assets 0-17 
8. Net Sales to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.26 
9. Net Income to Total Assets 0.04 
QUESTION: 
1 Please estimate how likely it is the frnn with the given corporate financial 
‘pro f i l e will be in financial distress in the coming year. Please m c h c ^ e your 
Limation by a number ranging from 0 (i.e., the firm absolutely will N O T be 
in financial distress in the coming year) to 100 (i.e., the firm absolutely will be 
in financial distress in the coming year), while 50 represents mdifference. 
I 一 I 一 I 一 I 
# Quick Assets 二 Cash + Short-term Marketable Securities + Accounts Receivable 
* Working Capital = Current Assets - Current Liabilities 
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[ 
THE FINANCIAL PROFILE OF COMPANY D 
FINANCIAL RATIO VALUE 
o ao 
1. Current Assets to Current Liabilities ^. 二 
2. Quick Assets# to Total Assets •• 13 
3. Working Capital* to Total Shareholders' Equity . 0.23 
4. Total Debt to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.09 
5. Total Debt to Total Assets 0.08 
7 29 
6. Net Sales to Cash • 
7. Net Sales to Total Assets 0.60 
8. Net Sales to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.65 
0 13 
9. Net Income to Total Assets 。• 
QUESTION: 
1 Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate financial 
‘pro f i l e will be in financial distress in the coming year. Please mchcateyour 
Ltimation by a number ranging from 0 (i.e., the firm absolutely will N O T be 
in financial distress in the coming year) to 100 (i.e., the frnn absolutely will be 
in financial distress in the coming year), while 50 represents indifference. 
I 一 I 一 I — I 
# Quick Assets = Cash + Short-term Marketable Securities + Accounts Receivable 
* Working Capital = Current Assets - Current Liabilities 
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THE FINANCIAL PROFILE OF COMPANY E 
FINANCIAL RATIO VALUE 
1. Current Assets to Current Liabilities 1.64 
2. Quick Assets# to Total Assets 0.27 
3. Working Capital* to Total Shareholders' Equity 〇• 13 
4. Total Debt to Total Shareholders' Equity •• 1 ^  
5. Total Debt to Total Assets 0.12 
0 ^1 
6. Net Sales to Cash ^'^ 
7. Net Sales to Total Assets 0.04 
8. Net Sales to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.05 
9. Net Income to Total Assets _0'07 
QUESTION: 
1 Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate financial 
. profile will be in financial distress in the coming year. Please md|cateyour 
Limation by a number ranging from 0 (i.e., the firm absolutely will N O T be 
in financial distress in the coming year) to 100 (i.e., the frnn absolutely will be 
in financial distress in the coming year), while 50 represents indifference. 
I — I 一 I — I 
# Quick Assets 二 Cash + Short-term Marketable Securities + Accounts Receivable 
* Working Capital = Current Assets - Current Liabilities 
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THE FINANCIAL PROFILE OF COMPANY F 
FINANCIAL RATIO VALUE 
1. Current Assets to Current Liabilities 2.35 
2. Quick Assets# to Total Assets 0.17 
3. Working Capital* to Total Shareholders' Equity 〇• 11 
4. Total Debt to Total Shareholders' Equity 〇• 1 ^  
5. Total Debt to Total Assets 0.09 
1 31 
6. Net Sales to Cash • 
7. Net Sales to Total Assets 0-12 
8. Net Sales to Total Shareholders' Equity 〇• 13 
9. Net Income to Total Assets _0.08 
QUESTION: 
1 Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate financial 
• profile will be in financial distress in the coming year. Please mdicateyour 
Ltimation by a number ranging from 0 (i.e., the firm absolutely will N O T be 
in financial distress in the coming year) to 100 (i.e., the firm absolutely will be 
in financial distress in the coming year), while 50 represents indifference. 
I 一 I 一 I 一 i 
# Quick Assets 二 Cash + Short-term Marketable Securities + Accounts Receivable 
* Working Capital = Current Assets - Current Liabilities 
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THE FINANCIAL PROFILE OF COMPANY G 
FINANCIAL RATIO VALUE 
1. Current Assets to Current Liabilities 0’40 
2. Quick Assets# to Total Assets 0.04 
3. Working Capital* to Total Shareholders' Equity -0.47 
4. Total Debt to Total Shareholders' Equity 0-06 
0 rn 
5. Total Debt to Total Assets ^'^^ 
48 ^7 
6. Net Sales to Cash 
7. Net Sales to Total Assets 0.28 
8. Net Sales to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.50 
0 9,7 
9. Net Income to Total Assets "^' 
QUESTION: 
1 Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate fmancial 
‘ profile will be in financial distress in the coming year. Please mchcateyour 
Limation by a number ranging from 0 (i.e., the firm absolutely will N O T be 
in financial distress in the coming year) to 100 (i.e., the firm absolutely will be 
in financial distress in the coming year), while 50 represents mdifference. 
1 一 I — I — 1 
# Quick Assets 二 Cash + Short-term Marketable Securities + Accounts Receivable 
* Working Capital = Current Assets - Current Liabilities 
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THE FINANCIAL PROFILE OF COMPANY H 
FINANCIAL RATIO VALUE 
n R9 
1. Current Assets to Current Liabilities .^。二 
n ^ 1 
2. Quick Assets# to Total Assets ^'^ 
3. Working Capital* to Total Shareholders' Equity -0'53 
4. Total Debt to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.50 
0 12 
5. Total Debt to Total Assets ^' 
0 1 QQ 
6. Net Sales to Cash 
7. Net Sales to Total Assets 0.61 
8. Net Sales to Total Shareholders' Equity 2.66 
9. Net Income to Total Assets 0.03 
QUESTION: 
1 Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate financial 
• profile will be in financial distress in the coming year. Please mchc^e your 
estimation by a number ranging from 0 (i.e., the firm absolutely will N O T be 
in financial distress in the coming year) to 100 (i.e., the firm absolutely will be 
in financial distress in the coming year), while 50 represents indifference. 
I 一 I 一 I 一 I 
# Quick Assets 二 Cash + Short-term Marketable Securities + Accounts Receivable 




THE FINANCIAL PROFILE OF COMPANY I 
FINANCIAL RATIO VALUE 
1. Current Assets to Current Liabilities ^.82 
2. Quick Assets# to Total Assets 0.05 
3. Working Capital* to Total Shareholders' Equity - O M 
4. Total Debt to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.00 
5. Total Debt to Total Assets 0.00 
6. Net Sales to Cash 166.16 
7. Net Sales to Total Assets 0.26 
8. Net Sales to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.31 
9. Net Income to Total Assets 〇• 13 
QUESTION: 
1. Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate financial 
profile will be in financial distress in the coming year. Please indicate your 
estimation by a number ranging from 0 (i.e., the firm absolutely will N O T be 
in financial distress in the coming year) to 100 (i.e., the frnn absolutely will be 
in financial distress in the coming year), while 50 represents indifference. 
I 一 I — I — I 
# Quick Assets 二 Cash + Short-term Marketable Securities + Accounts Receivable 
* Working Capital = Current Assets - Current Liabilities 
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THE FINANCIAL PROFILE OF COMPANY J 
FINANCIAL RATIO VALUE 
1. Current Assets to Current Liabilities 1 • 10 
2. Quick Assets# to Total Assets 0-44 
3. Working Capital* to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.12 
4. Total Debt to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.81 
5. Total Debt to Total Assets 0.38 
6. Net Sales to Cash ^*01 
7. Net Sales to Total Assets ^-^^ 
8. Net Sales to Total Shareholders' Equity 1.63 
9. Net Income to Total Assets _0.08 
QUESTION: 
1 Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate fmancial 
profile will be in financial distress in the coming year. Please indicate your 
estimation by a number ranging from 0 (i.e., the firm absolutely will N O T be 
in financial distress in the coming year) to 100 (i.e., the frnn absolutely will be 
in financial distress in the coming year), while 50 represents indifference. 
I 一 I 一 I 一 I 
# Quick Assets 二 Cash + Short-term Marketable Securities + Accounts Receivable 




(For Control Group Only) 
III. Estimating how likely a sample firm is among one of the financially 
distressed firms 
In this second round of the judgment exercise, the following additional information 
are given to you: 
The given ten (10) corporate financial profiles were in fact selected randomly from 
100 firms of which 30 firms have been in financial distress and 70 firms have not 
been in financial distress. 
Based on this additional information, for each corporate financial profile, please 
estimate how likely it is the firm is among one of the 30 financially distressed firms. 
To help you to answer the second question, you will be given back your estimation 
in the first round of how likely it is each firm will be in financial distress in the 
coming year on the basis of the firm's financial profile. 
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(For Experimental Group Only) 
III. Estimating how likely a sample firm is among one of the financially 
distressed firms 
In this second round of the judgment exercise, the following additional information 
are given to you: 
The given ten (10) corporate financial profiles were in fact selected randomly from 
a sample of 100 firms in an industry of which 30 firms have been in financial 
distress and 70 firms have not been in financial distress. This industry was regarded 
as risky in terms of very keen competition in that industry and highly fluctuating 
demands for its products. 
Based on this additional information, for each corporate financial profile, please 
estimate how likely it is the firm is among one of the 30 financially distressed firms. 
T o help you to answer the second question, you will be given back your estimation 
in the first round of how likely it is each firm will be in financial distress in the 
coming year on the basis of the firm's financial profile. 
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THE FINANCIAL PROFILE OF COMPANY A 
FINANCIAL RATIO VALUE 
1. Current Assets to Current Liabilities ^-^^ 
2. Quick Assets# to Total Assets 〇• 16 
3. Working Capital* to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.14 
4. Total Debt to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.16 
5. Total Debt to Total Assets 〇• 16 
6. Net Sales to Cash 0.05 
7. Net Sales to Total Assets 0.01 
8. Net Sales to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.01 
9. Net Income to Total Assets 0.:32 
QUESTION: 
1 Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate financial 
profile will be in financial distress in the coming year. Please indicate your 
estimation by a number ranging from 0 (i.e., the firm absolutely will N O T be 
in financial distress in the coming year) to 100 (i.e., the firm absolutely will be 
in financial distress in the coming year), while 50 represents indifference. 
I 一 I 一 I 一 I 
2 Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate financial 
profile is among one of the 30 financially distressed firms. Please indicate 
your estimation by a number ranging from 0 % (i.e., certainly the firm is 
N O T among one of the 30 financially distressed firms) to 100 % (certainly 
the firm is among one of the 30 financially distressed firms), while 50 % 
represents indifference. 
丨 一 I 一 I 一 I % 
# Quick Assets 二 Cash + Short-term Marketable Securities + Accounts Receivable 
* Working Capital = Current Assets - Current Liabilities 
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THE FINANCIAL PROFILE OF COMPANY B 
FINANCIAL RATIO VALUE 
1. Current Assets to Current Liabilities 2-35 
2. Quick Assets# to Total Assets ^-^^ 
3. Working Capital* to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.66 
4. Total Debt to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.82 
5. Total Debt to Total Assets ^-^^ 
6. Net Sales to Cash 356.11 
7. Net Sales to Total Assets 0.24 
8. Net Sales to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.56 
9. Net Income to Total Assets _0-94 
QUESTION: 
1 Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate financial 
profile will be in financial distress in the coming year. Please indicate your 
estimation by a number ranging from 0 (i.e., the firm absolutely will N O T be 
in financial distress in the coming year) to 100 (i.e., the frnn absolutely will be 
in financial distress in the coming year), while 50 represents indifference. 
I 一 I — I — I 
2 Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate financial 
profile is among one of the 30 financially distressed firms. Please indicate 
your estimation by a number ranging from 0 % (i.e., certainly the frnn is 
N O T among one of the 30 financially distressed firms) to 100 % (certainly 
the frnn is among one of the 30 financially distressed firms), while 50 % 
represents indifference. 
I — I 一 I 一 I % 
# Quick Assets 二 Cash + Short-term Marketable Securities + Accounts Receivable 




THE FINANCIAL PROFILE OF COMPANY C 
FINANCIAL RATIO VALUE 
1. Current Assets to Current Liabilities 2.52 
2. Quick Assets# to Total Assets ^-^ 1 
3. Working Capital* to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.56 
4. Total Debt to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.18 
5. Total Debt to Total Assets 0.12 
6. Net Sales to Cash ^'^^ 
1. Net Sales to Total Assets 0.17 
8. Net Sales to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.26 
9. Net Income to Total Assets 0.04 
QUESTION: 
1 Please estimate how likely it is the frnn with the given corporate financial 
profile will be in financial distress in the coming year. Please indicate your 
estimation by a number ranging from 0 (i.e., the firm absolutely will N O T be 
in financial distress in the coming year) to 100 (i.e., the firm absolutely will be 
in financial distress in the coming year), while 50 represents indifference. 
I 一 I 一 I — I 
2 Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate fmancial 
. profile is among one of the 30 financially distressed firms. Please indicate 
your estimation by a number ranging from 0 % (i.e., certainly the firm is 
N O T among one of the 30 financially distressed firms) to 100 % (certainly 
the firm is among one of the 30 financially distressed firms), while 50 % 
represents indifference. 
丨 一 I 一 I — I % 
# Quick： Assets 二 Cash + Short-term Marketable Securities + Accounts Receivable 
* Working Capital = Current Assets - Current Liabilities 
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THE FINANCIAL PROFILE OF COMPANY D 
FINANCIAL RATIO VALUE 
1. Current Assets to Current Liabilities 3.72 
2. Quick Assets# to Total Assets 0.13 
3. Working Capital* to Total Shareholders' Equity 023 
4. Total Debt to Total Shareholders' Equity ^.09 
5. Total Debt to Total Assets 0.08 
6. Net Sales to Cash ^'^^ 
7. Net Sales to Total Assets 0.60 
8. Net Sales to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.65 
9. Net Income to Total Assets _0.13 
QUESTION: 
1 Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate financial 
profile will be in financial distress in the coming year. Please indicate your 
estimation by a number ranging from 0 (i.e., the firm absolutely will N O T be 
in financial distress in the coming year) to 100 (i.e., the firm absolutely will be 
in financial distress in the coming year), while 50 represents indifference. 
I — I 一 I 一 I 
2 Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate financial 
. profile is among one of the 30 financially distressed firms. Please indicate 
your estimation by a number ranging from O % (i.e., certainly the firm is 
N O T among one of the 30 financially distressed firms) to 100 % (certainly 
the firm is among one of the 30 financially distressed firms), while 50 % 
represents indifference. 
I — I 一 I — 丨 ％ 
# Quick Assets 二 Cash + Short-term Marketable Securities + Accounts Receivable 
* Working Capital = Current Assets - Current Liabilities 
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THE FINANCIAL PROFILE OF COMPANY E 
FINANCIAL RATIO VALUE 
1. Current Assets to Current Liabilities 1.64 
2. Quick Assets# to Total Assets O.Z7 
3. Working Capital* to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.13 
4. Total Debt to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.15 
5. Total Debt to Total Assets 0.12 
6. Net Sales to Cash 0-31 
7. Net Sales to Total Assets 0.04 
8. Net Sales to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.05 
9. Net Income to Total Assets _0.07 
QUESTION: 
1 Please estimate how likely it is the fmn with the given corporate financial 
profile will be in financial distress in the coming year. Please mdicate your 
estimation by a number ranging from 0 (i.e., the firm absolutely will N O T be 
in financial distress in the coming year) to 100 (i.e., the firm absolutely will be 
in financial distress in the coming year), while 50 represents indifference. 
I 一 I 一 I 一 I 
2 Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate financial 
. profile is among one of the 30 financially distressed firms. Please indicate 
vour estimation by a number ranging from 0 % (i.e., certainly the firm is 
N O T among one of the 30 financially distressed firms) to 100 % (certainly 
the firm is among one of the 30 financially distressed firms), while 50 % 
represents indifference. 
I — 1 一 I 一 I % 
# Quick Assets 二 Cash + Short-term Marketable Securities + Accounts Receivable 
* Working Capital = Current Assets - Current Liabilities 
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THE FINANCIAL PROFILE OF COMPANY F 
FINANCIAL RATIO VALUE 
1. Current Assets to Current Liabilities 2.35 
2. Quick Assets# to Total Assets 0.17 
3. Working Capital* to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.11 
4. Total Debt to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.10 
5. Total Debt to Total Assets 0.09 
6. Net Sales to Cash 1'31 
7. Net Sales to Total Assets 0.12 
8. Net S ales to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.13 
9. Net Income to Total Assets -0.08 
QUESTION: 
1. Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate financial 
profile will be in financial distress in the coming year. Please indicate your 
estimation by a number ranging from 0 (i.e., the firm absolutely will N O T be 
in financial distress in the coming year) to 100 (i.e., the firm absolutely will be 
in financial distress in the coming year), while 50 represents indifference. 
I — I — I — I 
2. Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate financial 
profile is among one of the 30 financially distressed firms. Please indicate 
your estimation by a number ranging from 0 % (i.e., certainly the firm is 
N O T among one of the 30 financially distressed firms) to 100 % (certainly 
the firm is among one of the 30 financially distressed firms), while 50 % 
represents indifference. 
丨 — I — I — I % 
# Quick Assets = Cash + Short-term Marketable Securities + Accounts Receivable 
* Working Capital = Current Assets - Current Liabilities 
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THE FINANCIAL PROFILE OF COMPANY G 
FINANCIAL RATIO VALUE 
1. Current Assets to Current Liabilities 0.40 
2. Quick Assets# to Total Assets 0.04 
3. Working Capital* to Total Shareholders' Equity -0.47 
4. Total Debt to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.06 
5. Total Debt to Total Assets 0.03 
6. Net Sales to Cash 48.37 
7. Net Sales to Total Assets 0.28 
8. Net Sales to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.50 
9. Net Income to Total Assets -0.27 
QUESTION: 
1. Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate financial 
profile will be in financial distress in the coming year. Please indicate your 
estimation by a number ranging from 0 (i.e., the firm absolutely will N O T be 
in financial distress in the coming year) to 100 (i.e., the frnn absolutely will be 
in financial distress in the coming year), while 50 represents indifference. 
I I — I — I 
2. Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate financial 
profile is among one of the 30 financially distressed firms. Please indicate 
your estimation by a number ranging from 0 % (i.e., certainly the firm is 
N O T among one of the 30 financially distressed firms) to 100 % (certainly 
the firm is among one of the 30 financially distressed firms), while 50 % 
represents indifference. 
I 一 I — I — I % 
# (^uick Assets = Cash + Short-term Marketable Securities + Accounts Receivable 
* Working Capital 二 Current Assets - Current Liabilities 
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THE FINANCIAL PROFILE OF COMPANY H 
FINANCIAL RATIO VALUE 
1. Current Assets to Current Liabilities 0.82 
2. Quick Assets# to Total Assets 0.31 
3. Working Capital* to Total Shareholders' Equity -0.53 
4. Total Debt to Total Shareholders' Equity 0-50 
5 . T o t a l D e b t t o T o t a l A s s e t s 0 . 1 2 
6. Net Sales to Cash 21.99 
7. Net Sales to Total Assets 0.61 
8. Net Sales to Total Shareholders' Equity 2.66 
9. Net Income to Total Assets 0.03 
QUESTION: 
1. Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate financial 
profile will be in financial distress in the coming year. Please indicate your 
estimation by a number ranging from 0 (i.e., the firm absolutely will N O T be 
in financial distress in the coming year) to 100 (i.e., the firm absolutely will be 
in financial distress in the coming year), while 50 represents indifference. 
I — I — I — I 
\ 
2. Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate financial 
profile is among one of the 30 financially distressed firms. Please indicate 
your estimation by a number ranging from 0 % (i.e., certainly the firm is 
N O T among one of the 30 financially distressed firms) to 100 % (certainly 
the frnn is among one of the 30 financially distressed firms), while 50 % 
represents indifference. 
I 一 I — I — 丨 ％ 
# Quick Assets = Cash + Short-term Marketable Securities + Accounts Receivable 
* Working Capital 二 Current Assets - Current Liabilities 
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THE FINANCIAL PROFILE OF COMPANY G 
FINANCIAL RATIO VALUE 
1. Current Assets to Current Liabilities 0.82 
2. QuickAssets#toTotalAssets 0.05 
3. Working Capital* to Total Shareholders' Equity -0.04 
4. Total Debt to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.00 
5. Total Debt to Total Assets 0.00 
6. Net Sales to Cash 166.16 
7. Net Sales to Total Assets 0.26 
8. Net Sales to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.31 
9. Net Income to Total Assets 0.13 
QUESTION: 
1. Please estimate how likely it is the frnn with the given corporate financial 
profile will be in financial distress in the coming year. Please indicate your 
estimation by a number ranging from 0 (i.e., the firm absolutely will N O T be 
in financial distress in the coming year) to 100 (i.e., the firm absolutely will be 
in financial distress in the coming year), while 50 represents indifference. 
I — I — I — I 
2. Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate financial 
profile is among one of the 30 financially distressed firms. Please indicate 
your estimation by a number ranging from 0 % (i.e., certainly the firm is 
N O T among one of the 30 financially distressed firms) to 100 % (certainly 
the firm is among one of the 30 financially distressed firms), while 50 % 
represents indifference. 
丨 — I — I — I % 
# (^uick Assets = Cash + Short-term Marketable Securities + Accounts Receivable 
* Working Capital 二 Current Assets - Current Liabilities 
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THE FINANCIAL PROFILE OF COMPANY J 
FINANCIAL RATIO VALUE 
1. Current Assets to Current Liabilities 1.10 
2. Quick Assets# to Total Assets 0.44 
3. Working Capital* to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.12 
4. Total Debt to Total Shareholders' Equity 0.81 
5. Total Debt to Total Assets 0.38 
6. Net Sales to Cash 2.01 
7. Net Sales to Total Assets 0.76 
8. Net Sales to Total Shareholders' Equity 1.63 
9. Net Income to Total Assets -0.08 
QUESTION: 
1. Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate financial 
profile will be in financial distress in the coming year. Please indicate your 
estimation by a number ranging from 0 (i.e., the firm absolutely will N O T be 
in financial distress in the coming year) to 100 (i.e., the firm absolutely will be 
in financial distress in the coming year), while 50 represents indifference. 
I — I — I — I 
2. Please estimate how likely it is the firm with the given corporate financial 
profile is among one of the 30 financially distressed firms. Please indicate 
your estimation by a number ranging from 0 % (i.e., certainly the firm is 
N O T among one of the 30 financially distressed firms) to 100 % (certainly 
the firm is among one of the 30 financially distressed firms), while 50 % 
represents indifference. 
I — I — I 一 I % 
# Quick Assets = Cash + Short-term Marketable Securities + Accounts Receivable 
* Working Capital = Current Assets - Current Liabilities 
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IV. Information processing characteristics test: 
The following 18 questions are used to measure your information processing 
characteristics. Please indicate the degree of agreement or disagreement with each 
of the statements listed below, by circling a number between +3 and -3: +3 = 
"strongly agree", +2 = "moderately agree", +1 = "slightly agree", 0 = "neutral", -1 = 
"slightly disagree", -2 = "moderately disagree", -3 = "strongly disagree": 
1. I prefer complex to simple +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
problems. 一 neutral strongly 
2. I like to have the responsibility +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
of handling a situation that s_giy _rai sm>ngiy 
requires a lot of thinking. 
3. Thinking is nofunforme. +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
strongly neutral strongly 
4 I would rather do something +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
that requires little thought than strongiy n_ai s_giy 
something that is sure to 
challenge m y thinking abilities. 
5. I try to avoid situations where +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
there is likely chance I wiU s t r G _ neutrai s _ g i y 
have to think in depth about 
something. 
6. I find satisfaction in thinking +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
1 1 f. 1 i_ strongly neutral strongly 
hard for long hours. ^、 
7. I only think as hard as I have +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
strongly neutral strongly 
to. 
8 I prefer thinking about small, +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
daily projects to thinking about stro_ neutrai - _ 
long-term ones. 
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9. I like tasks that require little +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
thought once IVe leamed them str。ngly neutral Stmngly 
10.1 like to rely on thinking to +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
make m y jobs perfect. strongiy _ m i s _ g i y 
11.1 really enjoy a task that +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
involves coming up with new _ n g l y neutml strongly 
solutions to problems. 
12. Learning new ways to think +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
doesn't excite m e very much. s_giy _rai s_giy 
13.1 prefer m y life to be filled with +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
puzzles that I must solve. s _ g l y n_al s _ g l y 
14. The notion of thinking +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
abstractly is appealing to me. str_y neutmi s_giy 
15.1 prefer a task that is +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
intellectual, difficult, and strongly neutral stro_ 
important to one that is 
somewhat important but does 
not require much thought. 
16 I feel relief rather than +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
satisfaction after completing a stro_ n_ai _ g i y 
task that required a lot of 
mental effort. 
17 It's enough for m e that +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
• something gets the job done; I _ _ n_ai — 
don't care how or why it 
works. 
18 I usually stop thinking hard +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
.about issues when they do not str。_ neutrai — 
affect m e personally. 
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APPENDIXB: 







硏 究 問 卷 
I . 導言： 
多 謝 你 參 與 這 項 由 香 港 中 文 大 學 工 商 管 理 學 院 會 計 學 院 支 
持 的 硏 究 。 這 項 硏 究 的 主 要 目 的 在 於 探 討 銀 行 放 款 （ 信 貸 ) 從 
業 員 如 何 判 斷 一 間 公 司 會 否 遇 上 財 政 困 難 。 在 這 項 硏 究 中 ， 一 
間 有 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 乃 指 一 間 在 香 港 上 市 的 非 金 融 業 公 司 ’ 由 於 
財 政 出 現 問 題 而 被 香 港 証 券 交 易 所 停 牌 或 除 牌 。 
你 的 參 與 對 這 項 硏 究 十 分 重 要 。 在 完 成 這 項 硏 究 後 ， 你 
可 以 得 知 自 己 在 判 斷 一 間 公 司 會 否 遇 上 財 政 困 難 的 準 確 程 度 ° 
同 時 ， 你 對 了 解 香 港 銀 行 放 款 從 業 員 的 決 策 行 爲 也 作 出 了 供 
獻 。 如 果 你 有 興 趣 獲 得 這 項 硏 究 的 結 果 ， 請 在 以 下 指 定 的 位 
置內塡上”^”號： 
l___l 請 寄 給 我 一 份 硏 究 報 告 ° 
在 下 一 節 ， 我 們 將 會 詳 細 解 釋 和 進 行 這 份 問 卷 ° 
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n . 評 估 個 別 公 司 會 否 遇 上 財 政 困 難 的 可 能 性 ： 
在 這 份 問 卷 中 ， 我 們 抽 選 了 1 0 間 在 1 9 8 6 年 至 1 9 92 
年 期 間 在 香 港 上 市 的 非 金 融 業 公 司 作 硏 究 對 象 ° 這 些 公 司 包 括 
有 財 政 困 難 和 財 政 健 全 的 公 司 。 我 們 從 財 政 有 困 難 的 公 司 在 財 
政 出 現 困 難 之 前 一 年 的 年 報 中 撰 錄 其 財 務 資 料 。 而 財 政 健 全 的 
公 司 的 財 務 資 料 則 撰 錄 自 在 上 述 期 間 內 隨 機 取 選 的 年 報 。 這 些 
公 司 的 財 務 資 料 將 稍 後 以 隨 機 方 式 逐 間 提 供 給 你 評 估 ° 同 
時 ， 每 間 公 司 的 財 務 資 料 都 是 獨 立 的 ° 
同 時 ， 每 間 公 司 的 財 務 資 料 內 的 9 種 財 務 比 率 也 是 以 隨 機 
方 式 編 棑 ° 請 根 據 每 間 公 司 的 財 務 資 料 ， 估 計 該 公 司 會 在 未 來 
一 年 內 遇 到 財 政 困 難 的 可 能 性 ° 値 得 留 意 的 是 ， 在 評 估 一 間 公 
司 會 否 遇 上 財 政 困 難 時 ， 並 非 所 有 獲 提 供 的 財 務 比 率 均 有 用 ° 
你 可 根 據 自 己 的 需 要 而 選 取 有 用 的 比 率 。 每 頁 將 會 提 供 一 間 公 




1 .流動資產 /流動負債 5-76 
2.速動資產#/資產總額 0-16 
3.營運資金*/股東權益總額 0.14 
4 .借款總額 /股東權益總額 0.16 
5 .借款總額 /資產總額 0.16 
6 . 營 業 灘 總 額 / 現 金 0.05 
7.營業、斯直總額/資產總額 0 • 01 




能性。這個估計會是由 0 (即該公司肯定不會在未來一年內有財政困難） 







1 .流動資產 /流動負債 2.35 
2.速動資產# /資產總額 0.34 
3.營運資金* /股東權益總額 0.66 
4.借款總額/股東權益總額 0.82 
5 .借款總額 /資產總額 0.36 
6 .營業、 _總額 /現金 356.11 
7.營業、斯直總額/資產總額 0.24 




能性。這個估計會是由 0 (即該公司肯定不會在未來一年內有財政困難） 







1 .流動資產 /流動負債 2-52 
2.速動資產# /資產總額 0-51 
3.營運資金* /股東權益總額 0.56 
4 .借款總額 /股東權益總額 0-18 
5 .借款總額 /資產總額 0-12 
6.營業、斯直總額/現金 6.35 
7 .營業、 _總額 /資產總額 0.17 




能 性 。 這 個 估 計 會 是 由 0 (即該公司肯定不會在未來一年內有財政困難） 







1 .流動資產 /流動負債 3.72 
2.速動資產#/資產總額 0.13 
3.營運資金* /股東權益總額 0.23 
4.借款總額/股東權益總額 0.09 
5 .借款總額 /資產總額 0.08 
6 . 營 業 灘 總 額 / 現 金 7.29 





能性。這個估針會是由 0 (即該公司肯定不會在未來一年內有財政困難） 
至 1 0 0 (即該公司肯定會在未來一年內有財政困難）中的一個數値°而 
5 0則表示中立。 
#速動資產=現金+可轉讓短期投資+應收賬款 




1 .流動資產 /流動負債 1 • 64 
2.速動資產# /資產總額 0.27 
3.營運資金* /股東權益總額 0 • 13 
4 .借款總額 /股東權益總額 0.15 
5 .借款總額 /資產總額 0.12 
6 . 營 業 灘 總 額 / 現 金 0.31 
7. nmmmm /資產總額 o.o4 




能 性 。 這 個 估 計 會 是 由 0 (即該公司肯定不會在未來一年內有財政困難） 
至 1 0 0 (即該公司肯定會在未來一年內有財政困難）中的一個數値。而 






1 .流動資產 /流動負債 2.35 
2 .速動資產 # /資產總額 0-17 
3.營運資金“股東權益總額 0.11 
4 .借款總額 /股東權益總額 0.10 
5 .借款總額 /資產總額 0-09 
6 .營業消直總額 /現金 1-31 
7.營業、?對直總額/資產總額 0-12 




能性。這個估計會是由 0 (即該公司肯定不會在未來一年內有財政困難） 







1 .流動資產 /流動負債 0-40 
2.速動資產# /資產總額 0-04 
3.營運資金* /股東權益總額 -0.47 
4.借款總額/股東權益總額 0.06 
5 .借款總額 /資產總額 0-03 
6.營業、斯直總額/現金 48.37 





能性。這個估計會是由 0 (即該公司肯定不會在未來一年內有財政困難） 







1 .流動資產 /流動負債 0.82 
2.速動資產^^ /資產總額 0.31 
3.營運資金* /股東權益總額 -0.53 
4 .借款總額 /股東權益總額 0.50 
5 .借款總額 /資產總額 0-12 
6 . 營 業 灘 總 額 / 現 金 21.99 
7 .營業、 _總額 /資產總額 0.61 




能性。這個估計會是由 G (即該公司肯定不會在未來一年內有財政困難） 
至 1 0 0 (即該公司肯定會在未來一年內有財政困難）中的一個數値°而 
5 0 則 表 示 中 立 ° 
#速動資產=現金+可轉讓短期投資+應收賬款 




1 .流動資產 /流動負債 0-82 
2.速動資產# /資產總額 0-05 
3.營運資金* /股東權益總額 -0.04 
4.借款總額/股東權益總額 0.00 
5 .借款總額 /資產總額 0.00 
6 . 營 業 灘 總 額 / 現 金 166.16 
7.營業、?對直總額/資產總額 0.26 




能性。這個估計會是由 0 (即該公司肯定不會在未來一年內有財政困難） 







1 .流動資產 /流動負債 1-10 
2.速動資產# /資產總額 0-44 
3.營運資金* /股東權益總額 0 • 12 
4.借款總額/股東權益總額 0-81 
5 .借款總額 /資產總額 0-38 
6 .營業、 _總額 /現金 2.01 
7.營業、?對直總額/資產總額 0.76 




能性。這個估計會是由 0 (即該公司肯定不會在未來一年內有財政困難） 






I I I . 估 計 個 別 公 司 成 爲 其 中 一 間 有 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 之 機 會 率 ： 
在 這 第 二 部 份 的 問 卷 中 ， 我 們 會 進 一 步 提 供 以 下 的 資 料 給 
你： 
這 份 問 卷 所 提 供 的 1 0 間 公 司 的 財 務 資 料 其 實 是 隨 機 地 由 
1 0 0 間 公 司 中 抽 出 。 這 1 0 0 間 公 司 當 中 ， 包 括 3 0 間 出 現 
了 財 政 困 難 和 7 G 間 是 財 政 健 全 的 公 司 。 
請 根 據 每 間 公 司 的 財 務 資 料 和 上 述 附 加 資 料 ， 估 計 該 公 司 會 
是 這 3 0 間 出 現 了 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 一 間 的 機 會 率 。 爲 了 
幫 助 你 回 答 這 條 問 題 ， 我 們 會 發 還 你 在 第 一 部 份 根 據 每 間 公 





I I I . 估 計 個 別 公 司 成 爲 其 中 一 間 有 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 之 機 會 率 ： 
在 這 第 二 部 份 的 問 卷 中 ， 我 們 會 進 一 步 提 供 以 下 的 資 料 給 
你： 
這 份 問 卷 所 提 供 的 l G 間 公 司 的 財 務 資 料 其 實 是 隨 機 地 由 
同 一 個 行 業 內 的 1 0 0 間 公 司 中 抽 出 ° 這 1 0 0 間 公 司 中 ， ^ 
括 3 0 間 出 現 了 財 政 困 難 和 7 G 間 是 財 政 健 全 的 公 司 ° 該行 
業 被 公 認 爲 高 風 險 。 這 些 風 險 包 括 業 內 競 爭 激 烈 ， 和 市 場 對 業 
內 的 產 品 需 求 高 度 不 穩 定 。 
請 根 據 每 間 公 司 的 財 務 資 料 和 上 述 附 加 資 料 ， 估 計 該 公 司 會 
是 這 3 G 間 有 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 一 間 的 機 會 率 。 爲 了 幫 助 
你 回 答 這 條 問 題 ， 我 們 會 發 還 你 在 第 一 部 份 根 據 每 間 公 司 的 財 





1 .流動資產 /流動負債 5.76 
2.速動資產*» /資產總額 0.16 
3.營運資金“股東權益總額 0.14 
4.借款總額/股東權益總額 0.16 
5 .借款總額 /資產總額 0.16 
6 . 營 業 灘 總 額 / 現 金 0.05 
7 .營業、 _總額 /資產總額 0-01 




能性。這個估計會是由 0 (即該公司肯定不會在未來一年內有財政困難） 
至 1 0 0 (即該公司肯定會在未來一年內有財政困難）中的一個數値°而 
5 0則表示中立。 
2 . 請 根 據 每 間 公 司 財 務 資 料 ， 估 計 該 公 司 會 是 從 所 述 行 業 選 取 的 
1 0 0 間 公 司 內 的 3 0 間 有 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 一 間 0 ^ 機 會 率 ° 
請以 0 % 至 1 0 0 % 中的一個數値表示 .（ 0 % 表示該公司肯 
定 不 是 這 3 0 間 出 現 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 的 一 間 ； 1 0 0 % 表 
示 該 公 司 肯 定 是 這 3 0 間 出 現 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 的 一 間 ） 。 
而 5 0 % 則 表 示 中 立 。 






1 .流動資產 /流動負債 2-35 
2.速動資產# /資產總額 0-34 
3.營運資金* /股東權益總額 0.66 
4 .借款總額 /股東權益總額 0-82 
5 .借款總額 /資產總額 0-36 
6 .營業、 _總額 /現金 356.11 
7.營業、斯直總額/資產總額 0.24 




能性。這個估計會是由 0 (即該公司肯定不會在未來一年內有財政困難） 
至 1 0 0 (即該公司肯定會在未來一年內有財政困難）中的一個數値°而 
5 0則表示中立。 
2 . 請 根 據 每 間 公 司 財 務 資 料 ， 估 計 該 公 司 會 是 從 所 述 行 業 選 取 的 
1 0 0 間 公 司 內 的 3 0 間 有 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 一 間 的 機 會 率 。 
請以 0 % 至 1 0 0 % 中 的 一 個 數 値 表 示 （ G % 表示該公司肯 
定 不 是 這 3 G 間 出 現 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 的 一 間 ； l G G % 表 
示 該 公 司 肯 定 是 這 3 G 間 出 現 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 的 一 間 ） ° 
而 5 0 % 則 表 示 中 立 ° 






1 .流動資產 /流動負債 2-52 
2.速動資產# /資產總額 0.51 
3.營運資金* /股東權益總額 0-56 
4 .借款總額 /股東權益總額 0.18 
5 .借款總額 /資產總額 0.12 
6 .營業、 _總額 /現金 6.35 





能性。這個估計會是由 0 (即該公司肯定不會在未來一年內有財政困難） 
至 1 0 0 (即該公司肯定會在未來一年內有財政困難）中的一個數値。而 
5 0則表示中立。 
2 . 請 根 據 每 間 公 司 財 務 資 料 ， 估 計 該 公 司 會 是 從 所 述 行 業 選 取 的 
1 0 0 間 公 司 內 的 3 0 間 有 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 一 間 0 ^ 機 會 率 ° 
請 以 0 % 至 1 0 0 % 中 的 一 個 數 値 表 示 （ 0 % 表 示 該 公 司 肯 
定 不 是 這 3 0 間 出 現 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 的 一 間 ； l G G % 表 
示 該 公 司 肯 定 是 這 3 0 間 出 現 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 的 一 間 ） ° 
而 5 0 % 則 表 示 中 立 ° 






1 .流動資產 /流動負債 3_72 
2 .速動資產 # /資產總額 0-13 
3.營運資金* /股東權益總額 0.23 
4 .借款總額 /股東權益總額 0-09 
5 .借款總額 /資產總額 0-08 






能性。這個估計會是由 0 (即該公司肯定不會在未來一年內有財政困難） 
至 1 0 0 (即該公司肯定會在未來一年內有財政困難）中的一個數値。而 
5 0則表示中立。 
2 . 請 根 據 每 間 公 司 財 務 資 料 ， 估 計 該 公 司 會 是 從 所 述 行 業 選 取 的 
1 0 0 間 公 司 內 的 3 0 間 有 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 一 間 6 ^ 機 會 率 ° 
請以 0 % 至 1 0 0 % 中 的 一 個 數 値 表 示 （ G % 表示該公司肯 
定 不 是 這 3 0 間 出 現 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 的 一 間 ； l f l G % 表 
示 該 公 司 肯 定 是 這 3 0 間 出 現 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 的 一 間 ） ° 
而 5 0 % 則 表 示 中 立 ° 






1 .流動資產 /流動負債 1-64 
2.速動資產# /資產總額 0.27 
3.營運資金* /股東權益總額 0.13 
4 .借款總額 /股東權益總額 0.15 
5 .借款總額 /資產總額 0-12 
6 . 營 業 灘 總 額 / 現 金 0-31 
7 . 營 業 _ 總 額 / 資 產 總 額 0.04 




能性。這個估計會是由 0 (即該公司肯定不會在未來一年內有財政困難） 
至 1 0 0 (即該公司肯定會在未來一年內有財政困難）中的一個數値°而 
5 0則表示中立。 
2 . 請 根 據 每 間 公 司 財 務 資 料 ， 估 計 該 公 司 會 是 從 所 述 行 業 選 取 的 
1 0 0 間 公 司 內 的 3 0 間 有 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 一 間 的 機 會 率 。 
請以 0 % 至 1 0 0 % 中 的 一 個 數 値 表 示 （ G % 表示該公司肯 
定 不 是 這 3 0 間 出 現 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 的 一 間 ； l O G % 表 
示 該 公 司 肯 定 是 這 3 0 間 出 現 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 的 一 間 ） ° 
而 5 0 % 則 表 示 中 立 ° 






1 .流動資產 /流動負債 2.35 
2 .速動資產 # /資產總額 0.17 
3.營運資金“股東權益總額 0.11 
4 .借款總額 /股東權益總額 0.10 
5 .借款總額 /資產總額 0.09 
6 . 營 業 灘 總 額 / 現 金 1.31 





能性。這個估計會是由 0 (即該公司肯定不會在未來一年內有財政困難） 
至 1 0 0 (即該公司肯定會在未來一年內有財政困難）中的一個數値。而 
5 0則表示中立。 
2 . 請 根 據 每 間 公 司 財 務 資 料 ， 估 計 該 公 司 會 是 從 所 述 行 業 選 取 的 
1 0 0 間 公 司 內 的 3 0 間 有 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 一 間 0 ^ 機 會 率 ° 
請以 G % 至 1 0 0 % 中 的 一 個 數 値 表 示 （ G % 表 示 該 公 司 肯 
定 不 是 這 3 0 間 出 現 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 的 一 間 ； 1 0 0 % 表 
示 該 公 司 肯 定 是 這 3 0 間 出 現 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 的 一 間 ） ° 
而 5 0 % 則 表 示 中 立 。 








1 .流動資產 /流動負債 0.40 
2.速動資產# /資產總額 0.04 
3.營運資金* /股東權益總額 -0.47 
4 .借款總額 /股東權益總額 0.06 
5 .借款總額 /資產總額 0.03 
6 .營業、 _總額 /現金 48.37 
7 .營業、 _總額 /資產總額 0.28 




能 性 ° 這 個 估 計 會 是 由 0 (即該公司肯定不會在未來一年內有財政困難） 
至 1 0 0 (即該公司肯定會在未來一年內有財政困難）中的一個數値。而 
5 0則表示中立。 
2 . 請 根 據 每 間 公 司 財 務 資 料 ， 估 計 該 公 司 會 是 從 所 述 行 業 選 取 的 
1 0 0 間 公 司 內 的 3 0 間 有 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 一 間 的 機 會 率 。 
請以 0 % 至 1 0 0 % 中 的 一 個 數 値 表 示 （ 0 % 表 示 該 公 司 肯 
定 不 是 這 3 0 間 出 現 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 的 一 間 ； l G f l % 表 
示 該 公 司 肯 定 是 這 3 0 間 出 現 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 的 一 間 ） ° 
而 5 0 % 則 表 示 中 立 ° 






1 .流動資產 /流動負債 0-82 
2.速動資產！* /資產總額 0.31 
3.營運資金* /股東權益總額 -0.53 
4 .借款總額 /股東權益總額 0.50 
5 .借款總額 /資產總額 0-12 






能性。這個估計會是由 G (即該公司肯定不會在未來一年內有財政困難） 
至 1 0 0 (即該公司肯定會在未來一年內有財政困難）中的一個數値。而 
5 0則表示中立。 
2 . 請 根 據 每 間 公 司 財 務 資 料 ， 估 計 該 公 司 會 是 從 所 述 行 業 選 取 的 
1 0 0 間 公 司 內 的 3 0 間 有 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 一 間 6 ^ 機 會 率 ° 
請 以 0 % 至 1 0 0 % 中 的 一 個 數 値 表 示 （ 0 % 表 示 該 公 司 肯 
定 不 是 這 3 0 間 出 現 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 的 一 間 ； 1 G 0 % 表 
示 該 公 司 肯 定 是 這 3 0 間 出 現 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 的 一 間 ） ° 
而 5 0 % 則 表 示 中 立 。 






1 .流動資產 /流動負債 0-82 
2.速動資產# /資產總額 0-05 
3.營運資金* /股東權益總額 一 " 4 
4 .借款總額 /股東權益總額 0.00 
5 .借款總額 /資產總額 0-0fl 
6 . 營 業 灘 總 額 / 現 金 166.16 
7 . 營 業 灘 總 額 / 資 產 總 額 0.26 




能性。這個估許會是由 0 (即該公司肯定不會在未來一年內有財政困難） 
至 1 0 0 (即該公司肯定會在未來一年內有財政困難）中的一個數値。而 
5 0則表示中立。 
2 . 請 根 據 每 間 公 司 財 務 資 料 ， 估 計 該 公 司 會 是 從 所 述 行 業 選 取 的 
1 0 0 間 公 司 內 的 3 0 間 有 財 政 困 難 的 ， 司 當 中 一 間 的 機 會 率 。 
請 以 0 % 至 1 0 0 % 中 的 一 個 數 値 表 示 （ G % 表 示 該 公 司 肯 
定 不 是 這 3 0 間 出 現 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 的 一 間 ； 1 0 0 % 表 
示 該 公 司 肯 定 是 這 3 G 間 出 現 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 的 一 間 ） ° 
而 5 0 % 則 表 示 中 立 o 






1 .流動資產 /流動負債 1-10 
2.速動資產# /資產總額 0-44 
3 .營運資金“股東權益總額 0.12 
4 _借款總額 /股東權益總額 0.81 







能性。這個估計會是由 0 (即該公司肯定不會在未來一年內有財政困難） 
至 1 0 0 (即該公司肯定會在未來一年內有財政困難）中的一個數値°而 
5 0 則 表 示 中 立 ° 
2 請 根 據 每 間 公 司 財 務 資 料 ， 估 計 該 公 司 會 是 從 所 述 行 業 選 取 的 
1 0 0 間 公 司 內 的 3 0 間 有 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 一 間 的 機 會 率 。 
請 以 Q % 至 1 0 0 % 中 的 一 個 數 値 表 示 ( 0 % 表 示 該 公 司 肯 
定 不 是 這 3 0 間 出 現 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 的 一 間 ； l O G % 表 
示 該 公 司 肯 定 是 這 3 0 間 出 現 財 政 困 難 的 公 司 當 中 的 一 間 ） ° 
而 5 0 % 則 表 示 中 立 。 




V . 個 人 資 料 處 理 特 質 測 驗 ： 
以 下 1 8 條 問 題 是 用 作 測 度 你 的 資 料 處 理 特 質 。 請 根 據 
你 的 實 際 情 況 就 下 列 各 問 題 表 示 同 意 或 不 同 意 ^ ^ 程 度 。 請 使 用 
+ 3 至 - 3 間 的 一 個 數 値 來 表 示 。 + 3 者 表 示 一 極 之 同 意 ， + 2 
者 表 示 相 當 同 意 ， + 1 表 示 少 許 同 意 ， G 表 ^ 中 立 。 二 1 表 
示 少 許 不 同 意 ， - 2 表 示 相 當 不 同 意 ， - 3 表 示 極 之 不 同 意 ° 
1.我比較喜愛處理複雜問題多於 +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
ffi¥@® ° 極之同意 中立 極之不同意 
2.我喜歡負責處理需要多作思考 +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
自力工 ,。 極之同意 中立 極之不同思 
3.思考對我而言並非樂事。 +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 J 3 
極之同意 中立 極之不同思 
4.我寧願做些不大需要思考的事 +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 J 3 
多於做些挑戰自己思考能力的 極之同意 中立 極不同思 
事。 
5.我會試圖徊避一些可能會傷透 +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
腦 筋 的 情 況 。 極之同意 中 2 極之不同思 
6.對於長時間的深入思考，我會 +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
感 到 滿 足 。 .極之同意 中 1 極之不问思 
7.我只會在迫不得意時才會深入 +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
田 老 極之同意 中立 極之不问思 思考。 
8.我喜歡思考一些曰常瑣碎的 +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
事，多於喜歡思考一些長遠的 極之同意 中“ 極之不问思 
事。 
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9.我喜歡處理一些一旦熟習後就 +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
不 需 思 考 的 工 作 。 極之同意 . 中 立 極之不同思 
10.我喜歡倚賴思考來追求自己工 +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 :3 
/ 乍 達 到 完 美 。 極之同意 中立 極之不同思 
11.我喜愛能引發出解決難題新方 +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
& & 5 工 < , 。 極之同意 中立 極之不同思 
12.學會新的思考方法不會令我感 +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 ^ 
到 太 大 興 奮 。 極之同意 中立 極之不同思 
13.我寧願我的一生充滿必須要解 +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
決 的 疑 難 。 極之同意 中立 極之不同思 
14.我對抽象思考頗感興趣° +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
極之同意 中立 極之不同思 
15.我會選擇一項需要智慧，困難 +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
和重要的工作多過一項只是一 極之同意 中立 極之不同“ 
般重要但卻不需要太多思考的 
工作。 
16.當我完成一件需要深思熟慮的 +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 :3 
工作後，我會感到如釋重負而 極之同意 中立 極之不同“ 
非只是滿意。 
17.在我而言，肯§使一項工作完成 +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
已感滿足，再也不管之如何運 極之同意 . 中 " 極之不问思 
作或爲何它能運作° 
18.我通常避免思考一些與我無關 +3 +2 +1 ^0 -1 -2 J 3 
&9卩口1®。 極之同意 中且 極之不问思 
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A P P E N D I X C : 
S T E P W I S E L O G I T A N A L Y S I S R E S U L T S 
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Stepwise Logistic Analysis 
The LOGISTIC Procedure 
Response Variable: Type of Firm 
R e s p o n s e Levels： 2 
N u m b e r of Observations： 3 9 
Explanatory Variable： Financial Ratios 
Number of E x p l a n a t o r y Variables： 33 
Link Function: Logit 
Response Profile 
Ordered Type of Number of 
Value Firm Firms 
1 F i n a n c i a l l y Distressed. 13 
2 H e a l t h y 26 
T h e P o t e n t i a l E x p l a n a t o r y Variables： 33 F i n a n c i a l R a t i o s . 
c a s h / c u r r e n t liabilities current liabilities / total d e b t 
c a s h / total a s s e t s current liabilities / e q u i t y 
c a s h flows / c u r r e n t liabilities current liabilities / total a s s e t s 
c a s h flows / total debt quick assets / total a s s e t s 
c a s h flows / total liabilities q u i c k assets / sales . . 
c a s h flows / total assets q u i c k assets / c u r r e n t l i a b i l i t i e s 
c a s h flows / sales w o r k i n g capital / sales 
c u r r e n t assets / current liabilities w o r k i n g capital / e q u i t y 
current assets / total assets 
current assets / sales 
total debt / equity equity / total assets 
total debt / total assets fixed assets / total assets 
total liabilities / equity 
total liabilities / tangible assets 
sales / cash sales / w o r k i n g c a p i t a l 
sales / total assets 
o p e r a t i n g p r o f i t s / current l i a b . net income / sales 
e a r n i n g s b e f o r e tax / total assets net income / total a s s e t s 
n e t income / e q u i t y retained p r o f i t s / total a s s e t s 
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Stepwise Selection Procedure 
Step 0. Intercept entered: 
R e s i d u a l Chi-Square = 37.9732 w i t h 33 DF (p=0.2530) 
Step 1. Variable CA_CL (Current Assets to Current Liabilities) entered： 
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion^ Only Covariates Chi-Square for Covariates 
A I C 51.648 44.657 . 
SC 53.312 47.984 • 
_2 LOG L 49.648 40.657 8.991 w i t h 1 DF (p=0.0027) 
Score • • 5.319 w i t h 1 DF (p=0.0211) 
R e s i d u a l Chi-Square = 34.5180 w i t h 32 DF (p=0.3484) 
Step 2. V a r i a b l e S_CASH (Sales to Cash) e n t e r e d ： . 
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates Chi-Square for Covariates 
A I C 51.648 44.627 • 
SC 53.312 49.618 • 
_2 LOG L 49.648 38.627 11.021 w i t h 2 DF (p=0.0040) 
Score . . 5.894 w i t h 2 DF {p=0.0525) 
R e s i d u a l Chi-Square = 32.1793 w i t h 31 DF (p=0.4081) 
Step 3. Variable CL_DEBT (Current Liabilities to Total Debts) entered: 
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates Chi-Square for Covariates 
A I C 51.648 44.103 . 
SC 53.312 50.757 . 
o Tor L 49 648 36.103 13.545 w i t h 3 DF (p=0.0036) 
g 。 $ G I ^ 49-^^« 8.802.with 3 DF {p=0.0320) 
‘ Residual Chi-Square = 29.6860 w i t h 30 DF (p=0.4818) 
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s t e p 4 . V a r i a b l e D E B T _ E Q (Total D e b t s to E q u i t y ) entered： 
C r i t e r i a for A s s e s s i n g M o d e l F i t 
I n t e r c e p t 
I n t e r c e p t a n d 
C r i t e r i o n O n l y C o v a r i a t e s C h i - S q u a r e for C o v a r i a t e s 
A I C 5 1 . 6 4 8 4 3 . 3 4 4 . 
SC 53.312 51.662 . 
-2 L O G L 4 9 . 6 4 8 33.344 16.304 w i t h 4 DF (p=0.0026) 
S c o r e . • 1 0 . 8 9 4 w i t h 4 DF (p=0.0278) 
R e s i d u a l C h i - S q u a r e = 2 7 . 9 8 7 0 w i t h 29 DF (p=0.5186) 
S t e p 5 . V a r i a b l e S _ T A (Sales to T o t a l A s s e t s ) entered： 
C r i t e r i a for A s s e s s i n g M o d e l F i t 
I n t e r c e p t 
I n t e r c e p t a n d 
C r i t e r i o n O n l y C o v a r i a t e s C h i - S q u a r e for C o v a r i a t e s 
A I C 5 1 . 6 4 8 43.643 . 
SC 53.312 53.624 -
-2 L O G L 4 9 . 6 4 8 31.643 18.006 w i t h 5 DF (p=0.0029) 
S c o r e • • 12.289 w i t h 5 DF (p=0.0310) 
R e s i d u a l C h i - S q u a r e = 27.1609 w i t h 28 DF (p=0.5095) 
S t e p 6. V a r i a b l e E Q _ T A (Equity to T o t a l A s s e t s ) e n t e r e d : 
C r i t e r i a for A s s e s s i n g M o d e l F i t 
I n t e r c e p t 
I n t e r c e p t a n d 
C r i t e r i o n O n l y C o v a r i a t e s C h i - S q u a r e for C o v a r i a t e s 
A I C 51.648 43.615 . 
SC 53.312 55.260 . 
-2 L O G L 4 9 . 6 4 8 2 9 . 6 1 5 20.033 w i t h 6 DF (p=0.0027) 
S c o r e . . 14.393 w i t h 6 DF {p=0.0255) 
S t e p 7 . V a r i a b l e C L _ D E B T (Current L i a b i l i t i e s to T o t a l D e b t s ) is r e m o v e d : 
C r i t e r i a for A s s e s s i n g M o d e l F i t 
I n t e r c e p t 
I n t e r c e p t a n d 
C r i t e r i o n O n l y C o v a r i a t e s C h i - S q u a r e for C o v a r i a t e s 
A I C 51.648 4 3 . 3 2 1 . 
SC 53.312 53.302 • 
_9 T n � T 49 648 3 1 . 3 2 1 18.327 w i t h 5 DF {p=0.0026) 
s c o r e : . 1 1 . 5 7 0 w i t h 5 DF (p=0.0412) 
R e s i d u a l C h i - S q u a r e = 29.3360 w i t h 28 DF (p=0.3956) 
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step 8. V a r i a b l e S_EQ (Sales to E q u i t y ) entered： 
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates Chi-Square for Covariates 
A I C 5 1 . 6 4 8 4 4 . 1 8 4 . 
SC 53.312 55.829 • . 
_2 L O G L 4 9 . 6 4 8 30.184 19.464 w i t h 6 DF (p=0.0034) 
S c o r e . . 11.634 w i t h 6 DF (p=0.0707) 
R e s i d u a l C h i - S q u a r e = 2 7 . 2 1 8 7 w i t h 27 DF (p=0.4520) 
Step 9. Variable DEBT_TA (Total debts to Total Assets) entered: 
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit 
Intercept 
I n t e r c e p t a n d 
Criterion Only Covariates Chi-Square for Covariates 
A i c 5 1 . 6 4 8 3 7 . 7 8 1 • 
SC 53.312 51.090 . 
_2 L O G L 4 9 . 6 4 8 2 1 . 7 8 1 27.867 w i t h 7 DF (p=0.0002) 
S c o r e . . 11.737 w i t h 7 DF {p=0.1095) 
S t e p 1 0 . V a r i a b l e E Q _ T A (Equity to T o t a l A s s e t s ) is r e m o v e d : 
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates Chi-Square for Covariates 
A i C 5 1 . 6 4 8 35.923 • 
SC 53.312 4 7 . 5 6 8 • 
_2 L O G L 4 9 . 6 4 8 21.923 2 7 . 7 2 5 w i t h 6 DF (p=0.0001) 
s = o r e . . 1 1 . 3 1 6 w i t h 6 DF {p=0.0791) 
R e s i d u a l C h i - S q u a r e = 1 9 . 9 4 4 7 w i t h 27 DF (p:0.8331) 
S t e p 1 1 . V a r i a b l e W C _ E Q (Working C a p i t a l to E q u i t y ) entered： 
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates Chi-Square for Covariates 
Aic 51.648 33.796 . 
qc 53.312 47.104 • 
_2 L O G L 4 9 . 6 4 8 17.796 31.853 w i t h 7 DF (p=0.0001) 
Q ^ ^ . . 13.255 w i t h 7 DF (p=0.0661) 
R e s i d u a l C h i - S q u a r e = 19.7186 w i t h 26 DF (p=0.8047) 
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s t e p 1 2 . V a r i a b l e Q A _ T A (Quick A s s e t s to T o t a l A s s e t s ) entered： 
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates Chi-Square for Covariates 
A i c 5 1 . 6 4 8 32.277 . 
SC 53.312 47.249 • 
-2 L O G L 4 9 . 6 4 8 14.277 3 5 . 3 7 1 w i t h 8 DF (p=0.0001) 
S c o r e . . 13.766 w i t h 8 DF (p=0.0881) 
R e s i d u a l C h i - S q u a r e = 15.5569 w i t h 24 DF (p=0.9034) 
Step 13. Variable CF_TL (Cash Flows to Total Liabilities) entered： 
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit 
Intercept 
I n t e r c e p t a n d 
Criterion Only Covariates Chi-Square for Covariates 
A I C 5 1 . 6 4 8 20.000 . 
SC 53.312 36.636 . 
_2 L O G L 49 648 0.000 4 9 . 6 4 8 w i t h 9 DF (p=0.0001) 
S c o r e . . 14.093 w i t h 9 DF (p=0.1191) 
S t e p 1 4 . V a r i a b l e C F _ T L (Cash F l o w s to T o t a l L i a b i l i t i e s ) is removed： 
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
Criterion Only Covariates Chi-Square for Covariates 
A I C 5 1 . 6 4 8 32.277 . 
SC 53.312 4 7 . 2 4 9 • 
_2 L O G L 4 9 . 6 4 8 14.277 3 5 . 3 7 1 w i t h 8 DF {p=0.0001) 
S c o r e • . 13.766 w i t h 8 DF (p=0.0881) 
NOTE： Model building terminates because the last variable entered is 
r e m o v e d b y the W a l d s t a t i s t i c c r i t e r i o n . 
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Suranary of Stepwise Procedure 
Variable Number Score Wald Pr > 
Step Entered Removed In Chi-Square Chi-Square Chi-Square 
1 C A C L 1 5.3191 . 0-0211 
^ A S H 2 2.7220 . 0.0990 
3 CL_DEBT 3 1.7936 . ” 二 
4 DEBT_EQ 4 2.1910 • ^ ' ^ ^ 
. S TA 5 1.6751 . 0.1956 
6 E ^ T A 6 1.7975 . 0 ) 二 
7 CL_DEBT 5 . 0.5954 0.4403 
8 s_EQ 6 1.4930 . 0.2218 
9 DEBT TA 7 6.1894 • 0.0129 
10 EQ TA 6 • 0.1483 0.7002 
i? WC_EQ - 7 3.5115 . 0 二 
” OA TA 8 2.9355 . 0.0867 
13 CF'TL 9 11.7754 . 0.0006 
14 — CF_TL 8 . 0.00205 0.9639 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Parameter Standard Wald Pr > Standardized Odds 
Variable DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square Estimate Ratio 
INTERCPT 1 3.2774 2.7431 1.4274 0.2322 • 26.506 
C A c l 1 -5.8875 3.7196 2.5053 0.1135 "5.462574 0.003 
O A T A 1 15 1691 10.3128 2.1635 0.1413 1.428709 999.000 
W ^ E Q 1 -4.4380 2.3804 3.4761 0.0623 "1-639507 0.012 
n p i T E O 1 -19 0308 9.2494 4.2334 0.0396 -13.768492 0.000 
二 - S i 711211 3:.7720 4.1843 0.0408 12.092454 999.000 
r c A S H 1 0.0388 0.0284 1.8615 0.1725 2.728692 1.040 
S T ^ 1 -35.4285 17.8734 3.9291 0.0475 -10.347333 0.000 
S^EQ 1 6.3031 3.1038 4.1240 0.0423 8.759359 546.257 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
Concordant : 93.8% Somers, D = 0.917 
Discordant = 2.1% Gamma = 0.957 
Tied = 4.1% Tau_a = 0.418 
(338 pairs) c = 0.959 
Classification Table 
Correct Incorrect Percentages 
Prob Non- Non- Sensi- Speci- False False 
Level Event Event Event Event Correct tivity^ ficity POS NEG^ 
o"e70 r 22 4 6 74.4 53.8 84.6 36.4 21.4 
339 
1 A I C is Akaike I n f o r m a t i o n Criterion, SC is Schwartz Criterion, -2 LOG L is -2 L o g 
Likelihood statistic, and Score is score statistics. 
2 Sensitivity is the proportion of firms in financial distress that are correctly 
p r e d i c t e d to be financial d i s t r e s s . 
3 Specificity is the proportion of healthy firms that are correctly predicted to be 
non-healthy. 
4 The false p o s i t i v e rate is the p r o p o r t i o n of firms in financial d i s t r e s s r e s p o n s e s 
that are i n c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c t e d to b e h e a l t h y . 
5 T h e false n e g a t i v e rate is the p r o p o r t i o n of h e a l t h y that are i n c o r r e c t l y 
p r e d i c t e d to b e financial d i s t r e s s . 
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